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ABSTRACT 
'Barriers to change & integration in foreign M&As within East Germany: 
a qualitative study' 
Many domestic take-overs and mergers are not successful, over half fail. Cross- 
border M&As are even more fraught with problems due to differing national cultures 
exasperating different organisational cultures. International M&As in rapidly 
transforming East Germany offer attractive possibilities for research as change in the 
firm, and resistance to it, takes place against a backdrop of external, revolutionary 
societal change as well as internal, national and organisational clashes. 
The research followed a grounded theory, qualitative methods approach embedded in 
the overarching strategic management theoretical framework of the Resource Based 
View of the Firm. Through a series of case interviews with East German managers 
and employees in six foreign acquired M&As split off from old combines, together 
with employees released after take-over, the type of acculturation and perceived level 
of integration was examined. A model was developed to measure post acquisition 
integration problems signalled by acculturative stress. By highlighting using two of 
the case studies as a contrast, acculturative stress was seen to make a significant 
contribution to causes of failure. On the other hand, further development of the 
model showed successful integration as having implications as a stepping stone to 
two-way learning and onwards to long term success. 
The research's claims to contribution can be synthesised down to three areas. 
Firstly, the importance of the group in East Germany has been overlooked and its 
continued existence in the face of pressures for more individualisation has important 
implications for motivation, incentives, change and learning. Secondly, the choice of 
top managers and their relationship to the firm (co-ownership or not) is crucial in 
reducing acculturative stress and achieving integration and two-way learning. 
Finally, the acquired human resources, due to their knowledge, knowledge potential 
through unlearning, shared experiences and language are a potential route to 
competitive advantage. The areas of contribution form the basis for speculation and 
future research. 
X11 
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Barriers to Change and Integration in Foreign M&As within East 
Germany: 
A Qualitative Study 
Executive Summary 
Context 
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a period of massive economic and social change 
in Central and Eastern Europe and in East Germany in particular. The period since 
unification has witnessed the start of what will be a long economic catch-up race for 
East Germans. At unification, GDP per capita was estimated at approximately 30% of 
West Germany's, a figure set to rise to 55.1% in 1997. The comparative poverty of East 
Germany viz. a viz. West Germany caused difficulties in unification for both social 
psychological and economic reasons. Now as then differences in wealth serve to 
reinforce East German feelings of separateness and being regarded as "problem" 
relations, who are unwelcome as they are constantly demanding resources. 
Economically East Germany and many East Germans feel powerless in comparison to 
West Germans in particular and other advanced economies in general. However the 
overriding contextual impression for anyone visiting East Germany in the late 1990s is 
the fear of actual and potential unemployment. The currency swap at a 1: 1 ratio, the 
disappearance of COMECON export markets, poor infrastructure, the appearance of 
western competition and the exposure of chronic overmanning have led to every sixth 
East German being unemployed. 
Theoretical Context 
- 
There is a body of opinion (Spender, 1992) which opines that the 
theory being applied to Eastern European transformation is Western based and irrelevant 
to the conditions of the metamorphosing economies. The usual argument in support of 
this opinion is that the cultures are different. Although this research found areas where 
western theory was applied without much thought to East German acquisitions, e. g. the 
extensive use of individual incentive schemes without taking cognisance of the role of 
groups, this thesis is rooted in Western schools of thought. 
The over-arching theory comes from strategic management in general and the resource 
based view of the firm in particular, (Penrose, 1959). The thrust of the argument is that 
managers in the new M&As were not helpless hostages to the violent external 
environment but could control their destiny, (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994). One 
particular mechanism available to Eastern enterprises was the mechanism of being taken 
over by a non-German firm. The hope was that the foreign new parent would provide 
financial, knowledge and other resources to allow the organisation to revitalise. 
The argument in favour of mergers being an effective mechanism is not self evident. 
First there is a strong scepticism, especially in the economics literature, that mergers 
often fail to add value, especially where the two firms are not in the same market. The 
scepticism is further reinforced in the case of foreign take-overs by the work of Hofstede 
(1980 & 1991), who noted that strong hurdles will be present when firms from two 
different national cultures try to combine. 
There is further scepticism on the benefit of any attempt to renew existing enterprises, in 
the face of such large upheaval. The population ecology school of thought suggests that 
organisations are very poor at adapting to big environmental shocks, and that death is 
the usual outcome, e. g. (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Moreover they often assert that 
death is less costly and wasteful than the alternatives. 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, (1991) and others strongly contest the view that take-overs will 
necessarily'fail. They argue that both pre-acquisition and post-acquisition actions can 
combine to make success. They point to managing the pre-acquisition process, and even 
more importantly taking actions such as the use of teams to improve integration in the 
post acquisition period. 
In addition the work of (e. g. Miller & Friesen, 1980; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; 
Strebel, 1994) provide models for suggesting that organisations can respond to violent 
shocks and survive. Strebel, (1994) suggests paths for renewal in his work. 
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The existence of these debates makes it quite clear that a study of the integration process 
of East German firms which have been taken over by non-German organisations is a 
highly relevant search site. Because of institutional history and knowledge we know 
that all the foreign take-overs of East German firms were engineered by the THA, and 
that this organisation has as a subsidiary objective that the foreign organisations not only 
transfer financial resources but also knowledge and other kinds of intellectual capital. 
Moreover, the THA was able to impose regulations and controls which permitted them 
to observe whether the firms were following these objectives. Our sample firms are 
therefore highly appropriate to investigating the relevance of foreign mergers to the 
process of rejuvenation. In the light of the general debates, the researcher set out to 
answer the following three questions: 
" First, what were the key hindrances to effective integration and learning in the 
mergers? 
" Second, in line with the suggestion of (e. g. Strebel, 1994; Haspelaugh & Jemison, 
1991 and others), what were the strategic actions which eased the take-over process? 
In this respect, the focus is on two particular kinds of actions. The use of co- 
ownership as an incentive mechanism, and the role of group behaviour. It is argued 
that group behaviour (to supplement individualism) will be a key to success. Not 
only are groups seen as vital in the resource based view of the firm but they are also 
a key element of the culture and history of East Germany. 
Third, what implications do the findings have on the learning view of organisational 
success, which is currently so popular? 
Data Sources and Collection 
Six mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by foreign companies in East Germany were 
researched as cases using 36 in-depth interviews with staff at various levels in the firms. 
The case interviews were expanded by using two of the M&As as contrasting cases and 
including 12 interviews with former combine employees who had lost their jobs. 
Summarised below in Table 1 are details about the M&As visited and the methods of 
collecting data (Table 2) 
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Table I 
Summary of Data Sources 
" Company A-a large utilities operation, with approximately 2,100 employees. Situated in Saxony and 
Sachsen-Anhalt. Individual Interview with American MD 
" Company B-a manufacturer of heavy electrical supply equipment, with approximately 
400 employees. Situated in Berlin-Ost. 7 individual interviews 
" Company C- in planning and plant assembly within the chemical and water sector, with approximately 
50 employees. Situated in Sachsen-Anhalt. 10 individual interviews. 
" Company D- in planning and plant assembly within the chemical and water sector, with approximately 
240 employees. Situated in Saxony. 8 individual interviews followed by a more detailed case study. 
" Company E-a research provider in the agricultural industry, with approximately 20 employees. 
Based in Northern West Germany with only sales and contract production in East Germany. 3 
individual interviews as the pilot study but included in data base. 
" Company F-a research provider and also producer of speciality chemicals, with approximately 100 
employees. Situated in Saxony. 1 individual interview with American President, plus group interview 
with 6 employees. Followed up by a more detailed case study. 
Table 2 
Summary of Data Collection Techniques 
Six cases were constructed using in-depth, unstructured interviews with a total of 48 people. 42 in 
individual interviews, 6 in a group interview. The total includes 12 interviews with unemployed people. 
There were 29 interviews in 5 of the 6 firms, and a group interview with employees of the sixth (Company 
F) plus an individual interview with the firm's president. 
Two case studies were upgraded and used as contrasting cases (companies D& F). 
The M&As were chosen because they covered a full range of businesses from highly 
specialist genetic engineering and chemical production through engineering services to 
more mundane extraction and utilities. Foreign M&As were chosen for two reasons. In 
East Germany although foreign M&As were small in number from all privatisations 
(5.9%), they tended to be large in sales (15%) and therefore in importance. Secondly, 
the instantaneous exposure to modem Western management methods can be regarded as 
creating a productive laboratory to observe the working of radical change and resistance 
to it. 
Analysis & Results 
The findings 'distil down to two basic areas of interest which are inter-linked but 
separate. Additionally, the findings are counter-intuitive as the barriers to change 
mentioned in the title turn out to form important, potential core capabilities which, when 
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properly managed, could well produce sustainable competitive advantage. Both of the 
basic areas of interest are therefore accompanied here by sections on the implication for 
management. 
Acculturation and the source of stress 
The intermingling of two cultures is called acculturation, a term borrowed from 
anthropology. When two firms combine, two cultures do so as well. These cultures can 
be either national, organisational or in the case of this study both. During the 
intermingling process of acculturation, internal stress is produced. Acculturative stress 
being not just the difference between 'what was' before the M&A and 'what is' 
afterwards. It occurs when expectations of some proper state of affairs as to 'what ought 
to be' are not fulfilled, (David, 1977). There is a clear link from M&A theory, (Jemison 
& Sitkin 1986), who posited that the process of negotiating an M&A affects the post 
deal operational fit to expectational differences. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) note that 
expectational ambiguity, a concept necessary to achieve a speedy end to negotiations, 
can cause post acquisition stress between former work identity and expected, as well as 
actual, new work roles. Acculturative stress need not be a negative factor, as is well 
known some sort of stress is necessary for life in general and commercial development 
in particular. So the triangle of forces at work depend upon expectations not necessarily 
on the reality, a cogent reason for adopting an interpretative paradigm and qualitative 
research philosophy. Interviews in this research showed again and again that the East 
German expectations of what western firms could offer in the way of new machinery, 
equipment, training, technology etc., were utopian, a consequence of forced separation 
and ignorance. From the other perspective, new western owners awaited levels of self- 
initiative and responsibility which were not present. In a nut shell, both acquirers and 
acquired had different expectations, i. e. some acculturative stress was pre-programmed. 
In addition to the difference in expectations between acquirer and acquired, the other 
constituents of acculturative stress were found to be: psychic distance (roughly 
equivalent to national cultural differences), the number of new managers from outside 
acquired firm and the mode of combination (co-ownership merger or outright 
acquisition). A fifth factor, time since acquisition, was similar in all the cases and 
although it affects stress, it did not influence the outcomes in this research. These five 
factors are operationalised into a model (Figure 5-7 in the thesis), which measures 
acculturative stress. The model flows from the organisational cultures of the two 
combining firms, adds in measures of the five acculturative stress determinants to form 
typologies of acculturation. Given these typologies, either congruence (low stress) or 
non-congruence (high stress) or some intermediary stress level occurs. 
Table 3 summarises the variables of acculturative stress in each of the researched 
M&As. 
Table 3 
Acculturative Stress: 
Findings Concerning Components and Intensity 
Source Co-owner- 
ship or not 
New External 
Managers 
Psychic 
Distance 
Varying Ex- 
pectations 
Differences 
Intensity of 
Acculturative 
Stress 
Company A Non- Co- CEO only US, rest High, Large Medium (US) Ownership East German 
Company B Non- Co- Very small number High, Not too large Medium-High (GB) Ownership of West/East mgrs 
Company C Co- One Swede. Now High, Low Low 
Sweden ownership only East Germans 
Company D Co- One British rest High, Low Low 
(GB) ownership East German 
Company E Non- Co- Top managers Medium Medium Medium-High 
(GB) Ownership West German 
Company F Co- Top managers Medium, Large High 
(US) ownership from US or WG 
I via the THA 
The factors affecting acculturative stress are mainly within the control of the firm. If we 
take just one example, new external managers, we can see that the contrast between the 
American managers in Company F (the unsuccessful M&A) and the Swedes in 
Company C or the British bilingual Marketing Director in Company D was stark. The 
lack of any attempt to learn the host language by certain foreign managers sent very 
strong negative signals to the employees in East Germany. There is support from the 
6 
literature that the knowledge of the partner's language and a sensitivity towards cultural 
issues seems to be crucial, though undervalued factors for successful learning processes 
on both sides, (Villinger, 1996). A link was observed in Swedish Company C between 
what Hofstede (1991) misleadingly terms feminine aspects of managerial behaviour and 
the success of the foreign organisation in achieving low acculturative stress. 
Does acculturative stress run on to cause success or failure? The answer to this question 
seems to be maybe, but not necessarily. The model measuring acculturative stress is 
extended further (Figure 5-8) to incorporate factors other than stress which may cause 
success or failure. These other factors are both external to the firm, (its business 
environment) and internal, (two-way learning). The business environment is relatively 
easy to factor into the model. However the five factors affecting two-way learning were 
isolated but only subjectively measured. Hence the results for two-way learning shown 
in the final column of Table 4 can only be described as having implicational relevance. 
Indeed the end result, success or failure, is dependent on time, so the extended model 
Figure 5-8 addresses long and short term success/failure. Firms having high levels of 
two-way learning are implied as being best equipped for long term success. 
Low acculturative stress helps integration and acceptance of long term goals. 
Coincidentally low acculturative stress does not necessarily hinder in the short term. 
Most mergers with low acculturative stress had survived just as well, if not better, than 
their competitors the rigours of the post reunion marketplace. However they were 
exhibiting greater employee involvement and integration, which was showing itself in 
an accelerating acceptance of commercial thinking necessary for survival and expansion 
in a market economy. Company D, which is described in a case, is a prime example. 
Workers were constantly in and out of each others office and also that of the imported 
managers, the whole process of two-way learning was definitely in full swing. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Success, Integration and Learning in Researched M&As 
Source Assessment of present Domination of western Degree of two-way 
success1 company culture learning 
Company AI Quasi-monopoly position 
(US) gives current success 
Half and half 
, 
Medium amount 
Company BI Not too successful, dire 
(GB) market conditions. 
Company C Relatively successful 
Sweden Market conditions 
deteriorating 
Company D Relatively successful in (GB) increasingly malevolent 
market 
Company E Environmental jolt from 
(GB) BSE crisis meant very 
difficult market conditions 
and little success 
Company F Although the market (USA) conditions are not too bad, 
the M&A has been 
terminated 
Medium-High level of 
opposition 
Excellent acceptance 
of multicultural ism on 
both sides 
Excellent acceptance 
of multiculturalism on 
both sides 
Half and half 
Western culture 
rejected 
Medium amount 
High 
High 
Medium amount 
Low 
Co-ownership ameliorates stress and improves integration. 
Co-ownership existed in three cases and appears to have a positive effect. Co-ownership 
is a merger where some stock and voting rights stay with the acquired firm. The top 
East German managers in the successful M&A case firm (Company D) were offered at 
the start of the merger process the possibility of obtaining 25% of the stock. Although 
difficult for them to raise the money in the underdeveloped banking sector, they were 
successful in obtaining a loan. The motivational effects of having a very direct interest 
in the future policy of the firm were regarded by all as very high. Likewise in Firm C, 
. 
the former boss of the original section in the combine, sought out the foreign, Swedish, 
partner and was offered the top job and a stake in the enterprise. The difference 
between firms A&B outright acquisitions (no co-ownership) and mergers with East 
German management involvement, firms C&D, is great. The positive motivational 
1 Success is viewed as whether the firm is still in business and also producing some returns, i. e. an 
universalist view not comparison with other East German firms. 
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impulse was obvious from interviews with the Eastern managers in possession of stock 
and even staff without stock options. 
Managing the group reduces stress and improves integration. 
Past research has revealed intriguing national differences between individual-group 
tensions and uncertainty avoidance preferences in the USA and GB (the acquirers) and 
East Germany (the acquired). Even West Germany, which in the absence of direct East 
German figures can be tentatively used as a surrogate, showed differences here, 
(Hofstede, 1991). Some of the new managers especially in the less successful M&As 
thought that the vestiges of the old group culture in the firm hindered the process of 
change, e. g. by facilitating hiding in the group from responsibility or initiative. Actually 
it was found that this construct (the group) was so deeply ingrained into East German 
collective work force consciousness that attempts to eradicate it were meeting fierce 
resistance. Not only that, in some of the more successful organisations visited, the 
remains of the group were being used as an ideal launching pad for integrating new 
ideas and thinking into the work force, e. g. companies C&D. Whereas in less successful 
companies, the group remnants were either not co-opted and were acting as a brake on 
change, e. g. Company F, or were so splintered as to be no longer functional, e. g. 
Company B. However even the successful firms were racing against time as a clear 
relationship between the high unemployment reported in the context section and the 
breakdown of trust and functioning groups was reported by many of the interviewees. 
In most of the six firm's investigated managers were most proud to emphasise how they 
were implementing certain forms of person based incentive schemes. There seems no 
critical assessment of whether this imported idea is necessary or not. There are certain 
jobs where such schemes can be positively counterproductive. Whole teams were 
disbanded or dissected because what they were working on no longer made economic 
sense, e. g. Company F's R&D. These teams had afunctioning system of trust and 
networks which disappeared along with the team. Shift workers in Firm B complained 
about the increasing backlog of routine maintenance on the 24 hours in usage machines. 
Previously each shift had spent some of the eight hours ensuring correct settings, 
greasing and other routine maintenance was performed. With the move to piece rate 
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payments, the machines were often handed over in such a state that the following team 
had to stop production. 
Two-way Learning as a way forward 
What can we learn from the research? The research observations relevant to the 
extended model (Figure 5-8) are indicative rather than definitive. The subjective 
observations do seem to support the often argued link between low acculturative stress 
and the ability of new M&As to become learning organisations. Investment in replacing 
moribund East German plant and machinery by introducing modem IT took place in all 
the M&As investigated. It was not controversial and was accepted as an obvious, 
necessary part of expansion. However when it came to investment in human resources, 
the obvious link between investment and return seemed to be more difficult to grasp. 
The research posits that the creation of a trusting, accepting climate within a M&A, i. e. 
good acculturation, is the building block of a learning organisation and future success. 
Foreign take-overs bring resources which provide slack. There is a body of literature 
typified by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) supporting the view that some slack is important 
for maintaining routines which incorporate organisational knowledge. It is theorised 
further from this literature that the motivational impetus gained from entrusting at least 
some teams, with new projects which fitted the company's changed goals would be 
rewarding. The motivation would come from having an established group as the change 
agent, supporting the new management. Integration of new practices and strategies 
would be assured, naturally at a price. The price is that the labour costs would remain 
high longer than under a system of rigorous employee pruning. 
To be successful over the long term companies need some defensible advantage over 
their competitors. Organisational capabilities provide such an advantage being 
essentially knowledge based and the central element in the creation of Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Organisational capabilities are, 
unlike resources, based on developing, carrying and exchanging information through the 
firm's human capital. The most important capabilities are core capabilities: a set of 
differential skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide the basis for a firm's 
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competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular business, (Teece et al, 
1990). The development of a core capability is a difficult task which requires the 
creation of new and novel combinations of a firm's resources and capabilities. It may 
take five, ten, or more years to build a world leadership in a core competence area, 
consistency of effort is the key, meaning a long term view must be taken, (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994). 
In thinking about the challenge, it seems that management has certain options to store 
and integrate knowledge a task critical to core competencies. Routines are one of these 
options, (Nelson &Winter, 1982). It is argued that those routines which have been 
preserved from the past in the successful mergers which were reviewed (firms C&D) 
were accepted and internalised by the work force and as such were excellent vehicles for 
knowledge storage and integration. The routines and direction imposed by the buyer in 
the acquisitions (firms A&B) and unsuccessful merger (firm F) reviewed were not so 
accepted and internalised. The difference is one of agreement/non-agreement with the 
goals and directives which, according to the learning literature, will show up differing 
potentials for learning and later in business performance. 
The opposite to core capabilities are core rigidity. They are sets of knowledge which 
have been valuable sources of competitive advantage in the past but are now 
inappropriate to the future competitive game, (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Over time 
capabilities which have heralded success in the past may no longer offer the route to 
future success. As the firm seeks to create new capabilities which can produce improved 
products and services the old capabilities can hamper the effort to develop new ones. 
Core rigidities gradually pervaded the majority of East German industry, thus widening 
the competitive gap between them and the wider market driven world. 
The idea that unlearning, (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995), is a critical element in modernising 
an organisation by overcoming core rigidities is viewed in the West as an interesting, yet 
slightly irrelevant academic point. In Eastern Europe however it is more than relevant 
because the unlearning is taking place on at least two levels. People are coming to terms 
with the reality that state planning has failed and is being replaced by the market. In 
addition to the society level unlearning, the cosy world of the socialistic, monopolistic, 
vertically integrated firms is falling apart. Adherence to rules from above is no longer 
regarded as laudable. Customer needs, a formerly irrelevant sideline, are now 
important. The East German worker is therefore being forced to unlearn many aspects 
of working life which were taken for granted up till now. The unlearning has taken 
place, that means a great potential for learning new capabilities and routines is on tap. 
There are several promising areas for future research: 
Original Model 
- 
Refinement of the measurements of the five factors influencing 
acculturative stress. Development of a less subjective measure of the outlook for the 
acquired/acquiring firms. 
Extended Model 
- 
Attempt to measure strengths and weaknesses of the five forces in the 
extended model (Figure 5-8) which are presented as making up two-way learning. 
Time 
- 
Longitudinal follow on studies to check out the predictions of success. 
Design 
- 
Quantitative studies which can be generalised to industry sectors or all the East 
German economy. 
Place 
- 
Predictions of the positive effects of unlearning could be checked by running 
research in East Germany (in those firms where it is present) and abroad. 
Theory 
- 
New theory about foreign expansion into reforming ex-communist societies 
can be tested out using both the original and the extended models in other settings. 
Cross-cultural comparisons 
- 
Mixed team research comparing East Germany with West 
Germany, CEE countries and other countries. 
Intra German comparisons 
- 
To check out where and what remains from the socialist 
era. An example could be the observed reluctance of East Germans to give up their 
group based heritage. 
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Chapter 1 
Context and Challenge of German Reunification 
1. Introduction 
Events were certainly happening fast in Berlin in the Autumn of 1989. An ugly concrete 
wall was breached and became valuable overnight as bits were sold off as souvenirs. 
The people of East Berlin streamed through the wall and were met with such joy by their 
western neighbours. Strangers embraced, impromptu parties took place. Eight years on, 
the euphoria is gone, together with the wall. The embracing East and West Berliners 
view each other with sullen contempt. The above scenario is the backdrop against which 
this research took place. 
The research will look in later chapters at the situation of what happened in a small 
number of atypical East German mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Atypical because 
they were acquired by foreign, mainly British or American, MNCs. Qualitative research 
methods will be used to tease out an understanding of the process leading to the success 
or failure of integration of East Germans into the new, efficiency driven organisations, 
either as individuals or as group members. The situation is new; the pattern of 
resistance to or acceptance of change which emerged, may or may not be new. ' Indeed 
Isabella, (1990: 34) points out that resistance to change might alternatively be viewed, 
not as obstacles to overcome, but as inherent elements of the cognitive transition 
occurring during change. At the macro level a take-over of East Germany by the West 
was being experienced, what happened inside the pressure cooker of individual firms 
which likewise were being taken over? 
The answer to this question is addressed by the field data but it also depends upon the 
overall approach adopted. The research topic falls within several academic fields, each 
having a valid argument for being considered "the" accepted approach or slant. The 
fields are strategic management, organisational behaviour, mergers and acquisitions and 
Central & Eastern European transformation. There is no escaping approaching the 
subject matter using literature and tools from all four areas, however the chosen 
overarching approach is from a strategic management viewpoint. 
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Strategic management merges the process, content and context of a company's attempts 
to reach a long-term goal, (de Wit & Meyer, 1994). As Porter puts it: "The essence of 
formulating competitive strategy is relating a company to its environment, (Porter, 
1980), this is sometimes called strategic fit. The East German environment was 
changing dramatically, therefore the efforts to fit the organisations of interest in this 
research (foreign M&As) to their environments in times of revolutionary change 
coincide snugly with Porter's definition. Studying barriers to change and integration 
implies the heavy use of organisation behaviour theory but the theory is applied with the 
ultimate view of seeing whether or not the outcomes fit the firm to the new 
environment. Likewise material from Eastern European transformation or M&As is 
viewed from the strategic standpoint of whether strategic fit is helped or hindered. 
However strategic fit in the industrial economics Porterian sense has a lot to do with 
positioning, whereas by skilful leverage of existing resources and competencies, the fit 
with the environment can be achieved by stretching the goals, (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1993). The latter view of strategy as stretching resources (the in situ East German work 
force) is then the lens from which the research problems will be viewed. 
1.1 The East Germane Context and Multi-Level Analysis 
Although the country of East Germany no longer exists, see the footnote, it does form 
the location of the research investigation. Within this geographical area, the context of 
the research can be viewed from three different but interlinked levels (Staehle, 1994). 
The overall macro (societal) level context is beyond the scope of this research, but 
naturally is reflected in what is going on at the meso (firm) and micro (individual) level. 
Consequently the macro level phenomena are examined in this chapter and as already 
stated the lower level elements in the body of the dissertation itself. 
2 The country name East Germany will be used for ease of understanding throughout this dissertation. 
After the official reunification of the two Germanys on 3 October 1990, the old East Germany (GDR in 
English, DDR in German) ceased to exist and became simply the five new German states (Neue 
Bundesländer in German). However most East Germans and foreigners find it easier to envisage the area 
and people under their old identity. 
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a. Societal Level: Massive underemployment and structural misallocation of assets 
through state planning had by 1989 brought the East German economy to a state of 
virtual collapse. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the absorption of East Germany in to 
West Germany as the five new states triggered a massive restructuring of the moribund 
East German economy. The weak, not freely convertible East German currency unit 
was replaced overnight on 1 July 1990 with the strong, convertible West German DM. 
Meanwhile the major trading partners (COMECON countries) stopped buying and 
western quality imports started flooding in. Against this backdrop East German 
combines were privatised. 
b. Firm Level: The task of privatising the combines was given to a specially formed, 
government owned organisation called the Treuhandanstalt (often abbreviated to THA 
or Treuhand). The THA is introduces and discussed in more detail in section 1.1.2. 
The Treuhand split up the massive combines into sellable chunks and also started off 
the process of removing the layers of excess manpower. Many of these ` chunks' of 
combines were then sold to mainly West German buyers (74.9% of a total of 13,808 
acquisitions) although some went to East Germans mainly MBOs 
- 
(19.2%) and others 
to foreign (non-German) buyers 
- 
(5.9%), (Treuhandanstalt, 1994). The foreign figure 
masks the fact that the firms taken over by foreigners tended to big ones accounting for 
15% of the sales receipts. 
c. Individual Level: Workers who had never dreamed of unemployment suddenly found 
themselves without work. The shock of unemployment amongst East Germans should 
not be underestimated because it was unknown before 1989 and stood at 16.0% at the 
end of 1996, although a further 2.8% were in job creation and 3.4% on retraining 
schemes (Economist, 9 Nov. 1996). Years of state propaganda had instilled in the East 
German population a fear that the plague of a capitalist society was unemployment and 
that's exactly what the above 22.2% plus others who lost their jobs but have since found 
employment and the 1.5m emigrants out of East Germany have experienced (Spiegel, 
03.07.96). New working practices, intensity and efficiency drives on costs, plus a new 
wave of dismissals when the new owners worked out the uncompetitiveness of their 
inherited workforce led to a climate of mass uncertainty. The normal support in times 
of uncertainty, the group (Brigade), no longer functioned as before. 
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Having introduced the three levels of analysis and given some examples, it is proposed 
to split the context into four parts: economic, structural, unemployment and cultural. 
These classifications are by no means universal but are meant to cover the most relevant 
elements affecting people, their firms and their overall environment in East Germany. 
Each of the four context classifications will then be examined at the macro level of 
analysis, always with an eye directed at the dissertation title to avoid irrelevance. The 
meso and micro level form the material of the field research. 
1.1.1 Economic Context 
Extremely relevant to research on barriers to change and integration is the question 
whether antagonism is produced because East Germans feel that they are the poor, 
unwanted cousins in the new reunited Germany. In fact as we shall see, that is exactly 
how they feel and how they will remain for some considerable period of time. Disparity 
in economic terms is usually reflected in disparity in political terms leading to 
frustration, envy and ultimately anger. Conditions of mind quite unsuitable for 
achieving a smooth transition to full integration inside a market economy or indeed a 
M&A operating with Western partners who were richer and more powerful. So were 
the East Germans disadvantaged? 
To answer this question we need to return to the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989. The comparison between several leading social and economic indicators about 
East and West Germany at that time is informative but potentially misleading, see Table 
1-1. 
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Table 1-1 
Start Position 
Economic Indicators in East & West Germany (1989) 
Population, millions 62.1 16.6 26.7% 
GDP per head, $ 19,283 5,840 30.2% 
Exports, % of GDP 28.3 24.5 NA 
Imports, % of GDP 22.4 24.3 NA 
Farm Population, % 3.7 10.8 NA 
* Source: Economist 10.05.97: 84 
The figures are informative as one sees a certain similarity in the overseas trade 
dependency, however the East German trade was mainly with the COMECON3 
countries, whereas West Germany's trading partners were much more widely spread. 
With unification, the East German population added another quarter to the number of 
people living in Germany. The GDP figures are misleading as the East German 
statistics were questionable at the best of times. According to the official GDR 
announcements, interestingly enough agreed with by western intelligence gathering 
agencies like the CIA, the East German economy was the ninth largest in the world. 
One of the problems was that a lot was produced, but no one wanted it. The old jokes 
about trabant cars stopped by chewing gum on the roadway and condoms which 
furthered population growth not control contained the element of truth that quality levels 
were minimal. Additionally and typical of a command economy, shortages existed due 
to mismatches in the planning and lack of demand information. Door knobs were 
produced for the left hand side of cabinets between January and June, the right hand 
ones followed, given luck, from July to December. The waiting list for the 
aforementioned Trabant was 25 years and rising. Whatever was produced went into the 
GNP figures regardless of it was ever used (bought) or not. A similar problem existed 
in converting the GDR figures based on the Ost Mark into "hard" currency equivalents. 
The official exchange rate was usually around twenty times lower than the real 
(unofficial) one, but was only achievable by making an illegal transaction. All in all it is 
3 COMECON was founded in 1949. Founder members were USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania. Later admissions were Albania (1949 
- 
1961), Cuba (1972), East Germany (1950), 
Mongolia (1962) and Vietnam (1978). 
17 
safe to say that on the day of reunification most East Germans were substantially poorer 
than their reference group in West Germany. Not only were they poorer they felt it due 
to constant comparison with West Germans as would be expected from theory on social 
comparison, (Festinger, 1954). The unflattering comparison then provokes feelings of 
lack of equity, (Adam, 1965). 
But are the income differentials a temporary phenomenon which will quickly even out? 
If this were the case, then the East German feelings of lower social standing and 
inequity which hinder integration would also quickly disappear. A review of how the 
GDP has grown since unification in both parts of Germany is shown below in Table 1-2. 
The initial high growth rates in East Germany based on a construction boom have 
disappeared and the remaining modest gains are heavily dependent upon large public 
sector transfers. Figures from before 1992 for East Germany are either not available or 
are questionable or are in another format. 
Table 1-2 
Changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after Unification 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Germany Total N/A N/A 2.2% 
- 
1.2% 2.9% 1.9% 1.4% 2.5% 
West Germany 5.7% 4.5% 1.6% 
-1.8% 2.4% 1.6% 1.3% 2.3% 
East Germany N/A N/A 7.8% 7.2% 8.5% 5.3% 2.0% 2.0% 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt + B. M. Wi. Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1996 
With unification came also unification of economic statistic collection and standards. 
The latest figures for GDP show a much different picture from that seen in Table 1-1. 
For instance whereas using the questionable 1989 figures East Germany had a GDP per 
head of 30.2% of West Germany, by 1994 this had changed to 50.6% and in 1996 to 
54.5%. So a catch up process is underway, but it will take much longer than was 
anticipated at reunification. The No Digest, Quarterly Journal on Economic Trends in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, (Vol. 20, March, 1997: 3) reports the situation so: 
"Six years after the German currency, economic and social union the high growth phase 
in East Germany is over; the catch up process with West Germany is only making slow 
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progress, despite the still high investmentlGDP ratio. Although the disappointing 
performance of East Germany also reflects cyclical influences like the long growth 
pause in West Germany, it is mainly due to the fact that no self sustaining growth 
process could be initiated despite unusually high capital accumulation. In 1996 nominal 
GDP per capita in East Germany reached 54.5% of West German levels (the equivalent 
of DM 25,759 per head), which is only 1.5% more than in 1995 
- 
and despite gross 
public transfer payments of DM 11,910 per capita annually4. If the present slow pace 
of convergence continued (measured in terms of differences in growth rates), it would 
take 15 years just to halve the current per capita income gap between east and west, i. e. 
go from 54.5% to 77.2%". 
The catch up process mentioned previously is shown below 
Table 1-3 
City University 
Table 
I FEB 1999 
NOT TO BE REMOVED 
FROM THE LIBRAA'i 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita Using Current Prices 
East German as a% of West German Levels 
East Germany N/A 31.3 38.5 46.2 50.6 52.8 54.5 55.1 
* Source: Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der deutschen Wirtschaft im Frühjahr 1997 
Arbeitgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftler Forschungsinstitute e. V. 
So the East German population was relatively poorer in 1989, still is in 1997 and will be 
well into the 21 S` century. This fact plays on the collective psyche of East German 
workers causing emotions ranging from apathy to resentment. All these feelings make a 
poor starting point for achieving integration. 
1.1.2 Unemployment Context 
It is interesting to note that the change over to a market economy has been achieved, if 
the statistics as shown in Table 1-2 are to be believed, with no loss in GDP in Germany 
as a whole (small exception in 1993) and with significant rises in East Germany. Why 
4After deducting additional revenues from taxes and administration stemming from East Germany, public 
transfers to East Germany amount to DM 8,675 per inhabitant. 
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then all the misery and doom prophecies in the mid nineties? The answer is that the 
increase in GDP has not been spread equally across the people of East Germany. As in 
Thatcherite Britain, there has been a growth of economic inequality in East German 
society, albeit from an artificially balanced distribution of incomes at the end of the 
communist era. The most obvious cause has been the rise in unemployment. Those 
maintaining employment have benefited from the rising GDP, those losing there jobs 
have not. But even those lucky workers who kept their jobs noticed that they were 
considerably poorer than their West German counterparts doing roughly similar work. 
The importance of unemployment to this research lies in the corrosive effect it has on 
the ability to accept both change and integration. We have already discussed, in the 
economic context section, the inequity of economic well being between West and East 
Germany. The economic inequality creates an atmosphere of mistrust, exactly the 
opposite of what is needed to ensure smooth integration between the western and 
.. -. 
eastern partners in the M&As. The effects of unemployment were, according to the 
people interviewed, even more drastic. There are mixed views in academe about the 
need for a crisis to usher in the acceptance of change or to hinder it. Kanter, 1985 
believes that stability is necessary to ease the acceptance of new working methods, 
technology and organisational cultures. The majority of authors in the change 
management field as typified by Clarke, (1994); Plant, (1987), point to the need to even 
artificially create a crisis, so that the importance of the need for change sinks in. There 
can be no argument that a crisis of confidence was present in all the firms researched, 
and in East German industry in general. The lack of confidence and feeling of 
instability experienced by East German employees stemmed mainly from the fear of 
unemployment, both potential and actual and was well placed as we shall now see. 
In November 1989 just after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were 9.7 million workers in 
East Germany (zero unemployment), by the start of 1997 this had dropped to 6.2 million 
workers (16.2% unemployment)5. Once again these official figures hide much. A 
critical review of the official story is published each year by the Alternative 
Management Political Work Group. In their Memorandum'92: 59, they publish the 
s These are the official Government figures as published by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Labour 
Office) and the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistics Office). 
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following break down of what they call the "real" picture. Of interest here is the 41.3% 
fall in the potential work force from 10 million to 5.87 million between 1989 and 1992. 
This was accompanied by a rise of unemployment from zero to 1,343,400. The alternate 
thesis being put forward was that the unemployment figures alone, although critical, 
were only a part of the story and underestimate the problem. It is the fall in potential 
workforce, not just unemployment per se that has had the largest effect. In 1992 the 
potential workforce of East Germany was reduced by: 
760,000 workers going on early retirement, 540,000 commuting to West Germany, 
445,000 in further education or reeducation in another craft/profession, 393,500 in 
Labour Office supported work and 519,700 being on short term work assignments. 
Influences on the Level of Unemployment 
- 
The causes of the massive changes in the 
employment participation rate are well known and will be listed here. The list which is 
not all-inclusive is made up of: 
Economic causes: 
" Sudden arrival of competition from the West. 
" Currency reform at DM 1= Ost Mark 1 (the Ost Mark was the ` funny' money of the 
DDR) with the result that labour costs soared in comparison to productivity. 
" Collapse of the former export markets of COMECON, inducing reduction in demand 
not just in export firms but in their suppliers e. g. electricity production. 
Political Causes: 
" Decision to scrap public ownership in favour of private 
" Overmanning as seen with jobs for life and no unemployment 
Managerial causes: 
" Marketing not plan fulfilment became critical. 
" Outdated and worn-out equipment. 
" Concepts about the importance service or quality were unknown. 
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The above listing of causes of the lower employment participation rate in East Germany 
can be generalised and split into six problem areas: wages, productivity, sectoral, 
investment, Treuhand and structural. 
The wages problem: Sudden increases in a firm's wage bill can only be offset by 
increased productivity or higher end prices, given the latter the competitors of the firm 
will be able to take away customers and eventually the firm will become insolvent. This 
non-rocket scientist wisdom burst upon East German industry after monetary union. 
Figure 1-1 shows the growth of wages in East Germany in comparison with their 
international competitors. Before unification East German wages were 7% of those in 
West Germany, the wage rate quadrupled immediately after currency conversion. 
Negotiated wage settlements since then have ensured an 1100% increase in wages over 
six years, or an annual average increase of 51%. By 1993 the wage levels of USA and 
Italy had already been exceeded. The excessively high relative wage level has lead to 
uncompetitive businesses, bankruptcies and unemployment. The position is so perverse 
that in the manufacturing sector in 1993, total wages were 80% higher than the value 
added by workers in the sector, (Sinn, 1995: 407). The explanation of this can only be 
that part of the wage bill was being financed by capital, consumption or government 
subsidy. 
Another snippet of economic wisdom concerns the fact that after reunification, West 
German trade unions and employers' representatives negotiated the wage increases in 
East Germany. It may be slightly paranoid but the view is well established in East 
Germany that the West German negotiating partners were not about to tolerate a low 
cost competitor 
-a "tiger" in their own parlour (Sinn, 1995: 408). The result could have 
been that if wages were restrained by 1%, with a given capital stock, a potential increase 
in employment of 2% could occur. In fact the opposite happened, wages were pushed 
up and the relationship just described worked in reverse. The placing of blame on West 
German union negotiators for rising unemployment gives an inkling of the underlying 
lack of trust between West and East. Lack of trust leads to polarisation and lack of 
integration. 
22 
The problem is exasperated by the fact that the other reforming central and eastern 
European economies were not saddled with an uncompetitive currency and built in 
inflationary wage negotiating processes, see the level of comparative wages of Czech 
and Slovak workers in Figure 1-1. Hence jobs have been exported from East Germany 
even further eastwards. 
Figure 1-1 
Growth of Wages in East Germany compared with International Competitors 
" Source: Sinn, (1994) 
The Productivity Problem 
- 
Another element with a bearing on employment which 
needs an airing is that of productivity. There has indeed been a marked increase in the 
labour productivity in East Germany, see Figure 1-2 below and the base numbers 
supporting it in Table 1-4. This increase however may owe much to the fact that all the 
jobs which have fallen out of the calculation, due to liquidation, were the lowest 
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productive jobs and therefore their loss has had an over-proportional effect on the 
productivity figure. 
Figure 1-2 
Comparison of Labour Productivity and 
Unit Labour Costs in East & West Germany 
(West Germany 100) 
Productivity and labour costs 
East and West Germany (Manufacturing) 
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Table 1-4 
Comparison of Labour Productivity and 
Unit Labour Costs in East & West Germany 
(West Germany 100) 
East German: 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Labour Productivity6 31.0 43.1 51.6 54.3 55.2 56.8 57.9 
Unit Labour Costs7 150.7 140.9 131.6 129.8 131.2 130.0 129.1 
Sources for Figure & Table: Jahreswirtschaftberichte B. M. Wi. 1994 & 1996 
However the gains in productivity although impressive still leave East Germans behind 
West German standards. The productivity gains are swamped by the wages problem so 
that the end effect is unemployment. 
The Sectoral Problem 
- 
The various sectors of the East German economy have 
experienced different fortunes since reunification, see Table 1-5 below. 
6 Gross Domestic Product per head of population at current prices 
' Gross Domestic Income per employee divided by Nominal Gross Domestic Product per employee 
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Table 1-5 
Employment per Sector in West and East Germany 
(% of total work force) 
West Germany East Germany 
Agricultural, Forestry & Fisheries 3.3 2.8 2.7 6.2 3.5 3.3 
Energy, mining and water 1.6 1.5 1.4 3.2 1.7 1.5 
Manufacturing Firms 31.0 27.3 26.7 28.0 16.2 15.9 
Building & Construction 6.6 6.9 6.6 9.6 16.8 16.6 
Commerce and Transport 19.0 19.1 19.0 17.0 17.6 17.5 
Service Sector 19.2 22.3 23.1 12.7 20.5 21.7 
Government 14.8 14.8 14.9 20.5 18.8 18.4 
Other 4.5 5.3 5.5 2.8 4.9 5.0 
" Source: Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der deutschen Wirtschaft im Frühjahr 1997 
Arbeitgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftler Forschungsinstitute e. V. 
The high percentage of people working on the land in East Germany (10.8% in 1989) 
showed a potential labour supply for growth in services and manufacturing. Indeed as 
the figures show this percentage shrank quickly and drastically to a level (3.3% in 1996) 
approaching that of West Germany. It also raises an interesting factor that East 
Germany should not be treated as having a unified structure. Many of the northern East 
Gen-nan provinces were heavily agricultural, whereas others e. g. Saxony and Saxon- 
Anhalt (where most of the research interviews took place) were the most heavily 
industrialised area in Europe 
- 
no more! It now has a lower share of manufacturing jobs 
than Portugal or Ireland, (Sinn 1995). Thus regional sectoral factors exacerbated 
economic equity disappointments building up even more emotion in the firms sampled. 
Deindustrialisation 
- 
The talk of deindustrialisation is no exaggeration with regard to 
jobs. The East German manufacturing sector now employs only 15.9% of the work 
force, in comparison to West Germany where there are still 26.7% of all employees in 
manufacturing. Even this 15.9% of the workforce hides the massive cuts in this area as 
the overall workforce has shrunken due to emigration, early retirement etc. A good rule 
of thumb is that 80% of the manufacturing work force lost their jobs. The remaining 
workers and firms have increased their productivity and output per head (only the 
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efficient can survive), and so the demdustrialisation claim is true of employment but not 
output. Even so the output reductions were from an historical viewpoint almost 
unprecedented in peace time conditions. In the few months between the currency union 
and the end of 1990, East German industrial output fell from 86% of the 1989 level to 
45.5% (see Table 1-6 below) and GNP by 40% (Sinn, 1994: 7). 
Table 1-6 
East German Industrial Output 
1986 )). 1 
1987 94.8 
1988 97.7 
1989 100.0 
1989-October 100.6 
1989-November 98.6 
1989-December 97.6 
1990-January 94.4 
1990-February 96.6 
1990-March 97.8 
1990-April 97.0 
1990-May 92.1 
1990-June (currency unlon) 86.0 
1990-july 56.0 
1990-August 47.9 
1990-September 48.9 
1990-October 49.5 
1990-November 50.9 
1990-December 45.5 
Source: Akerlofet al ( 1991 )ý 6 
The best historical comparison is the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s brought 
about a crash in manufacturing in the USA and Germany of about 40% and GNP 
between 20-30%. It must be noted that we are talking here only about INDUSTRIAL 
output not GDP in total which includes services, construction etc. The effects of 
construction are discussed next. 
The Investment Problem 
- 
The building sector has played an artificially large role in 
keeping the East German economy from crashing completely. The construction boom is 
26 
mainly viewed as being a government transfer of funds to update the antiquated East 
German infrastructure. Actually even though by the end of 1996 about I trillion marks 
had been invested in the Neue Bundeslander, the lions share 84% is accounted for by 
private sector investment, see Table 1-7. 
Table 1-7 
Investments in East Germany 1991-1996 
DM Millions 
Private Sector 75.2 102.9 126.8 150.4 167.1 175.5 
Public Sector 15.4 24.0 25.2 29.0 30.0 32.0 
Total 90.6 126.9 152.0 179.4 197.1 207.5 
Cum. Total 90.6 217.5 369.5 548.9 746.0 953.5 
Source: (German Federal Government Report on the New Federal States, Sept. 1996). 
The Government transfers should not however be disregarded, especially as they were in 
public good areas such as transport, telecommunications and sadly unemployment pay. 
Measured on a per capita basis, each year East Germans receive transfers from the west 
that equal nearly three times the annual Polish disposable income! (Sinn, 1995: 404). 
Naturally this fact enrages West German taxpayers footing the bill, but more subtly 
places East German workers in the unenviable position of feeling dependent on outside 
help. The socio-psychological fall out of East German feelings of dependency is a 
tendency to more helplessness, as seen in lack of initiative and fatalism. A passive 
recipient mentality bodes ill for the achievement of successful integration, as the 
incoming Western management can force through their dogma. An integration is not 
achieved more an assimilation. 
Restitution 
- 
Investment has been hampered by the problems associated with the 
restitution of property. Two groups of ex-owners were offered the possibility within the 
reunification treaty to recover the property that was taken from them. Firstly, between 
1949 and 1989, the DDR government confiscated property from people who fled East 
Germany or simply to expand "key" industrial development. The second group of 
potential restitution receivers were mainly Jewish families whose property was 
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confiscated by the Nazis between 1933 and 1945. Interestingly, there is a third group, 
those from whom the Russian occupation forces between 1945 and 1949 took property. 
These claims were specially not permitted due to pressure from the Russians at the "2 + 
4 talks" preceding German reunification. 
The end product of the socially fair ideas underlying the restitution laws was that 
investment was stifled. It took until 1994 before even a third of the restitution claims 
had been processed, during which time little new investment took place. Existing 
owners or managers were not prepared to risk investing large sums in modernisation just 
to see some long lost owner crawl out of the woodwork and take away the renovated 
factory, building or farm. An idea of the size of this problem is that in the most extreme 
circumstances e. g. Leipzig, 90% of all real estate space was being claimed as restitution. 
In many other cities the figure lay around two thirds of all space (Sinn, 1994: 13). The 
combined German government realised (far too late) about the investment problems 
being caused and introduced an avoidance of investment hindrance clause into the 
restitution laws, which allowed the following: An investor could opt to buy an old 
business and would have to put forward a business plan which included investment 
amounts and job retention quotas (the usual sort of requirements when dealing with the 
Treuhandanstalt). Any prior owner claimant then had three months to decide whether to 
take over the business on the basis as laid out in the plan. If he reftised then the firm 
was sold to the new investor and the old owner would receive the purchase price when 
and if his claim was supported. The effect of this well meaning clause was minimal, 
only 15,000 cases have used it, from 2 million potential disputes. Sinn, (1994) reasons 
that East Germany was really in a pre-Coase state. Ronald Coase pointed out in 1960 
that for a market economy to work well, it didn't matter to whom any property belonged, 
only that it belonged to someone. The barriers to investment have hindered economic 
growth and thus negatively affected the sample M&As and increased uncertainty in their 
work force. 
The Treuhand Problem 
- 
Another investment dampening reality was the policy of the 
Treuhandanstalt o only sell firms for cash. This led to a situation where the East 
German population had no chance to invest or gain control of their own industry. 
Remember the East German work force had already paid once for building up the 
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combines, through lower wages than they would have received if there had not been a 
policy of compulsory public investment in industry. The very same combines which 
they had worked in and paid for were now offered to the highest bidder. Seeing as there 
were low levels of savings available in East Germany, even after the one for one 
Ostmark 
- 
DM exchange, then its not surprising that only about 6% of the THA sales 
went to East German buyers. Even western buyers had to stump up the purchase price 
and then multiply it several times over to bring the facilities up to modem standards. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the THA would have been well advised to sell against 
pledges of future profit earnings, thus freeing up necessary capital at the start for the 
modernisation process. 
The Treuhandanstalt, the privatisation authority for East German industry, is a 
controversial institution which exerted important influence directly into the area covered 
by this research. A short introduction to the Treuhand can help set in place its effect on 
the context of transforming East Germany. 
It is a little known fact that the organisation set up to shift state owned East German 
industries (Kombinate) into the private sector was set up before reunification. The 
government of Hans Modrow (the second replacement for the terminally ill Eric 
Honecker) founded the Treuhandanstalt (THA) in March 1990. It was more probably 
viewed as a delaying tactic to prolong communist rule. Certainly with the arrival of 
West German Detlev Carsten Rohwedder plus unification in October 1990, the 
ambitious goals and pressure to achieve them became real. 
The job was massive. The THA was the largest holding company in the world. It 
encompassed approximately 9,000 enterprises with 4.08 million employees, about half 
of the total employment in the old East Germany. Rohwedder adopted a "top-down" 
method of privatisation using sales of enterprises to competent outsiders. Competent 
outsiders were firms which had a knowledge of the industry in which the core activities 
of the enterprise were based and had access to finance required to the firm competitive. 
The "competent outsider" approach led to swift deals but raised criticism, especially 
earlier on when the cards were stacked in favour of West German acquirers. 
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The Treuhand used four negotiating variables in their dealings with potential acquirers. 
They were: 
1. Amount of investment promised to be pumped into the enterprise after purchase. 
2. Number of employees guaranteed a job after privatisation. 
3. Adequacy of business plan and the management competence of the acquiring firm. 
These three criteria were viewed as being independent variables and dependent on the 
levels of guarantees offered, the fourth variable 
- 
the purchase price 
- 
would be reduced 
as recognition of the scale of responsibilities assumed. 
Whatever else is said about the Treuhand, one fact cannot be disputed, it privatised 
quickly. Indecd so speedy was its work that the world's largest holding company had 
eased itself out of existence by 31 December 1994, i. e. in under five years. 
Although the THA started off with around 9,000 organisations on its for sale list, the 
number initially kept rising! The reason being that the THA played a restructuring role 
in preparing the former state owned combines for sale. These mammoths were split into 
more saleable chunks and reorganised so as to have more competitive structure with 
which to face for the first time competition. This process of splitting up and 
reorganising the combines led to heavy layoffs and criticism of the THA. The reduction 
in manpower at firms managed by the THA is shown in Table 1-8 below, however the 
steep decline is due to sell offs as well as restructuring so the whole 2.5 million 
reduction was not due solely to layoffs. I 
Table 1-8 
Employees in Treuhand Firms 
(millions) 
1 July 1990 4.08 million 
31 December 1994 1.50 million 
* Source, Treuhand SchIuüberIcnt, uecemoer iY '. 
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The hard nosed policy did ease the task of acquiring firms as much of the "dirty work" 
had been done for them. Especially bearing in mind that under German labour laws 
separating employees can be difficult and costly. 
The closing balance of the THA's work is shown below in Table 1-9. 
Table 1-9 
Total number of firms and part firms as at 31.12.1994 
Privatised in various forms 8,600 
Totally liquidated 152 
Being liquidated 3,565 
On sale offer 69 
* Source, Treuhand Schlußbericht, December 1994 
The Structural Imbalance Problem 
- 
The link, from investment, or lack of it, to 
structure is relatively straight forward. The East German industrial stock was run down, 
ancient, inefficient, but more important was also producing (mainly heavy industrial) 
products which were not in demand. The latter point was due to political ideology and 
the lack of the invisible hand of a market economy. 
The following section is meant purely as a typical example of governmental instigated 
sectoral imbalance. One of the sample companies, Company A, operates in the power 
generation sector and emphasises vividly the heavy job losses associated with the 
correction of sectoral imbalances. The East German power and heating industry was 
dominated by locally open-cast mined brown coal. The reason being that there was a 
politically motivated decision to artificially inflate the usage of brown coal in the 
generation of electricity. The comparison with the more 'normal' West German mix is 
informative, see Table I 
-10. 
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Table 1-10 
% of Total Electricity Generation in 1994 produced by brown coal 
West Germany 18.2% 
East Germany 88.4% 
Source: Schiffer, 1995: 63 
The introduction of market forces and tougher environmental laws brought about a sea 
change in how houses were heated, see Table I 
-11. There was a dash for gas as private 
households and small businesses switched from brown coal briquettes to gas fired 
central heating. Where gas was unavailable, then oil fired central heating gained a 
foothold. 
Table 1-11 
% of heating of all East German housing 
Type of Energy 1989 1994 
Coal 72.6 38.0 
City Heat 23.9 27.0 
Gas 2.5 23.0 
Oil 0 9.0 
Electric 1.0 3.0 
Source: Schiffer, 1995: 262-263 
The effects on industrial structure of these massive changes in demand reflected in a 
66% downturn in output and a 78% loss ofjobs between 1989 and 1994 for companies 
associated with coal. The above is an example of a scenario which was repeated 
throughout many other sectors, bringing in its wake heavy structural unemployment. 
So in conclusion there were substantial structural imbalances in the East German 
economy at the end of the communist era. These imbalances reflected in actual and 
potential unemployment, as discussed above, but increased an already worrying East 
German perception of economic and social disadvantage. The fall out from the feelings 
of disadvantage being a psychological barrier between them (West Germans) and us 
(poor, dependent, powerless East Germans). Them and us stereotypes are barriers to 
change and integration. 
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1.1.3 Cultural Context 
The East German feelings of separateness caused by economic inequalities and rampant 
unemployment are unfortunately exacerbated by what should be a unifying factor - the 
common culture. Is it possible to talk of a German culture or are there two, one for the 
ex-DDR and one for West Germany? The answer to this question affects the research in 
so far as any cross-cultural research citing West Germany can only be used as a parallel 
for East Germany if commonality exists. More relevant however is the probability that 
perceptions of cultural difference will enhance difficulties in achieving integration. 
A poll of German opinion (Spiegel Nr 27/3, July 1995) showed 67% of Germans 
supporting the statement `the Wall is gone but the wall separating our thoughts and 
feelings is growing'. What then is going on inside the heads of East Germans? 
One'body of literature on East German current culture, which is certainly above the 
anecdotal level, but would not get much thrift in refereed journals, is the trilogy of 
books by Hans-Joachim Maaz (1990,1993,1994). Maaz is the head physician of a Halle 
(East Germany) psychological clinic and as such has had much opportunity to see the 
trend in mental health both before and since the new era dawned. 
Maaz analyses the socialism in the DDR and shows howjust about everyone suffered 
from some form of repression, be it from the state, Stasi, justice, education, family, 
medicine or religion. The outcome of this constant repression was, and is, a feeling of 
deficiency and blockage of avenues to express feelings. These internal feelings have 
developed into a craving for the non-existent more stable past, with a tendency to seek 
out authority and obey and depend on it. Confronted with changed ideals such as 
creativity and self-reliance and disappointed with the new economic and social 
conditions, the average East German feels lost in a sea of insecurity. Add in the 
collision with the western world with its egocentricity, then an explosive recipe exists 
which can detonate with little warning. The ability of a psychologist to take his 
individual observations and forecast the state of the nation's people is risky (see 
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methodology section). However, Maaz's issues are of importance to the research and for 
instance the lack of self-reliance was commented upon as early as the pilot study. 
Certainly there was every reason for people in East Germany to feel insecure and 
repressed. "In 1988 
- 
the last "normal year of the DDR 
- 
the Ministry of State Security 
(the Stasi) had some I 10,000 regular informers, while an additional 60,000 people were 
involved in "conspiratorial" services, such as lending their flats for secret meetings, or 
were listed as reliable contacts. The ministry itself had more than 90,000 full-time 
employees. Setting the total figure against the adult population in the same year, this 
means that one out of every 50 adult East Germans had a direct connection with the 
secret police. Interestingly the Nazis in 1941 had nothing like this figure, the full time 
staff of the Gestapo, for the vastly larger territory of Greater Germany, came to fewer 
than 15,000, " (Ash, 1997: 164). 
A recent study in the Economist (9.11.1996: 6), supported the thesis that there is still a 
wall in the heads between people in East and West Germany. "... two-thirds of the 
people in the neue Lander consider themselves first and foremost "east German" whilst 
40% of those in the old Lander as "west German". If the two sides still define 
themselves differently, they will, by implication, also see differences between 
themselves and the other kind of German". Numerous opinion surveys carried out for 
intellectual magazines in Germany and abroad by the EMNID group have shown 
startling differences in perspective on common issues between people living in the East 
and West of Germany. A few examples: 
Questioned about whether life was better or worse since the fall of the wall, East 
Germans and West Germans showed large differences in opinion, see Table 1-12. 
Table 1-12 
Comparing Lives (1996) 
Worse 48% 89% 
The Same 43% 9% 
Better 7% 1% 
" Source: EMNID in Economist, 9.11.1996 
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The gulf between the two populations is widening not closing. The same survey 
conducted about 12 months previously and shown in Table 1-13 came to the following 
results. 
Table 1-13 
Comparing Lives (1995) 
Worse 43% 53% 
The Same 28% 33% 
Better 25% 13% 
" Source: EMNID in Spiegel, 3.07.1995: 41 
Both sets of Germans saw a deterioration in their lives, the East Germans were much 
more pessimistic. Indeed when asked about their opinion whether the mental 
differences were increasing (the wall in the heads), two thirds of East Germans agreed, 
some (15%) going so far as to wish to have the wall back! 
There seems to be a rising nostalgia in East Germany for the "good, old times", which 
cannot be based on hard economic or social facts. In Table 1-14 a whole batch of 
quality of life variables or areas were examined, both early after unification and five 
years later. The views amongst East Germans changed to seeing the DDR as being 
better in 7 as opposed to 3 of the nine areas. 
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Table 1-14 
Comparing Lives 1990 Vs. 1995 
In answer to the question "was the DDR or the BRD better in thefollowing area? " 
East German respondents replied: 
Living standard 
Protection from crime 
Equality of women 
Research & 
Technology 
Social security 
Schools 
Career training 
Health care 
Availability of 
housing 
91% 2% 85% 8% 
13% 62% 4% 88% 
10% 67% 3% 87% 
87% 2% 63% 6% 
16% 65% 3% 87% 
36% 28% 11% 64% 
36% 33% 11% 64% 
65% 18% 23% 57% 
34% 27% 21% 53% 
" Source: EMNID in Spiegel, 3.07.1995: 41 
With the best will in the world it is difficult to rationally support the claims by East 
Germans that health and schools have deteriorated since the fall of the wall. The reason 
seems to be a feeling that people in the old East Germany are just tolerated as a burden 
and are treated as second class citizens, see Table I- 15. 
Table 1-15 
2nd Class Germans 
In answer to the question "whether the citizens of the ex-DDR are second class 
citizens? " Table 1- 13 shows the responses: 
Yes, 2nd Class Citizens 22% 
No, not 2nd Class Citizens 72% 
* Source: EMNID in Spiegel, 3.07.1995: 49 
72% 
27% 
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The above discussion of the differences between the attitudes of the two sets of 
Germans either side of the former iron curtain illustrates that there is a difference, which 
may be temporary or not, in their cultural identity. That there are differences between 
people brought up in a market lead democracy and people developing in a politically 
closed, command economy should not be a surprise. Of more specific interest to the 
aims of this research are those differences which may have a bearing on the acceptance 
of change and integration. Once again there is a major difference between how West 
Germans view East Germans and how East Germans view West Germans. Figure 1-3 
shows a diagram of qualities mapped on a 1-7 Likert scale. 
Figure 1-3 
East & West Views on Personal Qualities of their Counterparts 
I 
1234567 
Child4over Don't like children 
Hard working Lazy 
Thorough Superficial 
Modest Overbearing 
Inventive 
- 
------------ 
Unimaginative 
Considerate Inconsiderate 
Flexible Inflexible 
Money oriented Not motivated by money 
Trustworthy Suspicious 
Self reliant Dependent 
Decisive Indecisive 
Urbane Provincial 
Business Like Amateurish like 
Self confident unsure 
123A567 
* Source: EMNID in Spiegel, 3.07.1995 
= East Germans talking about East Germans 
""'"'"" = East Germans talking about West Germans 
1.1.4 Discussion about the Macro Level Context 
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Many of the data and topics discussed above were macro level phenomena. Although 
necessary to set the scene, it is their trickle down effects upon the firm and groups (meso 
level) and individuals (micro level) which will influence this research. Three general 
themes can be seen as pervading most of the material discussed in the context review 
above. These themes or areas (competitiveness 
- 
introduced in the economic and 
unemployment context sections, unemployment, and mental differences 
- 
introduced in 
the cultural context section) are given further attention below. 
Lack of Competitiveness 
- 
The abrupt plunge in East German output and employment 
occurred not because the demand for goods and services suddenly dropped8, rather 
because this demand could be more effectively met (in terms of price, quality, delivery 
schedules etc. ) by producers other than in East Germany. The alternate sources of 
supply were mainly from West Germany where under-utilisation i. e. slack, could be 
quickly and cheaply used to ratchet up amounts supplied. As fixed costs were already 
covered, any further output from West German factories would incur only the variable 
costs. Average total costs (ATC) would therefore fall, especially where appreciable - 
slack was in place. The question naturally arises: how can it be cheaper to produce in 
West rather than in East Germany? The answer contains elements already surfaced 
earlier in this context chapter e. g. lower productivity, increasing, now almost equal, 
wage levels, as well as the usage of slack production capacity. Additionally three 
problems associated with quality led to East German uncompetitiveness: capital, 
management and labour. 
Quality of Capital 
- 
West German enterprises possessed in general a much more modem 
stock of capital goods. These allowed more precise standards and shorter stoppages for 
repairs or maintenance. Not only was the capital stock more modem, the network of 
sub-contractors was much wider in West Germany. This was due mainly to East 
8 Demand did suddenly drop in those areas where the demand was of the artificial state planner type and 
not customer driven. Classical economic theory states however that wants are unlimited, so therefore 
reduction in demand in one sector will be offset by rising demand in the next sector where marginal utility 
is higher than price. 
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Germany's attempt to produce everything necessary for a specific product in a vertically 
integrated combine, negating any need for'an intermediate product indust 
. 
Quality of Management 
- 
Modem management methods were not practised in the old 
DDR, meaning not only that production management techniques were dated but also 
concepts like marketing were particularly unknown, a fact which explains some of the 
success of new sellers to the East German market. Managers in East Germany tended to 
be technical people, financial or economic backgrounds were rare. Hentze & Lindert 
(1992) found economists dominated the higher management positions of West German 
firms whereby in Eastern Europe and East Germany, the opposite, engineers and 
technicians, dominated. Not only were management skills lacking in East German 
managers, but in THA owned firms a quarter of all managers had to be kicked out due to 
incompetence, corruption or political taintedness. 
Quality of Labour 
-A much more controversial potential cause of the uncompetitiveness 
of East German goods and services is that the work force is just not as "good" as their 
West German counterparts. Any discussion in this area, especially in the raw nerve 
atmosphere of present day Germany, is an invitation for trouble. However it should be 
possible to discuss what constitutes a "good" work force without coming to blows. It is 
only when judgmental statements uch as "Ossis are lazy" are bandied about, that 
reasoned argument becomes impossible. 
What then is needed from the post unification employees in East Germany? Most 
definitely changes in the attitudes and behaviour of members of the work force, 
specifically those affecting individual effectiveness. Most important here is the level of 
initiativelo shown to overcome barriers. Frese et al, (1996) found that only 13% of East 
Germans versus 35% of West Germans exhibited very high initiative at work. Their 
empirical investigation as to why this should be so, threw up two main factors: control 
and complexity. Control 
- 
Low control at work means little autonomy orjob discretion 
which leads to a passive and helpless approach to work as the workers expect nothing 
9 The East Gen-nans called this policy reproduklive Geschlossenheit n English reproductive self- 
containment, (Grabher, 1994: 3). 
10 Personal initiative being defined as a behaviour syndrome resulting in an individual taking a self- 
starting approach to work and going beyond what is formally required for the job. 
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can be done and give up in the face of setbacks, (Frese et al, 1996: 41). Complexity 
- 
Complexity of the work task tended to be low in East Germany due to the absence of 
modem machinery and overmanning. The higher the complexity of the job, the higher 
the need for intellectual flexibility, skills and creativity which facilitate the overcoming 
of barriers at work. Conversely, the lower the job complexity, the virtual circle just 
described reverses into a vicious circle ending in low initiative. So it is probably safe to 
generalise that the East German employee shows on average less initiative than his 
Western counterpart, but the good news is (according to Frese et al, 1996) that this 
personal attribute is a socialised one and will change over time. 
Unemployment 
- 
The theme of unemployment dominated all the interviews which took 
place as the empirical, field portion of this research. The causes have already been 
discussed, but the effects on acceptance of change and integration are both subtle and 
also far reaching. 
A common result of the rising levels of unemployment has been a growing isolation of 
individuals at their place of work. The former snug acceptance of all within the fold of 
the work group has disappeared as each looks over their shoulder to check if a colleague 
is not taking away some of their traditional workload and thus making them marginal in 
the eyes of the boss. In other words there has been a substantial movement towards 
individualisation and isolation at the place of work at the expense of the group 
solidarity. This movement has been accompanied by rising levels of tension and fear, 
attributes which are hardly conducive to learning new ways, developing trust with the 
new owners and building effective cross-discipline teams. The increased uncertainty in 
East Germans' lives is mirrored in this retreat into themselves as individuals 
(introspection) and extenuated by feelings of inadequacy in dealing with outsiders, 
especially West Germans. The lack of experience in dealing with people from a 
different culture plus the missing words, which for natives of a market economy are 
long ingrained and understood, often produce a feeling of fear or panic resulting in 
doing and saying nothing as the fail safe remedy. It is easy in such circumstances for 
individuals to develop a "them and me" mentality which hinders integration and 
learning. New managers are faced with little feed-back and sudden, unexpected 
outbursts of frustration leading them to draw unfavourable comparisons with workers 
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elsewhere. The fact that levels of unemployment have risen in West Germany alongside 
the exploding East German figures has not lead to any solidarity between West and East 
Germans rather the opposite as each blames the other for their employment woes. 
The Wall in the Heads 
- 
As just mentioned unemployment has brought about a high 
degree of mistrust between members of the old and new Bundesldnder. The feelings are 
even more inflamed by the massive levels of transfers placing a high taxation strain on 
West Germans whilst at the same time the East Germans are demanding ever more help. 
It may well be an uncomfortable truism that transfers per se can bring about a recipient, 
fatalistic mentality, once again a poor building block for integration and learning. It is 
still to early to judge whether a welfare mentality has grown up in East Germany. It 
should be remembered that the old DDR state did indeed try to practice cradle to grave 
welfare, so the expectation that the necessities of life will always be provided by 
someone other than oneself was already strong. 
As the researcher is a non-German it should also be mentioned that in his opinion, 
shaped by life in the Anglo-Saxon working world, West Germany is also a country 
where an expectation that certain services and rights are coming from the authorities is 
relatively well established. Post-Thatcher Britain is an example showing that these 
expectations can change, although whether they should is a political question. We may 
assume that there seems to be some similarity in pan-German attitudes towards self- 
sufficiency although West Germans preach it but do not practice it and East Germans 
just do not practice it. This latter generalisation is based on opinion and as such carries 
little weight. 
But what is of importance is that if the two peoples of Germany feel themselves to be 
different, even if they are genetically and socially quite similar, then unexpected 
repercussions can occur, especially when the two are forced to interact such as in a 
merger and acquisition (M&A). Assumed similarity which does not exist is a problem, 
exactly so as assumed difference. Both are problems in as far that managers and staff 
may be understanding completely different things from communications which leads to 
divergent behaviour, recriminations and lack of integration. The situation where 
similarity is assumed but does not exist is called the "psychic paradox" and is discussed 
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later in this dissertation. The relevant example of such a phenomena in this research is 
West German managers in East Germany, although it applies equally as well between 
USA and Canada or white managers and black employees in South Africa. In Germany 
the wall in the heads is that West German managers assume and perceive little cultural 
distance and therefore do not modify their management style. East German employees 
perceive a cultural divergence but react with passivity and do not actively seek to reduce 
the cultural misunderstandings. With one side not perceiving and the other not reacting, 
the process of acculturation is stifled before it starts. 
What is proven is that the West Germans have less interest in East Germany than vice 
versus. In 1985, when the wall was still standing, only 64% of West Germans had 
visited the DDR (K6hler in Berliner Zeitung, 3.6.97). Even amongst the euphoria of 
reunion only one half of West Germans had visited the East by the autumn of 1990, 
whereas 97% of all East Germans had made it over the non-existent border. Although 
newspapers published in East and West Berlin are now freely available to citizens in 
both parts of the city, Westerners stick stubbornly to their previous titles e. g. 
Tagesspiegel, whereas the roughly similar Berliner Zeitung produced in the East has 
gained almost no western readership. The same is true in the other direction leading to a 
pessimistic assessment of any increase in knowledge about the lives and thoughts of no 
longer separated neighbours. 
1.2 Themes Emerging from the Context Review 
Three themes, each associated with one of the three levels of analysis (macro, meso & 
micro), can be observed crystallising from the context section. As is often the case with 
management research the themes are intertwined and not necessarily attributable solely 
to the given level of analysis. They are intertwined as they all contain elements of 
learning and flexibility so we start with a discussion of these constructs. 
1.2.1 The Challenges in Learning and Flexibility 
The wide ranging themes which surfaced in the context review present great challenges 
to East Germany and East German organisations. in order to survive and overcome the 
42 
contextual problems, a process of speedy and comprehensive learning is necessary. 
Learning is needed to understand and incorporate democratic structures and ideals in 
government. At the firm or lower levels, learning is also necessary to give the firm the 
flexibility necessary to flourish not flounder in fast changing, consumer lead markets. In 
foreign M&As, the western acquirer brings in a vast store of knowledge but this is only 
of use if the eastern work force and management accepts it as useful and relevant. 
Unfortunately the relevance of learning in west/east M&As is often seen as a one-way, 
eastwards street. Indeed Geppert, (1996: 203) argues that even "... the language chosen 
for (future) communications will depend on the expected direction of the 'flow of 
learning between the two partners. 
... 
Western managers, though, may not be inclined to 
learn the local language, as they perceive themselves as the 'teachers' and not as the 
'students'. " It will be contended in this research that two-way I earning is possible, 
indeed necessary, in such M&As. The importance of learning to changes in Eastern 
Europe is such that Organizational Studies devoted a whole special issue (No. 17, Issue 
2,1996) to this very area. 
Besides challenges in learning, there are also challenges falling under the rubric of 
inflexibility. Inflexibility is used here to denote the inability to change quickly enough 
to adapt to an altered environment. Inflexibility is the arch enemy of change and 
integration, the subject matter of this research, and therefore its effects, particularly in 
conjunction with learning will be of relevance. 
1.2.2 Learning & Flexibility at the macro level 
Although the macro phenomenon of industrial inflexibility is beyond the scope of this 
research due to a chosen emphasis on the firm and group/individual, it is mentioned here 
for completeness but is then disregarded when gathering together themes to form the 
research questions. Under the banner of industrial inflexibility fall the areas of 
employment and competitiveness. The massive structural swings have forced non- 
voluntary changes onto large sections of the East German economy. The remaining 
employed workers will need to grasp changes in technology, techniques and customer 
centred attitudes to protect theirjobs. The millions who have paid the price of reunion 
with unemployment, will need to be equipped with training in areas where the new 
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market forces are creating shortages in skills. Unfortunately the existing unemployment 
training programmes, although sizeable, have been motivated more by a political goal of 
reducing headline unemployment figures rather than matching training to expected 
future skill requirements. 
1.23 Learning & Flexibility at the group level 
A challenge which will be followed-up is that of harnessing the latent power of the work 
group to achieve change. The alarming climb of unemployment has produced an all- 
pervading fear ofjob loss in East German firms. Two outcomes of this are contrary 
forces acting upon (in)flexibility. On the one hand there has been a move towards 
isolation and keeping knowledge (and work) to oneself. This trend is all the more 
remarkable because the East German work place was an environment where the group 
(Brigade) not the individual was of importance. Intra-group networking, stability and 
communications were at levels of intensity unknown in more individualistic western 
firms. Should the demise of the work group be mourned? Chapter 4 discusses this 
question in detail but groups exhort powerful social, normative forces on their members 
which can either hinder or support change. The challenge is therefore to keep the 
positive pro-change, pro-flexibility forces dormant within the work group and eliminate 
those forces which are barriers to change (see the second force below). The second 
force produced by the fear of unemployment is a tendency to revert to "the good old 
days". Here employees use their old group structures as annour against the changing 
environment. The dynamics of the group then encourage retention of old thought 
patterns and relationships and as such this trend hinders change. 
The link between groups and learning, itself a function that can facilitate change, is that 
learning is embedded in a specific social context (Geppert, 1996: 252). The social 
context is, as just explained, the group. According to Weick, (1991), the traditional 
definition of learning as the combination of same stimulus 
- 
different response does not 
hold true. Instead of individuals giving to the same stimulus, what really happens in 
organisations is that groups of people give the same response to different stimuli (In: 
Geppert, 1996: 250, this author's highlighting). East Germany's challenge is to achieve 
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the same response in support of change from group members, instead of splintered 
different responses from individuals. 
In the context of foreign M&As, the groups will tend to be groups already present in the 
acquired eastern firm and a group representing the new management and the culture of 
the acquiring western firm. Must these two sets of groups pass one another by like ships 
in the night? According to the case studies discussed later in the dissertation, the 
answer can vary depending on the degree of acculturation (mixing of cultures) which 
occurs post-acquisition. The possible difference in cultures between East and West 
Germans has already been broached (section 1.1.4 
- 
the wall in the heads). The 
differences when not noticed can produce a lack of convergence even in situations 
where the similarities would seem bound to. dominate. This phenomenon, already 
mentioned, is called "the psychic distance paradox", (O'Grady, 1996) and is covered in 
chapter 5. Wlien there is little acculturation, such as in a psychic paradox, there will 
likewise be little two-way learning. 
1.2.4 Learning & Flexibility at the individual level 
Mention has already been made of the findings of Frese et al (1996) where almost three 
times as many West Germans were exhibiting high levels of initiative in comparison to 
matched East Germans. Initiative can be fostered in a group setting but it is usually 
regarded as a quality to be found or not found in individuals. Initiative is important in 
East Germany for several reasons. 
The present situation in most firms, as shown by the dramatic fall in employment, will, 
if continued, see even more business failures and redundancies. To break the mould, the 
existing company culture requires attempting to do things differently. The impetus to 
do this can be exogenous; (usually the new western managers) or endogenous (the 
existing employees). So whether members of the work force are prepared to risk 
something new is a question of utmost importance as their future (often nearfature) 
depends on it. Doing something new almost always provokes uncertainty and Germans 
in particular are relatively loath to tolerate ambiguity - hence their penchant for 
following rules. 
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Further, even if someone is brave enough to try something innovative, it needs the 
additional step of learning from the results and acting accordingly for change to become 
more than a one-off occurrence. Therefore the ability of individuals to learn and take 
risks will affect the success of meeting this third challenge. 
1.3 Conclusions and Link to Methodology 
The end product of ourjourney through the context and challenge of German 
reunification is that three themes emerged, one of which was more global and therefore 
affects but will not become part of the research content. Meant here is the topic of 
macro level learning and flexibility in times of revolutionary societal change. The other 
two were relevant to the research title and were also associated with the strategic 
management subject area of fitting the firm's resources and capabilities to the 
aforementioned vastly changed environmental conditions. 
The first of these two themes includes the constructs of groups and learning and their 
interaction with (in)flexibility 
- 
the (in)ability to change quickly enough to a shifted 
environment. The second theme likewise includes the construct of learning but this 
time at the individual level. Here the area of interest is the ability of the individual to 
learn quickly and effectively so as to counter inflexibility. Note, both these themes 
include common elements 
- 
learning and inflexibility in an unstable environment. Also 
the groups and individuals in any one firm make up the bulk of a firm's competencies 
and resources. To leverage these resources may provide the key to overcoming the 
0 
challenges of German reunification within foreign M&As. 
To fit with the changed environment as described in the context section, employees, 
whether as individuals or groups need to integrate, learn and adapt. Especially in 
foreign M&As, the potential for internal stress due to differing national and 
organisational cultures is high. Therefore the necessity for successful integration and 
removal of barriers to change is also urgent. Consequently in Chapter 2, the objectives 
of the research as reflected in the research problem will incorporate levels of integration, 
the climate necessary for adaptability/flexibility and two-way learning. 
I 
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Chapter 2- Methodology" 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The chapter commences with a look at the general research objectives (2.2), which turn 
out to be both overarching and overlapping. Once the research objectives are out in the 
open, it is possible to construct a general research problem (2.3) and the research 
questions which flow from the problem (2.4). Sandwiched between the research 
problems and the methodology chosen to investigate them is a section on the 
philosophical base of the research, 2.5. Here the competing views on how the object of 
the research can be measured and observed are given an airing. The researcher's view 
of reality, whether it is socially constructed or that there is a concrete, definitive world 
out there to be observed influence the methods of measurement and observation. Once 
the philosophical basis has been laid down, the argument then turns to reviewing the 
usefulness of the qualitative and quantitative research methods to achieving the research 
objectives, section 2.6. 
2.2 General Research Objectives 
Set against a backdrop of revolutionary change at all levels, described in Chapter 1, this 
research aims to surface phenomena which affect the success or failure of integrating 
East Germans into their new, commercially driven organisations. The assumption being 
that with a well integrated work force, the strategic needs of fitting the employees' 
competencies to the changed environment will be eased as inflexibility and barriers will 
be sunnountable. The research concentrates on foreign, as opposed to domestic, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as it was assumed that here the internal forces for 
change would be most acute. Foreign involvement introduces a major potential 
hindrance to integration. There could well be a difference in the power positions 
between the foreign acquirer and the East German acquired. A second potential brake 
on integration could be the clash ofcultures between resident East German and 
11 Thanks and acknowledgement are due in this chapter to Karin Breu, also doing doctoral research into 
the East German transformation process at Oxford, Brooks University, who helped to clarify many points 
in the philosophyý section. Mary Morgan of LSE made valuable suggestions on updating the references. 
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incoming foreign managers. The integration, or non-integration, is to be reviewed 
through the eyes of the individual employee and also at the level of the work group. 
Here the objective of the research is to examine the effect on differences in integration 
and acceptance of change depending on whether the change is faced individually or as a 
group member. It would seem obvious that well integrated employees are more able to 
accept change. Actually this tacit assumption has little grounding in academic research, 
but one area where there does seem to be a link between integration and acceptance of 
change is that of learning (Parkhe, 1991). The very existence of learning can be an 
expression of successful integration (Cyr & Schneider, 1996). 
2.2.1 General Type of Information Needed 
A closer examination of what was said about the general research objectives above has 
implications for the type of information needed to achieve these objectives. The 
following quotes were highlighted: surface phenomena; clash of cultures; reviewed 
through the eyes of the individual employee; explore the abilityfor two-way learning to 
take place; well integrated These words point towards non-factual, personal 
interpretation type data, as opposed to observing, measuring, counting etc., measures 
which would necessitate collecting factual data. In other words it is the feelings and 
interpretations of interviewees which are of importance and this has important 
implications for the philosophical basis of the research. 
2.2.2 Type of Philosophy Needed 
The philosophical stance which supports best the research objectives is the subject 
matter of section 2.5. Even before this discussion it can be said that type of information 
needed from the research is investigative, which clashes with the more concrete factual 
information usually produced when approaching social science research from a 
positivist viewpoint. Additionally, as the fall of the "Iron Curtain" is a recent 
occurrence, there has been little time in which theories on change in transforming 
economies could evolve. Consequently the research will of necessity be theory forming 
as opposed to testing theory out. 
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2.3 General Research Problem 
2.3.1 Overview of the Problem 
The overall title of the dissertation needs to be kept in mind when constructing "the 
research problem". The statement of the problem, upcoming in 2.3.2, must be relevant 
to, and allow insight into barriers to change and integration in foreign M&As. There are 
several strands to the general research problem underlying this research project some of 
which have been mentioned in the context section of Chapter 1. The strands are in order 
of discussion: Societal Change, Groups & Individuals and Two-Way Learning. After a 
short discussion of each of these themes associated with the research problem, the 
themes are gathered together in a one sentence statement which incorporates feedback 
from the grounded research methodology. Societal Change 
- 
At the macro level, 
revolutionary changes in government, employment, openness of expression and 
communications had initiated a, period of immense social change. These macro changes 
had the effect of spreading uncertainty. The ability to handle this change induced 
uncertainty outside the work place and its knock-on effects inside the firm are reflected 
in the research problem. Groups & Individuals 
- 
Communist society was a society of 
groups. Citizens were trained to feel belonging to a group, be it political, work or 
leisure. The emphasis on groups is grounded in Marxist theory but also allowed the 
state to control the group, thereby controlling individuals via group, pressure, 
surveillance and the threat of withdrawing group privileges. The incoming western 
management had norms and recipes based on a more individualistic society. The clash 
between individualism and communitarianism forms part of the problem. Two- Way 
Learning 
- 
The third underlying strand of the research problem is that of leaming, which 
was mainly flagged in discussions about the field work. The process of taking over a 
firm and merging the cultures of the acquirer and acquired is highly dependent upon the 
respective power positions of the two parties. The East German acquired organisations 
were almost always financially, technically and politically weak and therefore under the 
acculturation process tended to be swamped by the incoming western company culture. 
Although it is assumed that the East Germans will learn western ways, the adverse 
power position of the acquired firm makes learning in the reverse direction unlikely. 
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Grounded Theory Feedback 
- 
Other strands of the research problem stemmed from 
primary and secondary data. Here it is obvious that the a priori data gathered from 
literature and interviews influenced the research question. As a grounded theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) approach to the research was adopted, then patterns emerged from the 
data and were in turn linked back to/ and affected the research problem and research 
questions. 
2.3.2 Statement of the Problem 
The research problem can be simplified to one statement: 
What were the key hindrances to integration and learning? 
Naturally the research problem is embedded in the context of a western M&A in East 
Germany. The context includes mass unemployment, loss 'of markets, currency reunion 
etc., all the topics as discussed in Chapter 1. Management research often starts with a 
management problem, in this case barriers (hindrances) to change and integration. The 
research problem should reflect this management problem, which in this case it does, by 
combining change into the concept of integration. The addition of leaming into the 
problem statement reflects the grounded nature of the research. As the research 
developed, patterns surfaced linking successful integration to learning. 
2.4 The Research Questions: 
There are two main questions one based on the process under review and the other based 
within the context of the firm. The first research question refers back to the research 
problem which in turn links to the dissertation title. The second question refers forward 
to possible outcomes of a successfully managed post-acquisition integration process. 
Note also the negative slant of the problem statement (as emphasised by the word 
hindrances) cha nges to7 a positive slanted investigation of how the hindrances are eased 
and any onwards implications. 
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2.4.1 Main Questions: 
* What strategic actions eased the take-over process? 
# What were the implicationsfor two-way learning of any actions taken? 
The unit of enquiry for the first research question is the individual or group. It is 
through their eyes that the strategic actions are assessed. The findings concerning this 
question mainly appear in chapter 4. It should be emphasised that here processes are 
being studied, a fact which favours the use of qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, 
methodology. The implications for learning, as reflected in the second question, are 
based inside the context of the firm and are the subject of Chapter S. 
2.4.2 Sub-Questions: 
* How was the acquiringlacquiredfirm perceived? 
# How much pressurefor change and integration built up? 
The unit of enquiry for these sub-questions is the firm. The findings concerning these 
questions mainly appear in chapter 5, where a model to measure pressure for change and 
integration in the firm is developed. The model includes a classification of the 
perception of the two parties to each other. 
2.5 Research Paradigms 
- 
Philosophical Stance 
2.5.1 Philosophical Link from Research Question to Methodology 
The research methodology is a by-product of the choice of an underpinning philosophy 
for the research, such as positivist, interpretative or whatever. It is therefore critical to 
address at the start of the research the opinion of the researcher about the nature of the 
social world, i. e. which philosophical stance is to be adopted. Once this basic 
philosophical stance has been chosen, then it controls the nature of the information 
needed to examine the research questions and eventually achieve the research objective. 
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2.5.2 Paradigms 
Over centuries there have been debates about how to conduct science. At any one time 
certain "ground rules" are accepted, internalised and obeyed by members of the 
scientific community. These "ground rules" or basic assumptions include an ontological 
element, i. e. what is the very essence of the phenomena under investigation (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979: 1)? Is the phenomenon external to the individual or is it the product of 
individual cognition? This is the ontological debate: nominalism Vs. realism. As well 
as an ontological element, the basic assumptions have an epistemological element, i. e. 
the grounds of knowledge (Ibid.: 1). Can knowledge be acquired from outside or must it 
be personally experienced? This is the epistemological debate: anti-'ýositivism Vs. 
positivism. Dependent on the basic assumptions followed, different perspectives of the 
phenomena under review will follow. Thomas Kuhn (1970) wrote about the general 
acceptance of these basic assumptions and also their rejection, calling them paradigms 
and their re ection paradigm shift. Kuhn defines a paradigm as an original scientific 
achievement (e. g. Einstein's relativity), that gains recognition by a particular scientific 
community. It "... defines the legitimate problems and methods of a research field.. ", 
(Kuhn, 1970: 10). Once a particular paradigm gains credence most normal science, 
Kuhn, 1970: 25, is conducted using the assumptions embedded in it. Most normal 
science involves the application of the existing paradigm through research methods to 
solve problems. Often the solution to problems turns up unexpected answers, 
inexplicable using the existing paradigm. Examples could include Galileo or Fleming. 
The crisis in the inexplicability of results under the old paradigm creates new theory 
using a new paradigm, a process called paradigm shift. 
Unfortunately the word paradigm has been high-jacked by all manner of writers and 
used so indiscriminately that the original meaning according to Kuhn is nowitist one of 
many attached to the word's usage. The word is used here with extreme caution and 
circumspection to describe certain opposing conceptual positions. A case can be made 
for saying that the four Burrell & Morgan paradigms which follow or indeed the whole 
nominalist Vs. Realist debate are not Kuhnian paradigms but philosophical stances. In 
so far that paradigms relate to ways of doing scientific research, it has been decided to 
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stick with the word, warts and all, as it is for the relevance in choosing a research 
methodology that the discussion of paradigms and philosophy takes place at all. 
Burrell & Morgan in their 1979 book highlight four key paradigms at use in social 
science research, they are shown below in Figure 2-1. Although designed for 
sociological issues in the 1960s and 1970s, the authors stress that they can be used for 
the analysis of a wide range of social theories. 
Figure 2-1 
4 Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
Radical Change 
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist 
Subjective Objective 
Interpretative Functionalist 
Regulation 
Source: Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 22 
The paradigms of Burrell and Morgan are mutually exclusive offering alternative views 
of social reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to understand four different 
views of society. They are different forms of seeing, (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 25). 
The two uppermost paradigms in Figure 2-1 are radical, which means that they are 
involved in changing the social world. Radical humanists wish to overthrow the 
limitations of existing social arrangements using subjective means, an example would 
be Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. Radical structuralists also wish to overthrow 
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be Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. Radical structuralists also wish to overthrow 
contemporary social limits but believe this is best possible by attacking concrete (not 
subjective) structural relationships e. g. Marx's attack on the class system. These two 
paradigms have not been chosen for this research, surprisingly as they involve the 
sociology of radical change. However, the process of radical change was well under 
way in, East Germany during the data collection and as such is a contextual "given". Of 
more interest to studying change/resistance to change in M&As are the functionalist or 
interpretative paradigms. As at the macro level societal change was under way, it is 
more productive to try and explore the micro (firm) level happenings (functionalist) or 
understand these going-ons (interpretative). 
The two lower level paradigms in Figure 2-1 are now contrasted to see which suits the 
attaimnent of the research objectives and also the beliefs, interests and abilities of the 
researcher. 
2.5.3 Functionalist Paradigm 
The ftinctionalist theorists approach their sub ect matter from an objective point of view. j 
That means they are looking for rational explanations of social affairs and do so in a 
highly pragmatic, problem-oriented way. The functionalist paradigm is rooted in the 
tradition of sociological positivism or as its better known logical positivism. It uses as 
its tools the models and methods of natural science to study human affairs (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979: 26). Logical positivism was a reaction against those of a Kantian 
persuasion, who believed that all scientific theories are products of the human mind and 
that man tries to impose his theories on nature (Alt, 1980: 7). The classical adherents of 
positivism sprang up in Great Britain in the late 17th and 18th centuries, e. g. Bacon, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume. David Hume gave positivism its fundamental character by his 
insistence on the primacy of direct observation. He was following on from Gallileo's 
insistence on the primacy of scientific observations and measurements in the natural 
sciences. The mantle was taken up by the French, the most famous proponent being 
Auguste Comte in his book "positive philosophy" published in 1855. The effect of 
positivism on scientific research has been, and still is, substantial. The classic capture 
of data through: observations, scaling and measuring them, making empirical 
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generalisations and logically inducing theories flow directly from positivist thought e. g. 
Hume's billiard ball analogy (Alt, 1980: 8). The theory is then tested out by deduction 
of hypotheses which are then investigated for truth by once again capturing the data 
through observations. 
In the mid 20th century there developed an awareness that major scientific discoveries, 
e. g. Einstein 
- 
relativity; Fleming 
- 
penicillin, were not the product of logical and 
practical applications of scientific method. Indeed according to Alt, (1980: 10), 
"... logical positivism will not stand a moment's erious criticism". Take the notion that 
science grows by an accumulation of facts. The work of Gregory (1966) in the 
psychology of perception has shown conclusively that visual perception is not 
determined simply by the stimulus pattern on the retina 
- 
the facts of the matter, as it 
were 
- 
but that perception involves actively searching for the best interpretation of the 
sensory data", i. e. also using knowledge and experience. "There is no such thing as a 
fact which does not require some degree of interpretation by the observer". Strong 
words to lead into the second paradigm to be discussed. 
2.5.4 Interpretative Paradigm 
The interpretative paradigm is the direct product of the German idealist tradition of 
social thought, (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 3 1). Already mentioned above was the 
functionalist paradigm's emergence as a reaction to Kantian ideas. The work of Kant 
was the foundations for the interpretative paradigm with its emphasis on the spiritual 
nature of the social world (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 10). Kant's work developed at the 
turn of the twentieth century beyond its here-to influence on the "romantic" literature 
and art of the mid-I 8th century. Major contributions by theorists such as Dilthey, 
Weber, Husserl and SchUtz extended its interpretative nature to become a framework for 
social analysis. 
So the interpretative paradigm views the social world as having a spiritual nature, but 
what does it really encompass? Three streams of thought are usually referred to as the 
central foundations of the interpretative paradigm: Hermeneutics, phenomenology and 
ordinary language philosophy, (Giddens, 1976: 23). 
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Hermeneutics is the science and methodology of interpretation, especially the Bible 
(Webster's II Dictionary, 1988). Texts contain subjective meanings exactly like humans. 
Just as the printed word of text can be studied to release the subjective meaning it holds, 
so also can human behaviour be interpreted and understood (verstchen), (Giddens, 1976: 
23). The period at the turn of the twentieth century also saw the contrast between 
natural and social sciences become more focused. Dilthey championed hermeneutics as 
a general methodology for the social sciences, emphasising understanding as the driving 
principle as opposed to the explaining (erklaren) principle of the natural sciences. 
Phenomenology is associated with Husserl, (1905) and is defined as: "the study of 
human awareness in which considerations of objective reality and purely subjective 
response are temporarily left out of account", (Webster's 11,1988). It was left to 
Husserl's prot6gd at Freiburg, Alfred SchUtz, to emphasise the use of phenomenology to 
social research. He noted that in order to penetrate to the essence of things, the 
researcher must question and suspend taught notions, assumptions and theories about 
the world, (Giddens, 1976: 25). The researcher must go back to basics which precede 
understanding by having an open but alert, not pre-programmed mind and research 
attitude. No small task for the researcher! 
The ordinary language school founded by Wittgenstein the latter, is based on language 
becoming the basis of cracking philosophical problems. Language is a form of life and 
both life and language take for granted assumptions which need to be understood within 
a specific social context. Hence knowledge coming out of social science enquiry is not 
value free or objective, it is socially constructed and socially sustained, (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979: 255). 
The above three streams of thought help make up the interpretative paradigm, (Wilson, 
1970). Hence the task of the social scientist should not be to gather facts and measure 
patterns, rather to appreciate the different constructions and meanings people place on 
their experience. Human actions arise from the sense that people make of different 
situations. Therefore social research should investigate through the adoption of a 
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research methodology, that is capable olf capturing the real world, i. e. real peoples' given 
meaning of social phenomena. 
2.5.5 Modernist Vs. Postmodernist 
The functionalist Vs. nominalist debate stemmed from the 1960s and 1970s and as such 
is somewhat dated. The philosophical debate has moved on now to a discussion of 
modernism Vs. postmodernism. The participants and concepts have a lot of 
commonality. Gibson Burrell, oft quoted above in Burrell & Morgan, (1979), 
introduced the concepts of modernism and postmodernism into organisational analysis 
from the area of the arts (Cooper & Burrell, 1988). 
In the modernist model, organisations are viewed as a social tool and an extension of 
human rationality. In the postmodern view, organisations are Less an extension of 
planned thought and calculated action and more a defensive reaction to forces intrinsic 
to the social body, which constantly threaten the stability of organised life. 
The link from the functionalists to modernism is that of rationality. The link draws on 
Max Weber's concept of the iron cage of modem economic order, where all non- 
rational processes are sacrificed in favour of organisations whose purpose is a process of 
embellishing rationalisation and objectification of social life (Cooper & Burrell, 1988: 
92). Modernism assumes a universal foundation that the world is logical and 
meaningful and controlled by reason. 
Postmodernism is more akin to the nominalist standpoint. The idea that we are subject 
to forces beyond us is repugnant to postmodern thought. The world is basically self- 
referential, it is neither pro human nor anti human, itjust is. Postmodernism therefore 
decentres the human agent from its self-elevated position of narcissistic "rationality" 
and shows it to be essentially an observer-community which constructs interpretations 
of the world, these interpretations having no absolute or universal status, (Cooper & 
Burrell, 1988: 94). Postmodernism has taken up the mantle of an interpretational view 
of social research. 
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2.6 Methodology for Social Science Research 
In the two previous sections the differing and mutually exclusive paradigms of 
functionalism (positivist) and interpretativism (anti-positivist) were examined. The 
former views the social world as being "objective", the latter as being "subjective". 
Each tends to be associated with a particular methodology. Positivism with quantitative 
and interpretivism with qualitative research methods. Research methodology being ".. a 
system of explicit rules and procedures on which research is based and against which 
claims for knowledge are evaluated", (Frankfort-Nachmais, 1992: 14). 
2.6.1 Quantitative Research 
So what does all the philosophy in 2.5 mean for the research in this dissertation? The 
rationale for plumping for either a quantitative or qualitative design can be explained 
philosophically by answers to the choices in Table 2-1. 
TABLE 2-1 
Contrasting Attributes with Different Paradigms 
Positivist Interpretative 
Researcher is independent VS. Researcher is involved 
Testing theories VS. Generating theories 
* Source: Easterby-Smith et al, 1991 
Quantitative research methodology tend to be the logical fall out from adopting a- 
positivist paradigm. As positivists view the world as containing external facts, so they 
use the classic hypothesis deduction method of research to test out hypotheses to 
confirm/refute them and hence the underlying theory. The techniques of the natural 
sciences are most useful here as the emphasis is on the "nature type" laws in the social 
world which require the surfacing of causal relationships between social phenomena, i. e. 
data which can be measured by identifying variables and statistically analysed for 
general isability. Observations are used here to deduce linkages to confirm or refute a 
theory. In order to achieve the (non) confirmation of a theory then the data gathered 
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must be trustworthy. Trustworthy data are data which exhibit validity, reliability and 
generalisability and which can be examined against the canons of soundness which 
according to Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 145 are applicable by using four questions. 
I (1) How truthful are the particular findings of the study? By what criteria can we judge 
them? The first double question measures the internal validity of a data set. The term 
internal validity was first introduced by Campbell & Stanley, (1963) and expanded by 
Cook and Campbell, (1979). 
External validity refers to the generalisability of findings across or to target populations, 
settings, times, etc. The canon question here is: 
(2) How applicable are these findings to another setting or group of people? The term 
generalisable to concerns the validity of generalisability of samples to populations of 
which the samples are presumably representative, e. g. does a 10% sample of miners 
represent all miners? On the other hand generalising across populations concerns 
results obtained from a given population being generalised to other populations, e. g. 
using results from female workers for male workers as well. 
The reliability of findings can be expressed by answering the following question: 
(3) How can we be reasonably sure that the findings would be replicated if the study 
was conducted with the same participants in the same context? There are at least four 
reasons why results may be unreliable. They split between subject and object and 
between error and bias, i. e. between the people being researched and the researcher. 
The fourth canon question relates to the objectivity of the results. 
(4) How can we be reasonably sure that the findings are reflective of the subjects and 
the inquiry itself, rather than the product of the researcher's biases and prejudices? 
Some authors, e. g. Kirk & Miller (1986) view objectivity as the simultaneous realisation 
of as much reliability and validity as possible. 
In summary, the results of the first three questions, when applied, give an indication of 
trustworthiness, a concept made up of reliability, validity and generalisability, (Robson, 
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1993: 66). This means 
- 
are the results of the enquiry worth taking account of, and are 
they believable? 
One question in Table 2-1 was whether the researclfs objective is the testing out of 
theories or the generation of theories? As noted in section 2.1, the contemporary nature 
of the fall of the iron curtain means that a body of theory has not surfaced concerning 
change and its (non) acceptance in the changeover from command to market economy. 
Little theory exists to be tested out but there is a large deficit in producing theory. This 
does not mean that existing Western theory is irrelevant and cannot be tested out in 
transforming Central & Eastern European economies. However, it is debatable whether 
the basic understanding o, f the workings of the market system, that we in the West take 
for granted, is deeply engrained enough in the Eastern collective psyche for the theories 
to be tested out. The concept of marketing, for instance, is now taught throughout East 
Germany. However, practitioners relate that it is regarded as what appears in textbooks, 
i. e. academic, and the relevance to current conditions has not been assimilated. 
The second question in Table 2-1 concerned the independence or involvement of the 
researcher including any relevant personal beliefs, interests and abilities. The 
background of the researcher is a long career in general management and a social 
science, as opposed to natural science, educational specialisation. This history has 
helped shape the personal belief that it is the person (or persons in groups) who are 
critical to achieving business transformation. It is difficult to remain independent of the 
people who are the subject matter of the research. It is also undesirable if one wishes to 
gain access to their more deeply held values and beliefs. These tend to be regarded as 
private and only shared when a researcher has built up a level of empathy, involvement 
and trust. The possibility for researcher bias is therefore present and duly flagged. 
2.6.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative methodology usually involves the inductively going from empirical to the 
theoretical level. It also expects the subjects to be able to think about and express their 
feelings and beliefs, they are notjust objects to be examined. Some of the various 
qualitative techniques associated with interviews are shown below in Table 2-2, which 
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links them to the different depth of information attempted to be extracted from 
individuals. Qualitative research techniques vary on a continuum from those nearest 
quantitative (merely exploring type research) to theory building, a very qualitative 
activity. 
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Table 2-2 
Responses to Interviews 
City Univorsity 
ftdisfw Crmam LýW 
12 FEB 1999 
N*T TO BE REMOVED 
FROM THE LIBRARY 
Accessibility to respondents Layers of response Examples of Techniques 
ftorn respondents 
r r ----------- r ----------------- r ------------------ 
P 
U Highly structured 
13 C questionnaires 
L 0 Spontaneous 
I M reasoned e. g. telephone surveys 
C M conventional 
U A 
N W 
I A Questionnaires with an: 
C R amount of open ended 
A E questions to allow 
B Concealed probing 
P L personal 
R E e. g. face to face surveys. 
V 
A 
T 
E Semi structured to 
unstructured interviews 
N Intuitive on an individual or 
0 Imaginative group basis 
N 
C e. g. focus group 
0 interviews 
M 
M 
U U 
N N Unstructured 
I A interviews and 
C W Unconscious observations 
A A Repressed both quantitative 
T R and qualitative 
A E e. g. naturalistic 
B approaches on a 
L one-to-one basis, 
E collaborative 
inquiry 
L 
----------- ----------------- 
L 
------------------ 
$ Source, University of Bath Research Methods Course, 1995 
Qualitative methodology usually involves small sample sizes as it is time consuming 
and expensive to obtain in-depth data on the underlying beliefs of individuals. 
Returning to the criteria of soundness or trustworthiness and g- iven small sample size, 
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how trustworthy will any results be? This question can be answered by acknowledging 
that a small number of interviews (say 36 maximum) might never be generalisable 
(externally valid) to all eight million East Germans. That bald statement is actually true 
statistically. However it is a quantitative statement which contains a difficulty for a 
qualitative study. The difficulty is letting go of the goal of wanting to generalise to the 
nth. degree. When the positivist goal of maximum general isabil ity is thrown out and 
replaced by a more modest phenomenological goal of showing the linkage between the 
original theoretical framework and the data collected and its analysis, then small sample 
sized qualitative studies can be externally valid or more accurately, transferable. 
The use of the term transferable as a replacement for external validity or generalising 
across was suggested by Lincoln & Guba (1985). Indeed they sought to stress the 
difference between positivism and phenomenology by giving all the constructs of 
soundness different names. The new names and their altered meanings are set out in 
Marshall & Rossman (1989) on which this section is based. 
Lincoln & Guba renamed internal validity (or generalising to) as credibility under the 
qualitative paradigm. The goal under credibility is to demonstrate that the inquiry was 
conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and 
described i. e. has the researcher gained full access to the knowledge and meaning of the 
informants? Using this definition of credibility, it seems possible to justify the small 
sample size and in-depth interview methodology. 
The concept of reliability is a positivist notion which assumes an unchanging universe, 
where inquiry can be logically replicated. However, qualitative thinking assumes the 
complete opposite, that the social world is always changing, thus hindering replication. 
Lincoln & Guba, (1985) suggest the term dependability for qualitative reliability. Here 
the researcher attempts to integrate changing conditions into the study and refines the 
design continuously as understanding increases. Now the question can be posed as 'will 
similar observations or meanings be made by different observers or interviewers on 
different occasions? Given this definition of dependability it should be possible to 
classify the actual field work as dependable. Each in-depth interview led to the 
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refinement of questions to be posed in the next and subsequent interviews. However 
will similar meanings be made on any subsequent replication? 
Here the qualitative viewpoint brings up the final Lincoln & Guba construct of 
confirmability which replaces logical objectivity. Objectivity of findings is dependent 
on being reflective of the subjects and the inquiry itself, rather than the product of the 
researcher's biases and prejudices, compare with the Kirk and Miller definition quoted 
earlier. However under phenomenology, as already stated, objective observation is 
impossible and understanding is derived from experience. Here the effect of a 
researcher's presence on the setting is as inevitable as it is hard to gauge (researcher and 
subject bias). To allow for this inescapable bias is the goal of correct conformability 
and needs a thorough understanding of the researcher's own personality and background. 
The subject matter of this researcher's potential biases, beliefs, interests and abilities has 
been addressed above in the quantitative section, further attention will be given in 
section 4.4.5 entitled " researcher and subject bias". 
2.6.3 Choosing between Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology 
An involved researcher knows that he affects the research and is indeed part of it. 
Without being involved it is difficult to give weight to the view of reality imparted by 
the subject. The sample size and numbers involved are small, giving weight to a 
qualitative approach. Additionally, the nature of the subject matter itself (differing 
perceptions) is mainly non-quantitative, leading again towards qualitative research. 
Instead of converging deductively on a neutral view of reality, interpretative based 
research, induces alternate theories and models from the observed patterns. These 
alternative theories and models can be classified as claims to the truth. It is the 
originality and explanatory power of a truth claim, that is a form of expression and is a 
relationship with a larger public that produce value in a scientific community, (Lindlof. 
1994: 250). 
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To make the research manageable and to delve deeper into the possible causes of 
acceptance/non-acceptance of change, limitations have to be built in. These limitations 
are what delineate qualitative research from quantitative and are: 
The results will not be generalisable to East Germany as a nation, but will allow 
future researchers to transfer the issues and research methods to another setting. 
Transferability instead of genemlisability, (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & 
Rossman, 1989). 
The results will have credibility only in as far as they are an accurate description and 
identification of the issues. Credibility instead of validity, (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Marshall & Rossman, 1989). 
The results will be dependable only in as far as similar meaning will be found at a 
different time. Dependability instead of reliability, (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall 
& Rossman, 1989). 
In summary then an interpretative paradigm governs this research facilitating the choice 
of qualitative methodology to gain the below the surface level personal data necessary to 
satisfy the accomplishment of the research objectives. To quote Clifford Geertz (1973) 
"The concept of culture I espouse... is essentially a semiotic one. Believing with Mar 
Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs ofsignificance he has spun, I take 
culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search oflaw but an interpretative one in search of meaning" The selection 
of a research design which will facilitate this interpretative process of finding meaning 
is explained in the data chapters 4&5. The differing goals and units of analysis of 
chapters 4&5 mean that there are of necessity differences in the type of data collection 
required and hence the separate discussion of the research design. 
2.6.4 Pilot Study 
A pilot study took place with such promising results that the data gathered has been 
incorporated in the general data discussed in chapters 4&5. 
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The selection of 
, 
and approach to, a target company was an extremely fortuitous and 
unplanned exercise. A guest lecturer at the business school, who was the managing 
director of a food processing company, was approached as he mentioned in his lecture 
that the firm, Dalgety PLC had opened up a new subsidiary in East Germany. The 
outcome was a series of three in-depth interviews at the German headquarters of 
Deutsche PIG GmbH, a subsidiary of Dalgety PLC. The company's business is 
breeding pigs, both hogs and sows, and by selectively pairing plus genetic engineering 
increasing the meat yield. Although small in size the company had hired new workers 
from East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The three interviews were split 
between the West German deputy CEO and two East German 'successes'. Successes 
are classified here as those that did not leave, both voluntarily or involuntarily, like 60% 
of the other hired East Germans. 
This study was useful in testing out interview procedures (use of tape recorder, % of 
time on social niceties etc. ) and refining questions. The questions asked were open 
ended and each unexpected answer was incorporated into a new question at the next 
interview. The outcome was a confirmation that there was some mileage in the research 
issues especially in the area of individual Vs. group, and, as would be expected under 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), allowed new areas of potential fertile 
material to surface. Additionally, the results were included into the main primary data 
as already stated. 
2.7 Conclusions and Onward Links 
In summary, the research methodology is bedded in postmodernism and the interpretive 
paradigm, which encourages the use of qualitative research methods. The dissertation 
continues with a general review of literature (Chapter 3), followed by the two field data 
chapters, where the qualitative research methods necessary for the divergent chapter 
themes are selected and employed at six East German M&As. 
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Chapter 3- General Literature Review 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
Like most other PhD dissertations, this research was preceded by a substantial phase of 
reading around, and into, the subject. This rather short general literature review reflects 
the areas explored in the literature at that early stage. Speciflc literature reviews which 
deal in more depth with the subject matters under exploration are included in each of the 
two data chapters, (Chapters 4& 5). The idea being to have the most relevant literature 
fresh in mind and in close proximity to where it is most needed. Additionally this allows 
the data chapters to be structured like journal articles and they can be read by the reader 
in a hurry without having to first cover this chapter. 
The layout of this chapter then reflects the progression of introductory reading around 
each of the critical points of the objectives of the research. As is stressed throughout the 
whole dissertation, the overarching theoretical slant of this research is strategic 
management. The chapter opens therefore with an overview of strategic management 
literature germane to the main areas of the research objectives, integration and learning. 
Here the usefulness of the resource Based View of the Firm is raised for the first time. It 
is the human resources inherited with the acquired East German firms who can feel 
integrated and learn new technologies and commercial thinking. A direct link to the 
Resource Based View is then obvious. Literature and theory in the fields of change 
management and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is introduced, but the main 
discussion of the relevance of these theories is saved for the specific literature section of 
Chapter 5. 'The importance of the topic of leaming to successful integration became 
obvious only at the end of the data collection. The review of literature on leaming is 
located therefore totally within Chapter 5. 
Research in management cannot be easily pigeon holed into'one or other school of 
thought. Likewise this research spills over from the Strategic Management field into 
Organisational Behaviour. Consequently as a lead-in to the more specific 
Organisational Behaviour theories, a historical walk through general Organisational 
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Theories is attempted in order to set the macro-level theory scene within which the 
researched M&As operated. 
Field research in East Germany by a British researcher based in West Germany brings 
up interesting issues concerning cross-cultural research. The overriding work in this 
section is that of Geert Hofstede, whose concept of cultural cluster dimensions is 
introduced. Detailed discussion of Hofstede's findings and their relevance to East 
German research are saved for the data chapters. 
Research on East German culture is not well developed, see Appendix' I for a 
substantive listing of pre and post unification work. Therefore differences between 
Anglo-American and German culture are examined to gain some approximation of East 
Germany by using West Germany as a surrogate. There are dangers here of assuming 
cultural similarity which does not exist between the two parts of united Germany. By 
way of introducing East Germany and closeness or distance from West German culture, 
a look at the nurture Vs. nature debate sets the scene. If "nurture" is in ascendancy, then 
East Germany will have a different learned culture from West Germany due to forty 
years separation. On the other hand, if "nature" is more prevalent than the deep-freezer 
effect will be at work. The deep-freeze theory is that the genetically similar East 
Germans will burst back into the market economy exhibiting all the inherited pan- 
Germanic characteristics which equip West Germans so well. The general literature 
review closes with a brief look at some of the German language material on East 
German transformation. 
3.2 Strategic Managiment Literature 
The question "what is strategy? " seems like a simple to answer challenge but 
surprisingly there are conflicting schools of thought in this field (for a sample of the 
different schools, see Mintzberg, 1990; Schoemaker, 1993 and Whittington, 1993). One 
underlying, basic idea is that strategy is how to move an organisation from where it is 
now to where the management want it to be in the future. Most people assume that 
strategy involves well laid out plans to achieve the future goals, but in fact often what 
happens is just the result of reacting to the environment i. e. emergent strategies 
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(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). In addition to including the ambition of reaching a 
different future, most definitions of strategy contain three elements: process, content, 
context (De Wit & Meyer, 1994). Each of these three elements can be viewed from an 
internal (firm specific) or external (environmental) objective. 
It is therefore proposed in this section to review the strategic management literature 
using the three element of process, content and context, exposing each to internal and 
external influences. As the field of strategic management literature is extremely 
comprehensive, the review concentrates on those sections which are relevant to 
international expansion via M&As and specifically to the strategic implications of 
barriers to change and integration which occur in such expansions in East Germany. 
i. Strategy as aprocess views the world of strategy as processes or techniques to be 
applied. The best known process is the SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, ' 
opportunities'and threats). Externally SWOT can be used to gauge the opportunities and 
threats in the environment facing the firm, especially the competitive situation within 
the industry e. g. Porter's five forces, Porter, (1979). Additionally firms operating in 
various markets with differing products and subsidiaries can use portfolio analysis 
associated with the Boston Consulting Group (Hofer & Schendel, 1978) to pick winners 
for the future. It is interesting to note here that the field interviews failed to show any 
usage of the above techniques by the six firms investigated before they entered East 
Germany. This lack of pre-consideration supports the existence of an emergent strategy 
which was mainly based on logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978), i. e. test the new 
market out a bit and make changes to survive, rather than following deliberate, pre- 
planned strategies. 
Internally SWOT, or the strengths and weaknesses part of it, can be used to assess the 
core competencies of the organisation (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990). Hamel and Prahalad 
define core competencies as the collective learning in the organisation, especially how 
to co-ordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology. It 
is interesting that learning is an important part of this definition of core competencies, 
the link to the theme of Chapter 5 is therefore obvious and relevant. 
69 
ii., Strategy as a content means the output of the strategic process 
- 
the intended or 
realised course of action selected to achieve the company's long term objectives (De Wit 
& Meyer, 1994: 213). Once again the external or internal viewpoints can be useful in 
approaching strategy content. The external view of strategy content is often linked to 
the idea of a positioning approach (Mintzberg, 1990) or outside-in approach. Here the 
management should try to fit (position) their strategy to what is going on in the market 
place, i. e. their environment. What was going on in the East German market place at the 
time of the research was revolutionary change which showed itself in disappearing 
demand and the rise of competition both international and domestic. Internally the 
content of the strategy process could include the nurturing of the core competencies 
identified by the SWOT process. Specifically, we are talking about the core 
competencies of the western take-over firm 
- 
perhaps in marketing, financial or 
technical areas 
- 
and also those of the East German organisation. It is the identification, 
valuation and development of the existing East German capabilities which form the 
basis of the research's main argument. Many of the M&As which were examined took 
scant notice of the talents they were inheriting. It is our contention that there existed 
talents and capabilities which when properly harnessed to the M&A's new vision could 
produce an excellent basis for future success. 
iii. All strategy takes place inside a context. The external context (the environment) in 
East Germany was not controlled but chaotic, another reason why incrementalism not 
planning was mostly in evidence. In the context area there are several school of strategy 
vying for attention to be used to explain what happens to a business. 
Institutional Theory as a test of how firms become isomorphic with their enviromnent, 
in the case of this research mimetic isomorphism (their response to uncertainty). 
According to Pennings, (1996) there are two strands to institutional theory: 
a. Organisations mirror societal conventions, traditions and values. Leading advocates 
being Tolbert & Zucker, (1983) and Hofstede, (1991). 
b. Organisations copy each other and move towards some norm, DiMaggio & Powell, 
(1992). 
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In the case of East German privatisations these two strands are both at play. In the first 
strand society does not change overnight and well established communist conventions 
hang on, in the heads if not in the structures. Pulling against this force is the underlying, 
German as opposed to East German culture. Has 40 yr. enforced isolation made East 
Germans values and norms different to West German ones? As will be discussed later 
in chapter 3, according to Schneider (1991) there are two views, East Germany as a deep 
freeze 
- 
they immediately resume their pre communist German culture on thawing out in 
a capitalist system, or nurture whereby social experience (even the impoverished 
communist one) shapes people as much as hereditary. 
In most of the firms visited, the western purchaser has tried to emphasise the second 
strand of institutional theory, namely structure is the result of mimicking and 
enforcement. However when the copying and mimicking has been solely a one-way 
process, there is a prognosis about a resultant dernotivating effect on the East German 
workforce who wanted their input to be recognised. The effect therefore of institutional 
theory is mixed. On the one hand West-East movements of knowledge are helped by 
copying and mimicking. More controversially, the research will posit that two-way 
learning, i. e. also East-West, is hindered by one-way institutionalisat ion. 
Agency Theory (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) seems to offer some application 
in this research. There were some cases where the Treuhand kept some residual stock in 
the privatised firms and there were resultant agency problems as the new western 
owners and the Treuhand had different goals, e. g. cost reduction vs. job retention, see 
the case on Company F at 5.5.2. In the case of Acerplan at 5.5.1, the East German 
management purchased some of the equity of the M&A and this had an excellent effect 
in reducing potential agency problems. 
Population Ecology (Lomi, 1996). There-would seem to be interesting research prpjects 
in ex-communist countries to test out the theory that firms die when they cannot adapt to 
changes in their environment. In East Germany it is relevant to note the artificial 
influence of the German government which, by massive subsidies (I trillion DM in 6 
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years), has at least temporarily interrupted the normal evolutionary process. Once again 
however research in this area is outside the scope of the dissertation. 
Globalisation (Levitt, 1983). The Uruguay Round of world wide tariff reductions, the 
growth of regional trading blocks and impressive technical advances in communications 
and logistics mean that very few markets are free of influence from the consequences of 
globalisation. In East Germany these consequences include the presence of low wage 
competition in the near eastern neighbour countries, e. g. Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary etc., and the servicing of East Germany from the excess capacity available in 
the old Bundeslander. 
As far as the internal context is concerned, the anti-Porter views of Stopford and Baden- 
Fuller, 1992, that the firm matters, not the industry are the theoretical starting point for 
the research. That the firm matters can be explained by the resource based view of the 
firm. 
Resource based View of the Firm (Penrose, 1968; Wernerfelt, 1984; Connor, 1991) sees 
the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities. This school has definite applications 
to the research in hand. Namely it is the researcher's contention that by disregarding the 
existing resources (skills and contacts) of the East German acquisition, then some new 
owners have both missed an opportunity to leverage their purchased assets and also 
created a barrier to further integration of the new subsidiary. 
3.2.1 Change Management Literature 
The area of change management is one of the more developed topic areas discussed in 
this chapter, with regard to theory. Before launching into a review of the various 
theories, an explanation of the relevance of change management to the research may be 
worthwhile. 
The newly acquired East German subsidiaries had to change quickly or cease to exist. 
Ibe reasons are well known but are listed for completeness: 
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9 Sudden arrival of competition from the West. 
Decision to scrap public ownership in favour of private. 
Currency reform at DM I= Ost Mark I (the Ost Mark was the 'funny' money of the 
DDR). 
0 Marketing not plan fulfilment became critical. 
Collapse of the former export markets of COMECON. 
Outdated and worn-out equipment. 
Overmanning as seen with jobs for life and no unemployment. 
Concepts about the importance service or quality were unknown. 
With the disappearance of the inner German border, all East German consumers were 
able to, and indeed did, fulfil their needs through purchases from western firms. 
Without a swift and revolutionary change to efficient performance and a market dictated 
output, then the whole of East German industry could easily have disappeared. The 
need for quick change was thus omnipresent, unfortunately this seems not to have eased 
the transition. 
How then did existing theories of change stand up to the fall of communism? It needs 
saying right up front that the literature and theories of change management have all been 
developed in the western, capitalist world. This ethnocentricity of thought may be a 
weakness as theory was developed using a mindset, and assuming a mindset, 
fundamentally different from that which had emerged under communism. The theme of 
western dominated theory is discussed and further developed under the cross-cultural 
research heading (3.4) of this methodology chapter. 
Many of the views expressed in the change management theories seem at first glance to 
be divergent, indeed Gersick, (199 1) argues that underpinning heterogeneous paradigms 
cause such diversity. However some commonality exists. Firstly many of the theories 
are known by their countervailing extremes: Evolutionary or revolutionary, inertia or 
stress, top-down or bottom-up, imposed or negotiated etc. That the theories highlight 
extremes on a spectrum introduces the second commonality, that a tension exists 
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between the extremities. Indeed it is this tension which, if properly exploited, can form 
the basis of acceptance of change. 
The first continuum of change pressure to be examined is whether change slowly 
evolves (Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Miller & Friesen; 1980, Nelson & Winter, 1982), or 
explodes onto the scene as a revolutionary transformation via catastrophe theory 
(Bigelow, 1982). According to Grinyer & McKiernan, (1990) the 'slow change' models 
(Clarke & Stanley, 1988) have as parents Cyert & March's (1963) seminal work on the 
behavioural theory of the firm, which itself incorporated detailed thought on 
bureaucracies from Max Weber, (1924). Bureaucracies are damned as being unable to 
adapt to a changing environment because of historically determined structures and 
power distribution. The belittling of bureaucracies is somewhat unfair because in stable, 
mature markets, mechanistic (Bums & Stalker, 1961) or machine (Mintzberg, 1983) 
bureaucracies can operate efficiently. Not only inherent structures and power 
distribution exert pressure to remain with the status quo, there has usually been a 
substantial investment in human and financial capital, as would be expected from the 
resource based view of the firm, (Penrose, 1959), which is unlikely to be easily 
sacrificed. The pressure for change, often visible in the relative decline of the firm, is 
present to some extent in all organisations (Slatter, 1984: 61). Some firms are proactive 
and by a series of complementary, sequential small changes or logical incrementalism, 
(Quinn, 1978) are able to avoid a full blown crisis. Other firms wait too long and thus 
have to be reactive to the crisis when it arrives. 
A second body of change management literature which also very visibly incorporates the 
idea of pressure between extremes is the interaction of stress and inertia (Huff, Huff & 
Thomas, 1992). Inertia encompasses personal commitments, financial investments and 
institutional mechanisms upporting the current way of doing things. Stress arises 
between a mismatch between the demands/opportunities facing the organisation and 
current strategies. The environment may change through new methods (Van der Ven, 
1986), new entrants (Porter, 1980) or new employees (Clark, 1970)., All lead to 
dissatisfaction with the misplaced current strategy, i. e. stress (Chandler, 1962). 
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3.2.2 Mergers & Acquisitions Literature 
The issue of merger's & acquisitions can be viewed from a macro (national) or micro 
(employee) position. The idea that West Germany has bought out East Germany and 
imposed the culture of the winner on the looser is prevalent not just in East Germany. 
The long term effects of this perception, regardless of if its actually true or not, may well 
be future social and political unrest. However the macro level falls outside the scope of 
this research, although the perceptions and emotions are present in the workplace of 
East German M&As. 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions, hereafter M&As, splits into two groupings. 
The somewhat more researched and established part concentrates on reasons for the 
choice of a M&A partner. Most of this research has focused on the strategic or financial 
fit (Blake & Moulton, 1984, Chattedee, 1986, Lubatkin, 1987). The fit or synergy was 
only viewed in a non-dynamic way, usually by examining the position prior to M&A. 
Jamison & Sitkin, (1986) expanded this view to see it as a process over time, including 
the period of negotiating the M&A. 
The second, less researched area in the literature looks at the post M&A time period. 
Indeed Mirvis & Sales, 1984 saw this as a process in their longitudinal (3 yr. ) study of a 
merger. As East German subsidiaries were researched, which had some time previously 
gone through the negotiating phase, then the second body of literature is more relevant. 
There are several post merger activities which have been researched: human resource 
management (Canella & Hambrick, 1993), management systems or tasks (Shrallow, 
1985; Schweiger & Walsh, 1990). The divergent cultures of a capitalist, foreign, mainly 
Anglo-American acquiring company versus the communist, East German acquired 
company exposes cross-cultural interactions in the post merger phase, both between 
different nationalities and firm cultures. The cultural interaction theme is currently 
receiving much attention but the existing literature (Mirvis & Sales, 1984, Walter, 1985, 
Shrivastava, 1986, Nahavandi & Malekzadeli, 1988, Chattedee, Lubatkin, Schweiger & 
Weber, 1992) is not encyclopaedic. The interaction or intermingling of two cultures is 
called acculturation, a term borrowed from anthropology (Berry, 1980) and is discussed 
in depth in Chapter 5. 
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3.3 Organisational Theory Literature 
The literature on organisations can be divided into four schools each occupying a 
quadrant of Figure 3-1 (Luthans, 1992). Two of the variables under discussion, 
individuals and groups, were researched within the setting of the firm. It can be seen 
that given the research concentration on individual firms within a research aim of 
theorising from emerging patterns, then the resultant findings will tend to be relevant to 
organisational behaviour, the top right segment of Figure 3-1. The applied schools 
within the OD and P/HR areas are not discussed as they tend to be prescriptive and this 
research is investigative. 
However it would be counterproductive to review only organisational behaviour 
literature, and that in a vacuum, and therefore a historical summary of the six main 
schools in organisational theory precedes the more micro level works. The aim is not to 
cover each school in detail but to bring out points relevant to a study of groups and 
individuals embedded in the various schools. 
Figure 3-1 
Schools of thought in the study of organisations 
Macro Micro 
OT OB 
Theoretical (Organisational (Organisational 
Theory) Behaviour) 
OD P/HR (Personnel 
Applied (Organisational and Human 
Development) Resources) 
Society Firm 
* Luthans (1992, pp. 8) 
According to Shafritz and Ott (1987) organisation theory schools of thought can best be 
surnmarised using a historical approach, however there are countless other ways of 
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classifying writers into schools e. g. Astley & Van de Ven (1983) use level of analysis 
and deterministic or voluntaristic assumptions. The chosen schools are shown below in 
Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 
Six Schools of Organisational Theory 
1. The classical school 
- 
Fayol (1916), Weber (1922), Follet (1926), Mayo (193 3), 
Bamard (1938). 
2. The neo-classical. school 
- 
Maslow (1943); Simon (1946), Selznick (1949), Lewin 
(1951), Parsons (1956) 
3. The'modern' structural school 
- 
Bums & Stalker (1961), Lawrence & Lorsch (1969) 
4. The systems and contingency school 
- 
Katz & Kahn (1966), Thompson (1967), 
Galbraith (1973) 
5. The power and politics school 
- 
Pfeffer (1981), Mintzberg (1983) 
6. The organisational culture school 
- 
Schein (1985), Peters & Waterman (1982) 
* Adapted from Shafritz & Ott (1987) 
Preceding the six chosen schools were the famous works of Adam Smith (1776) and 
Frederick Taylor 0 911). These founding fathers of respectively economics and 
management are relevant to the discussion because of the attention they paid to 
specialisation. Smith's brilliant description of the benefits of the division of labour 
using an example of pin manufacturing was extended by Taylor to research the one best 
way of accomplishing any given task. The thrust of both men's specialisation arguments 
was to break jobs down into their basic constituents i. e. those tasks performed by the 
individual workers. So we find, even before the dawn of organisational theory, an 
intellectual basis for organising production on the basis of the contribution of 
individuals. 
Now it is immediately obvious that many individuals doing their own thing, no matter 
what their motivation, will not achieve strategic goals and effective output levels 
without some form Of co-ordination, or as it came to be known, of management. Henri 
Fayol published the first complete theory of management in 1916 although its late 
translation into English (1949) means that its importance was not immediately obvious. 
Fayol involved himself with the task of developing universal principles which could be 
applied to even large organisations where the co-ordination of individuals was difficult. 
His final, and for Fayol most interesting, principle was that of the esprit de corps. 
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'Union is strength! was his dictum. 'Efforts should be made to establish it'was his 
advice and'personnel should not be split up. These views place Fayol firmly at the 
front of a growing interest in the combination of individuals into groups or teams. 
Weber (1922) described the co-ordination and control of individuals as being handled 
by a bureaucracy, where there is a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in 
which there is supervision of the lower offices by higher ones. Weber's concept of 
bureaucratic authority is relevant to any discussion of groups and individuals but was 
extended by Follet (1926) to distinguish between authority or'power with' from 'power 
over' i. e. any authority is assigned from underneath by acceptance of personality rather 
than ascribed' bureauchtic position authority. Starting in 1924 and lasting until 1932 
the Hawthorne Studies at the Western Electric Company in Chicago took place. Writing 
in 1933 Elton Mayo used the studies to emphasise for the first time the human element 
in management and documented interesting results on group performance during and 
even after experiments with lighting conditions. Chester Barnard (1938) introduced the 
concept of communications in organisations and linked communications (meaning and 
understanding) to authority. 
The neo-classical school of organisation theory was born between the two world wars 
and criticised the classical theories as being too theoretical and not based on a scientific 
study of what happened at the workplace. The prime example being Herbert Simon 
(1946) who cautioned against he blind application of management rules (e. g. Fayol). 
Every decision in management should be weighed up to see if it contributed to 
maximising efficiency, not applied because it was the accepted recipe. Selznick (1949) 
is of interest in that his work involved the individual in the organisation. He noted that 
organisations consist of individuals whose goals and aspirations might not necessarily 
coincide with those of the organisation. Kurt Lewin (195 1) besides being famous for 
the force field theory of change also did some path breaking work on the achievement of 
change through the use of group pressure to achieve group norms. His research on 
getting new mothers in the rural South of the USA to accept natural stilling methods 
instead of using manufactured powder milk for their babies is a classic in highlighting 
the advantages of group, as opposed to individual, counselling as a means of changing 
long standing habits. One can summarise his message as the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts. Talcott Parsons (1956) expounded a sociological view of 
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organisations, and sociology being the study of groups his views can be used for the 
interpretation of group activities in the organisation. 
The 'modem' structural school has at its core the idea that there is one 'best' structure for 
a rational organisation. This'best' structure was shown to depend upon the environment 
by Bums & Stalker (1961). If the environment was stable then a mechanistic structure 
would probably suffice. A mechanistic structure included traditional hierarchy and rules 
and regulations. However if the environment was fast changing then an organic form of 
organisation was probably more apt. An organic form would entail less rigidity and 
more participation. The economic situation in East Germany changed rapidly in 1989 
from stable to unstable, thus Bums & Stalker's dichotomy of structures is of relevance. 
Similarly Lawrence & Lorsch (1969) stressed the importance of the environment in 
analysing organisations and dependent on the environment, different theories of 
organisation theory could be applicable. 
The systems and contingency school reflected the rise of computers and information 
systems in business. The organisation was viewed as a complex set of dynamically 
intertwined and interconnected elements, including its inputs, processes, outputs, 
feedback loops and the environment in which it operates. A change in any element 
inevitably causes changes in other elements (Schafritz & Ott: 234). Katz & Kahn 
(1966) call such a system an open system, where the system adapts constantly to 
changing environmental factors. In East Germany the environment had changed from 
closed to open. J. D. Thompson (1967) offered helpful advice to firms moving from a 
closed to an open system. He advocated dividing the organisation into sections which 
interacted with the newly unstable environment, and others which concentrated upon the 
technical operations, which he assumed were more stable. Exactly such a dilemma 
faced the management of all. East German firms after currency reunion. Indeed 
Galbraith (1973) noted that uncertainty was prevalent amongst open system 
organisations due to the relative lack of information viz. a viz. the amount needed. The 
greater the uncertainty, the more an organisation is advised to use a contingency 
approach to planning and decision making. 
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The power and politics school takes an even ftirther step along the road to more realism 
in organisational theory. The goals of the organisation are not always automatically co- 
opted by players. Coalitions within the firm continuously compete with one another for 
scarce resources using power and politics to attain their aims. In East German take- 
overs, or indeed any take-over, there is automatically two camps (the acquirer and the 
acquired). A lack of balance between these two camps can lead relations being 
governed by power. According to Pfeffer (198 1), power and authority are synonymous 
and therefore legitimate or structural authority gives the holder significant advantage. 
New owners may then have significant structural authority which is easier to exploit if 
the acquired employees are individualised as opposed to being in a solidifying group. 
The reality is that power is not always based on structural authority, people without such 
authority protect their domains and hence their status. In the ex-DDR this was common, 
with a so called Planerfullungspakt 12 (Voskamp & Wittke, 1991), here workers and 
their supervisors agreed unofficial output norms. The supervisor gained the security of 
some output, the workers protections from the worst excesses of party doctrine. 
Mintzberg (1983) splits up organisations into groups of influencers who try to attain 
their goals by exercising power. Mintzberg has five external and six internal groupings 
of influencers, all of whom influence events inside the firm and inside firms researched 
here. 
The final school of organisational theory literature came to the fore in the 1980s and is' 
the organisation culture school, a continuance 
-of the move started under power and 
politics towards more real life equivalence. An organisation's culture is often described 
as 'the way we do things round here'. Schein (1985) brings in a more precise definition: 
'deep level basic assumptions and beliefs that are unconsciously shared by members of 
an organisation and have been learned'. The culture is the result of continuous learning 
of responses that have been successful in the past in linking the environment to the firms 
internal workings. Schein's view of organisational culture stems from theories of group 
dynamics and group growth. Due to the historical, cumulative nature of organisational 
culture, it is by definition difficult to change and also potentially at odds with a 
12 In English "a plan fulfilment pact". This was a subtle mixture of co-operation and non-co-operation. 
The workers knew they would not be fired and used this power to extract a gentle working tempo, which 
would attain the low production targets but no more. 
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constantly changing environment. This later point is reflected vividly in the 
consequence of acceptance of Peters and Waterman's (1982) idea of using successful 
organisational cultures as models for changing other less successful firms. The 
successful firms are, with the benefit of hindsight, no longer so successful and the 
imported culture was never accepted at the deep levels necessary to become an 
organisational culture. The importance to the situation in East Germany is that 
successful organisational. cultures, of say West German firms, cannot be simply imposed 
on newly acquired East German firms and success automatically follows. Results from 
the field interviews plus the failure of one M&A (see section 5.5.2) highlight this point. 
3.4 Cross-Culture Literature 
One further source of macro level literature that needs mentioning at this juncture is that 
of national culture and its relationship with the organisational culture school needs to be 
defined. Culture was already noted as having a major influences on a fin-n. 
Organisations reflect the national culture where they are situated but also have their own 
organisational culture flavour i. e. culture exists not just in an organisational or national 
setting but in both. We do not acquire a new culture or lose the one we possess when 
we walk through the door to our workplace. According to Hofstede 1980: 10, 
everybody carries several layers of different cultures in their heads at all times. These 
include: 
" national 
" regional 
" ethnic 
" religious 
" 
linguistic 
" generational 
" class 
" organisational 
Germane then to this research is national culture i. e. the culture of East Germany as 
opposed to West Germany or Great Britain. The review of literature on national culture 
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started with Hofstede (1982 and 1991). Smith (1992) champions Hofstede as the major 
contributor to understanding national business cultures. Hofstede used a data base from 
72 IBM national subsidiaries, 38 occupations, 20 languages in 1968 and repeated his 
questionnaire survey in 1972. Hofstede's cross-cultural study grouped countries 
according to certain dimensions using cluster analysis. The four dimensions were: 
authority, individuality, masculinity and uncertainty. However with the exception of 
Yugoslavia, as it then was, IBM had no subsidiaries behind the iron curtain. So West 
Germany was used as a surrogate for East Germany at the start of the research. 
Hofstede's four clusters were later extended to eight by Ronan and Shenker (1985) but 
still without an eastern block country being represented. For a summary of the 61 
replications'Of Hofstede's work throughout the world, by the end of 1993, see 
Soendergaard (1994). 
A crucial question to usefulness of any research in the area of cross-cultural comparison 
is whether the world's cultures are moving closer together, through travel,, 
intemationalisation of business, better channels of communications and information etc. 
This idea is called the 'culture free thesis'. It is important because if say East German 
and West German national cultures are quickly converging, then the results of this 
research could be viewed as interesting but quickly to become irrelevant data. A good 
summation of the'culture free thesis'is given by Hickson & Pugh (1974). The idea that 
the logic of industrialism through the economies of scale and technology force a 
common pattern in different countries grew in acceptance throughout the 1960s, (Kerr et 
al (1960); Hickson et al (1974); Inkeles (1960); Galbraith (1967)). Child & Kieser 
(1979) review specifically the 'culture free thesis' by looking at organisational and 
managerial roles in British and West German companies without reaching any firm 
conclusions. The opposite camp (culture specific) is naturally focused around Hofstede 
with support from among others Haire et al (1966). Hofstede himself maintains that 
national cultures are moving but that they are moving together so the net result is little 
convergence. Replications of Hofstede's work according to Sondergaard (1994) support 
this view only in the area of increased world-wide individualisation, other dimensions 
seem not to have changed over time. That means perceived national cultural differences 
are staying that way 
- 
the 'culture specific' school is maybe vindicated, which increases 
the relevance of this specific research. 
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It is one thing to believe national culture affects values at work in organisations, it is 
another to believe, like Child, (1981), that national culture affects behaviour. Millar 
(1997) cautions that the assumption of national culture affecting behaviour (and not just 
values) is untested and in her own work on Eurotunnel, not supported. The relevance of 
decoupling national culture from behaviour in this research is that possibly East 
Germans took on communist ideals not as values but as behaviour. Behaviour is by far' 
the easier of the two to change. However if the 40 odd years of socialist society had 
occasioned the acceptance of communist thought as an intemalised value, then change 
in this area would be much more difficult and time consuming. This point affects 
concretely the variable of individual Vs. collegiate behaviour, to be discussed in depth 
in Chapter 4. The observed stubborn reluctance of East German employees to move 
away from group to individually based work activities supports the view that this area 
represents an internalised value, not a temporary behavioural trait. 
Hofstede found that national culture explained more of the differences in work-related 
values and attitudes than did position within the organisation, profession, age or gender 
(Adler, 1991: 46). The findings from Hofstede's work which are relevant to the research 
goals of this research are in two of his four dimensions of culture, uncertainty avoidance 
and individualism- collectivism. The other two dimensions, masculinity/femininity and 
power-distance although crucial variables in cultural differences between some nations 
showed similar values between Britain and West Germany. As the research is looking 
for dissimilarities in Anglo-German culture, then these two dimensions were not 
investigated. It should be remembered that four of the firms visited in the field research 
had British involvement in the M&A, the other two American i. e. all have similar 
Anglo-Saxon heritage. 
It-is worth noting here that a replication of Hofstede's work in East Germany has taken 
place (Hentze & Lindert, 1991/1992) and as if to prove the dangers of using West 
Germany as a surrogate, a significant difference was also found between UK attitudes 
and East German in the area of power distance 
- 
the third HoStede dimension. The 
significance of this finding will be addressed in the data chapter literature review. 
83 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
Is it possible to talk of a German culture or are there two, one for the ex-DDR and one 
for West Germany? The answer to this question affects this research in so far as any 
cross-cultural research cited between West Germany and Britain can only be used as a 
parallel for East Germany if commonality exists. Recent polls of German opinion 
(Spiegel Nr 27/3, July 1995) showed 67% of Germans supporting the statement 'the 
Wall is gone but the wall separating our thoughts and feelings is growing'. Support for 
the nurture theory. Further work on East German female consumers (Millar, 1994), 
discussed below, also supported the nurture theory. The nurture Vs. nature debate has 
direct implications for data collection, hence the concentration of interviews with East 
Germans as opposed to West Germans or foreigners. 
3.7 East Germany 
The general literature review on East Germany is split by language- The English 
language literature on East Germany falls into two categories. A wide introduction into 
East Germany aimed at interested generalist readers (Edwards & Lawrence, 1994) or 
more specific research on certain segments Of East German society, (Hitchens, et al, 
1992, Millar, 1994). Millar's article was very relevant as she assessed the changes in 
attitude of female consumers in East Germany, the rest of the CEE nations, West 
Germany and Great Britain. Hitchens et al produced a review of the comparative 
productivity between East Germany, West Germany and most uniquely, Northern 
Ireland. 
Millar's results showed East German consumers were still subject o the legacy of the 
old system and the trauma of its displacement. East Gen-nany then was firmly allied to 
other CEE consumer attitudes and not West German. The attitudes investigated were: 
optimism or pessimism about the present and future, receptiveness to marketing, home 
centredness, attitudes towards the west, consumer's frustration and children's buying 
interest. Only in the areas of reception to marketing and westernisation was there any 
solidarity between East and West Gennan consumers. Interestingly both sets of German 
consumers were highly sceptical of advertising. Having seen the inadequacies of 
German adverts, that is not surprising. 
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German monetary union (GEMU) on I July 1990 can be viewed as a forerunner for the 
European single currency. The effects on East Germany of GEMU could well reoccur 
in other peripheral, small, low productive EC countries, (Hitchens et al, 1992). That 
East Germany was poorer and less productive than its western neighbours should be of 
no surprise (except for the CIA, who constantly overestimated the GDR's GNP and 
placed the DDR as the 9th largest world economy). ' Kinsella (199 1) estimated East 
German per capita GNP at about 49% of West Germany's in 1988, even after allowing 
for price differentials. As discussed in Chapter 1, Productivity was equally dismýl. 
Even the most optimistic assessment only reached 50% of West German levels (Kom, 
1991) and shows the depth of the divergence. As in most countries, it is erroneous to 
treat the DDR as a homogeneous economy. The southern Lander: Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Sachsen and Thuringen are more heavily industrialised than the northern agricultural 
Lander: Mecklenburg-Vorpommem and Brandenburg, whilst East Berlin had most 
services, (Bode & Kriegen-Boden, 1990). The immediate result of monetary union was, 
as expected from the change management material (Grinyer & McKieman, 1988), a 
'Sharp retrenchment' producing job losses and some productivity improvements, as 
already discussed in Chapter 1. 
There has been a veritable avalanche of German language material on the transformation 
of East Germany since the fall of the Wall (Schwarz (1995). The sparsity of what the 
West knew before is apparent from Table 3-8, situated in the Appendix, which lists 
major studies both before and after the Wende in 1989. Note these studies are 
concerned with mainly management as opposed to employees right across the 
organisational hierarchy. 
Table 3-8 is in the Appendix 
Title: Empirical Studies about East German Management before and after 
reunification. Source: Lang (1994) 
Eight studies in the 40 years of communism compared with 26 and rising fast since 
1989 shows the explosive development of academic interest in East German 
transformation. However as Alt et al (1995) complain, the flood of studies has not as 
yet produced much theory, a point supported by: (Gutmann (199 1); Mayer (1994); 
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ReiBig (1994). Many studies by western academics and practical change programs from 
western ma. nagement consultants uncritically utilise existing western management 
theory (Spender (1988), without even seeking possible new theoretical models that 
would be grounded in the reality of the transforming CEE economies. There are many 
reasons other than western chauvinism for this lack of progress in producing new 
transformation theory: some are specific to the situation in East Germany, which is 
atypical of other Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies also switching from a 
planned to a market economy whereas others depend upon the definition of a 
transformation. 
East Germany is different from CEE neighbours in as far as monetary union, the use of a 
privatisation authority to quickly sell off ex-state owned firms and massive inward 
transfers from the old Bundeslander meant that economic transformation happened 
extremely quickly and ruthlessly. One could therefore argue that any theory coming out 
of the East German experience could show the way for the more slowly transforming 
CEE economies. This'leading indicator' function for East Germany rather as California 
is for the rest of the USA and then the world in marketing, is very seductive, but 
probably due to the specific circumstances isn't indicative of future trends. 
A more useful starting point is the definition of a transformation, because dependent on 
the definition chosen the process can be viewed as being finished or still on-going. The 
traditional definition of transformation is a political/economic one (system integration). 
Here once the political system has been changed to a democratic one and the economic 
system from a plan to a market one then the transformation is finished. The East 
German transformation could be viewed as being completed under this definition, 
whereby other CEE countries are still in the middle of this system integration process. 
However it is the researcher's viewpoint and that of Alt et al (1995); ReiBig (1994); 
Peter (1994); Trommsdorf (1994) that alongside the system integration, a social and 
culture integration is necessary for true transformation to have taken place. Alt et al 
(1994) use a definition of transformation which extracts from management theory, 
industrial sociology and psychology. 'Transformation is a controlled and self fulfilling 
social-cultural process which causes basic alterations in political, legal, technological, 
managerial, organisational and social structures. These structural changes also reflect 
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similar basic alterations in underlying values, mental and behavioural processes of 
individuals and groups within their environment and organisations in society'. 
Ethnographic studies in East German M&As are rare. However thanks to the kind 
interest showed by Dr. Birgit MUller, one example came into the possession of the 
author, (MUller, 1993, The wall in the heads: East-West German stereotypes and the 
problems of transition in three enterprises in East Berlin). One of the three enterprises 
reviewed, Hochhinauf, is the story of a 100% acquisition by an American corporation. 
The parallels between Hochhinauf and some of the six M&As visited in this research are 
interesting and revealing. Specifically the use of individual based incentives and the 
switch from standardised to individualised products. 
3.8 Conclusions and Onward Link 
East Germany, being the CEE country experiencing the most rapid transformation is 
therefore an interesting research location. The junction of Eastern and Western national 
and organisational cultures in M&As forms an even more potentially lucrative research 
laboratory. Armed therefore with theories from Strategic Management, Organisational 
Theory, Mergers & Acquisitions, Change and Cross-cultural Management which may or 
may not be relevant in an eastern setting, the research turns to concrete primary data 
from the field. The general literature of Chapter 3 will be supported by a more 
specialised look at that literature relevant to the data chapters' subject matter. 
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Chapter 4- Group Vs. Individual 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 4 is the first, and much the smaller, of two chapters dealing with research 
material collected in the field. It is a chapter which deals with the processes involved 
when individuals and groups learn to adapt to their new circumstances. In a series of 
interviews in six East German M&As, perceptions and depths of feeling about job 
uncertainty, possible lack of initiative and personal responsibility were surfaced. The 
connections between these constructs and successful integration of the post-acquisition 
East German work force were then postulated, taking into account the changing role of 
the work group. The breakdown of the East German work group (Brigade) in favour of 
increasing individualisation under pressure from job insecurity has implications for 
change management and successful integration. 
4.2 Setting the Context 
The starting point for reviewing literature of specific interest to assessing the role of the 
group and individual in helping/hindering integration in East Germany is the work of 
Geert Hofstede, already introduced in Chapter 3. The findings from Hofstede's work 
which are relevant to the research goals of this research are in two of his four 
dimensions of culture, uncertainty avoidance and individualism- collectivism. The other 
two dimensions, masculinity/femininity and power-distance although crucial variables 
in cultural differences between some nations showed similar values between Britain and 
West Germany. As the research is looking for dissimilarities in Anglo-German culture, 
then these latter two dimensions were not investigated. It is worth noting here that a 
replication of some of Hofstede's dimensions in East Germany has taken place (Hentze 
& Lindert, 1991/1992) and as if to prove the dangers of using West Germany as a 
surrogate, a significant difference was also found between UK/West German attitudes 
and East German in the area of power distance 
- 
the third Hofstede dimension. The 
significance of this finding will be addressed later in Section 4.2.6. 
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4.2.1 Individualism 
- 
Hofstede's definition (Hofstede, 1991: 51) is 
"individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his and her immediate family" 
i. e. to take personal responsibility. In measuring individualism Hofstede created an 
index (IDV) based on answer about 14 work goals, Table 4-1 shows the results. 
Table 4-1 
Individualism Index Values for Selected Countries 
USA 91 1 (Top) 
GB 89 3 
West Germany 67 is 
Yugoslavia 27 33/35 (only communist society 
measurement) 
Guatemala 6 53 (Lowest) 
* Adapted from Hofstede 1991: 53 
So it is to be expected that East German society, bearing in mind the 40 odd years of 
political encouragement of the group over the individual, will be even more collectivist 
than West Germany. Management in an individualistic society is management of 
individuals whereas in a collectivist society its management of groups (Hofstede, 1991: 
65). 
There is an extreme sparsity of references on the subject of individualism as opposed to 
group preference in German language research, one exception being R611inghoff (1996). 
It should be remembered that as shown'in Table 4-1, Anglo-Saxon scores on 
individualism (IDV) were substantially above those of West Germany. Hentze and 
Lindert (1992) confirm that East German IDV scores are even more weighted towards 
group than West German. The questions used by Hentze & Lindert to measure IDV have 
been criticised and given their research took place more than thirty years after Hofstede 
direct comparisons of IDV are inadvisable. An overall move towards more 
individualism is observable world-wide, due to rising levels of wealth, which according 
to Hofstede is directly correlated with increasing individualism (Hofstede, 1991: 76). 
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The causality according to Hofstede is higher wealth causing higher individualism, not 
the reverse. He found that out of the 20 countries surveyed in the IBM survey, 19 had 
grown richer between 1968 and 1972 and they had all shifted towards more 
individualism. Poor Pakistan was the only one to get poorer and suffered a shift towards 
collectivism (ibid.: 77). Therefore the implication for East Germany with a supposed 
relatively low IDV is that as the population becomes richer, there should be a 
convergence upwards towards West German individualistic index values, so long as the 
GNP of both parts of Germany is also converging. 
4.2.2 Individualism and Job Security. 
The researcher was unable to uncover any literature connecting unemployment, or more 
importantly fear ofjob loss, to a rise in individualism. As will be seen in the discussion 
of the field research findings, there is an almost hysterical fear amongst the interview 
subjects about loss of theirjob. The link hypothesised is that: with risingjob retention 
uncertainty, the old group bonds of integration and co-opeiation start to break down. 
Hofstede had nothing to say about this job insecurity influence on individualism, but its 
existence is captured in Lang (1994), where he reports measures ofjob security fears in 
the DDR before reunification and the New Bundeslander afterwards, see Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2 
Job Security Fears in East German Management 
I High feeling of job insecurity 
7 Low feeling ofjob insecurity 
DDR 
- 
1987 
DDR 
- 
1990 
Markinowski 1989 
SOKULT 92 & 
Hentze/Lindert 1992 
6 
1 
New Bundesldnder 
- 
1992/3 
Sokult 92 
in Lang 94 
Adapted from Lang 1994 
2 
The linkage between individualism, or more specifically loss of group cohesiveness, and 
job loss fears will be addressed under the findings of the analysis of the research data. 
4.2.3 Groups 
- 
Starting with the Hawthorne studies, 1924-1932 
- 
see Mayo 
(193 3), there has been an abundance of significant research on groups that has 
implications for organisational behaviour and management (Luthans, 1992: 350). 
Luthans goes on to summarise this research and its impact on effectiveness, see Table 4- 
3. 
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Table 4-3 
Summary of Research on the Impact That Groups Have 
on Organisational and Individual Behaviour 
Accomplishing tasks that could not be done by Aiding in learning about the organisation and its 
employees themselves environment 
Bringing a number of skills and talents to bear Aiding about learning about oneself 
on complex difficult tasks 
Providing a vehicle for decision making that 
permits multiple and conflicting views to be 
Providing help in gaining new skills 
aired and considered 
Providing an efficient means for organisational. Obtaining valued rewards that are not attainable 
control of employee behaviour by oneself 
Facilitating changes in organisational policies or Satisfying important personal needs, especially 
procedures 
Increasing organisational stability by 
transmitting shared beliefs and values to new 
employees 
needs for social acceptance and affiliation 
* Adapted from Nadler et al (1979) in Luthans 1991: 351 
After the Hawthorne Studies further research using controlled experiments into group 
cohesiveness and the effect of such cohesiveness together with leadership had on 
productivity were carried out by Schachter et al (195 1) and Berkowitz (1954). The 
results indicated, especially in the latter study, that highly cohesive groups which are 
well led obtain the highest productivity. Paradoxically cohesive groups which were 
poorly led obtained the lowest levels of productivity. Low cohesive groups regardless 
of leadership quality fell between the two extremes of the cohesive groups. The 
implications for management being that a group when well handled is a most valuable 
productive tool, however when mishandled the consequences can be dire. As we shall 
see, East German industry was based on the-group (Kader) and therefore transformation 
attempts would seem to have most potential success if the group was maintained and 
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given strong leadership. The results of Schachter's work are surnmarised in diagrarn 
fonnat in Figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1 
The pitchfork results from the Schachter study 
* As per Luthens 1991: 352 
I Productivity Hi Co. + Leadership 
Leadership 
Low Co. 
- 
Leadership 
Hi Co. 
- 
Leadership 
Time 
Hi Co. = High level of cohesiveness in the group 
Low Co. = Low level of cohesiveness in the group 
+ Leadership = positive, strong leadership (induction or influence in Schachter's language) 
- 
Leadership = negative, weak leadership (induction or influence in Schachtees language) 
4.2.4 Groups Vs. Individuals; pros and cons 
Where do the advantages of groups or individuals come from in an organisational 
setting? Morris et al. (1994) produced the following tables, which try to identify the pros 
(4-4) and cons (4-5) of both individualism and collectivism within the organisation. 
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Table 44 
Hypothesised pros of individualism and 
collectivism in an organisational setting 
Pros: 
" Employee develops stronger self-concept, 
more self-confidence 
" Consistent with achievement motivation 
" Competition amongst individuals encourages 
greater numbers of novel concepts and ideas: 
breakthrough innovations 
" Stronger sense of personal responsibility or 
performance outcomes 
" Linkage between personal effort and rewards 
creates greater sense of equity 
Pros: 
" Greater synergy from combining efforts of 
people with differing skills 
" Ability to incorporate diverse perspectives 
and achieve comprehensive view 
" Individuals treated as equals 
" more personalised, synchronised, 
harmonious while interpersonal conflicts are 
discouraged 
" Greater concem for welfare of others, 
network of social support available 
" More consensus regarding direction and 
priorities 
" 
Credit for failures and successes equally 
shared 
" Teamwork produces steady, incremental 
progress on projects 
* Morris et al 1994: 68 
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Table 4-5 
Hypothesised cons of individualism and 
collectivism in an organisational setting 
Cons: 
" Emphasis on personal gain at the expense of 
others, selfishness, materialism ' 
" Individuals have less commitment and 
loyalty, are more 'up for sale' 
Differences among individuals are 
emphasised 
* Interpersonal conflicts are encouraged 
Cons: 
Loss of personal and professional self to 
group/collective 
Greater emotional dependence of the 
individual on the group or organisation 
Less personal responsibility for outcomes 
* Individuals free ride on efforts of others, 
rewards not commensurate with efforts 
9 Greater level of personal stress, pressure for e Tendency towards group think 
individual perfonnance 
Insecurity can result from over-dependence * Outcomes can represent compromises among 
on one's self diverse interests, reflecting need to get along 
more than need for performance 
Greater feelings of loneliness, alienation and 9 Collectives can take more time to reach 
anomie consensus, may miss opportunities 
* Stronger incentive for unethical behaviour 
e Onus of failure falls on the individual 
* Morris et al 1994: 68 
One body of academic research supporting collectivism and questioning individualism 
(Franke et al, 1991), draws on the concept of 'Confucian dynamism' (CVS) 
- 
stressing 
thrift, perseverance, hierarchical relatedness and also the propensity to work in cohesive 
groups. The idea of 'Confucian dynamism is linked with the name of Michael Bond 
who co-ordinated the 24 researchers who via a cross-cultural study in 20 nations came 
up with this fifth Hofstede dimension (Hofstede, 1991: 164 &173). The accent on 
working in cohesive groups makes CVS an interesting factor for the topic of this chapter 
and indeed Shane (1994) publishes a table, replicated below as Table 4-6, where 
interesting differences are shown to exist between West Germany and Britain. There is 
a link from CVS to agency theory (Ouchi, 1981) where in cultures with a strong sense of 
obligation and duty to others then there will barriers to acting opportunistically against 
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the collective will (the agency problem). Managers have to monitor their workers less if 
they trust them not to show opportunistic behaviour, thus reducing agency costs. 
Table 4-6 
National scores on integration/trust 
* Shane (1994) 
4.2.5 Uncertainty Avoidance 
- 
is a measurement of the (in)tolerance of 
ambiguity in society (Hofstede, 1991: 111). This definition is extended to'the extent to 
which the members of a culture feel threatened by uhcertain or unknown situations' 
(ibid.: 113). This feeling shows itself in nervous stress and the use of written and 
unwritten rules to provide predictability. Hofstede developed an uncertainty avoidance 
index (UAI) which was calculated mathematically from replies to questionnaire 
questions. The index ranged from zero (weakest uncertainty avoidance) to over 100 for 
the strongest. Citizens of countries with weak uncertainty avoidance e. g. Singapore (8) 
were relatively comfortable in unpredictable situations. At the opposite cxtreme, high 
uncertainty avoidance e. g. Greece (112) means a pathological fear of being in situations 
where the outcome is unsure. This dimension showed the largest difference, (when 
measured by score rank), between British and West German cultural measurements of 
all Hofstede's measures. See Table 4-7. 
aty UnKvrsity 
Frotis*ý crmvt wvy 
17 FEB 1999 
WT TO BE REM01VED 
Fil 0M TH E Ll BWAIAR r 
2 Figures from Confucian Connection (1987) 
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Table 4-7 
Uncertainty Avoidance Values for Selected Countries 
Greece 112 
Yugoslavia 88 
West Germany 65 
Great Pritain 35 
Singapore 8 
I (Top) 
8 (only communist society measurement) 
29 
47/48 
53 (Lowcst) 
* Adapted from Hofstede 1991: 113 
The data in Table 4-7 allow the tentative formulation of an assumption. German society 
is more intolerant of ambiguity than British and if Yugoslavia can be used as an 
indicator of communist societies, then East Germany can be assumed to be even more 
so. A case can be developed to link the assumption about uncertainty avoidance to a 
perceived lack of initiative within the East German workforce. When an employee uses 
initiative, then they probably circumvent rules or do something that is not covered by 
rules and procedures. They are entering an ambiguous situation where the outcome is 
not certain. It is therefore proposed that 
East German employees will show relatively less initiative than their British or indeed 
West German counterparts. 
Hofstede's view of the more cautious German nature receives backing from Laurent 
(1983). In answer to the statement'It is important for a manager to have at hand precise 
answers to most of the questions that his subordinates may raise about their work', 46% 
of German respondents replied they agreed, whereby only 27% of British replies agreed. 
The study involved managers in nine Western European, the USA and two Asian 
countries. Similar results for a further statement about uncertainty avoidance were 
obtained. In reply to the statement' In order to have efficient work relationships, it is 
often necessary to bypass the hierarchical ine', 54% of German respondents agreed 
whilst the figure for British, replies was 69%. 
That differences in culture are recognised as a potential positive factor for 
multinationals is shown by the recent take-over of Morgan Grenfell by Deutsche Bank 
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(Financial Times, 29 October 1994). According to Herr Kopper, the board member of 
Deutsche Bank involved in the take-over: 'We hope it will give the Deutsche Bank 
another culture, thereby speeding up other things that we do'. Deutsche wished to learn 
from the innovating, free-wheeling, Anglo-Saxon way of doing business. 'Germany's 
consensus minded approach leads to consistency and quality but is a handicap when 
technologies and financial markets are rapidly evolving'. The subsequent scandal over 
rogue trading must have intensified the leaming process about the downside of free- 
wheeling dealing. There are only 9 million credit cards in Germany compared with 37 
million in GB, (Financial Times, 30 November 1994). Credit cards hostility can be seen 
to be a German reaction to the fear of uncertainty and follows on other examples 
- 
Germans took ages to start using cheques and cash machines. 
There seems to be a link between the existence and acceptance of hierarchy and the need 
for uncertainty avoidance. Maurice et al, 1980 couple the existence of qualifications to 
general acceptance in a certain level ofjob. What they found was that West Germans 
were much more specialised both in qualifications and years of on the job training than 
comparable British managers and supervisors. The inference being that British firms are 
prepared to accept a generalist in a responsible production position, whereas German 
firms would not. 
As briefly mentioned above in this chapter, the Hofstede dimensions of Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAI) and Power Distance (PDI) have been longitudinally tested now in East 
Germany with some interesting results, see Table 4-8 for UAI and Table 4-9 for PDI 
below. 
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Table 4-8 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) in East Germany 
BRD 
- 
1968 & 1972 Hofstede (199 1) 65 29 
BRD 
- 
1992 Hentze & Lindert 57 Would be 33 
1992 
DDR 
- 
1990 Hentze & Lindert 75.9 Would be 21/22 
1992 
New Bundeslander 
- 
Sokult 92 
1992 in Lang 94 
New Bundeslander 
- 
INTERKULT 62.03 Would be 31 
1994 ' in Herrmann & 
Wirant 1994 
* Adapted from Lang 1994: 87 
A word of warning is necessary in making comparisons of the scores. The Hofstede 
original surveys were made up of interviews with employees of IBM who according to 
Hofstede (1991: 25 1) make up a non-representative but functionally equivalent sample 
of national populations. However the three German studies in Table 4-8 looked at only 
managers and therefore they are even more unrepresentative of the population as a 
whole. Taking this criticism on board it is still possible to review the direction and 
speed of change in at least the East German cultural indicator. It would seem that East 
German managers at least have a higher feeling of threat from uncertain situations than 
their West German counterparts. Coming out of several decades of stagnation and 
resistance to change onto a revolutionary changing world platform, this finding is not 
too surprising. What is encouraging is the relative speedy movement of UAI figures 
towards their West German counterparts. One could generalise and say that 40 yr. of 
communism and isolation had nurtured an even more pronounced dislike of uncertainty 
than existed prior to the post war German separation into two states. However the 
return to old, inherited levels of uncertainty avoidance i. e. nature is taking place 
relatively quickly, but differences still exist. Naturally the distance to Anglo-Saxon 
attitudes in this area is still substantial. 
105 
4.2.6 Power Distance Index in East Germany 
An unexpected finding in the review of German language literature was made in a 
replication of one of Hofstede's dimensional tests, that of power distance. Hofstede 
(1991: 28) defines power distance as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally. That means in a small power distance country there is only 
limited interdependence between boss and subordinate, whereas in large power distance 
countries the opposite is the rule. The power distance dimension was not thought too 
relevant at the start of the research as Britain and West Germany scored exactly equal on 
this dimension as shown in Table 4-9, (Hofstede 1991: 26). 
Table 4-9 
Power Distance (PDI) 
Germany 1 35 
Great Britain 1 35 
USA 40 
India (lowest CVS) 
1 
77 
* Hofstede ( 199 1) 
It is theorised that the formal German propensity for hierarchical structure, so well 
characterised in the Hauptinann von Kbpenick, has been partly erased with generations 
of German schoolchildren being taught in post WW II schooling to emphasise anti- 
authoritarian attitudes. This was a conscious and laudable attempt to pre-empt any 
recurrence of Rihrer mentality extremism. Also at play here is the better training and 
qualification of the West German workforce, as shown already in Chapter 3, Table 3-3 
from Maurice et al (1980). The higher standards allow most shop floor production 
problems to be handled inside the work group in West Germany without going to the 
boss. Whatever the causes, there did not seem to be much mileage in researching power 
13 Figures in Hofstede & Bond (1988) 
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distance in East Germany. Lang (1994) in his research report on the project SOKULT 
92 turned up some very interesting figures for East German power distance, see Table 4- 
10. 
Table 4-10 
Power Distance Index (PDI) in East German Management 
BRD 
- 
1968 & 1972 Hofstede (1991) 
BRD 
- 
1992 Hentze & Lindert 
1992 
DDR 
- 
1990 Hentze & Lindert 
1992 
New Bundeslander 
- 
Sokult 92 
1992 
New Bundeslander 
- 
1994 
35 
24 
62.75, 
42.55 
45.10 
42/44 
Would have been 
49/50 
Would have been 
25/26, 
Would have been 
37/38 
Would have been 
37 
in Lang 94 
INTERKULT 
in Hemnann & 
Wirant 1994 
* Adapted from Lang 1994 
The relatively high PDI figure before reunification can be hypothesised as being the old 
pre-war Prussian acceptance of authority being frozen in place throughout the 
communist era. A second hypothesis could be that the political system in East 
Germany, with an all powerful, not to be questioned SED political authority, had 
ingrained in the population an acceptance of power against which they were helpless to 
make changes. The events immediately prior to October 1989 when the political 
absolute power was successfully challenged would suggest that the second hypothesis is 
of a temporary nature, if at all applicable. Certainly the rapid drop in the PDI scores 
immediately after the union of the two Germanys points to an element of forced cow 
tailing in the population. These interesting figures, with possible macro level causes, 
are also useful to the goals of the research as barriers to change may be influenced by 
the acceptance or not of authoirity. Specifically if the new Western owners and 
managers were seen to be and accepted as experts in the black art of capitalist 
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management, then the strategic changes they wished to make would receive less 
opposition than if they were to come from the old combine managers. 
4.2.7 The Post-Repression Psyche 
One body of literature on East German current culture, already mentioned in Chapter 1, 
section 1.1.4, is the trilogy of books by Hans-Joachim Maaz (1990,1993,1994). Maaz is 
the head physician of a Halle (East Germany) psychological clinic and as such has had 
much opportunity to see the trend in mental health both before and since the new era 
dawned. I 
Maaz analyses the socialism in the DDR and shows how just about everyone suffered 
from some form of repression, be it from the state, Stasi, justice, education, family, 
medicine or religion. The outcome of this constant repression was, and is, a feeling of 
deficiency and blockage of avenues to express feelings. These internal feelings have 
developed into a craving for the non-existent more stable past, with a tendency to seek 
out authority and obey and depend on it. Confronted with changed ideals such as 
creativity and self-reliance and disappointed with the new economic and social 
conditions, the average East German feels lost in a sea of insecurity. Add in the 
collision with the western world with its egocentricity, then an explosive recipe exists 
which can detonate with little warning. The ability of a psychologist to take his 
individual observations and forecast the state of the nation's people is risky (see 
methodology section). However, the issue of self-reliance is of immense importance to 
this research forcing itself into the main body of interviews. 
43 Emergent Questions and Working Assumptions 
The problem statement and main research questions involved here were the subject of 
Chapter 2, sections 2.4 & 3.2: 
What were the key hinderances to integration and learning? 
e What strategic actions eased the take-over process? 
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* What were the implications for two-way learning of any actions taken? 
In addition to the research questions, the literature chapter, backed up by a more specific 
literature review in this chapter, supports three working assumptions to do with 
hinderances to integration and leaming. The assumptions are bedded in the work of 
Hofstede (here West Germany is used as a surrogate for East Germany) or Hofstede 
replications in East Germany itself. 
The most comprehensive and significant pattern was hinted at in the literature, but 
strongly emerged from the data analysis itself The pattern is very comprehensive and 
significant as it incorporates all three of Hofstede's indexes, (PDI; UAI & IDV) but is 
not a mere replication of Hofstede's work.. UDI and PDI surveys have been carried out 
in East Germany, so therefore assumptions 2&3 below are interesting but not path 
breaking. However the novelty and severity of unemployment makes assumption I of 
higher significance and importance. 
The first proposition is comprehensive in that it addresses full square the rising 
individual isation, supported in the literature, and links it to the real life situation of 
employees in East Germany. It also allows some insight into the research problem. 
1. Risingjob uncertainty will break down group bonds ofintegration and co-operation. 
Working assumption 2 is the outcome of Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance index 
(UAI) differences between GB and West Germany (Table 4-7). Replication of 
Hofstede's work in East Germany shows a relatively convergence of West and East 
German UAls (Table 4-8), with East Germans showing more anxiety in uncertain 
situations. The pronounced GB 
- 
German difference on the UAI supports the view of 
differing initiative levels, because to use initiative means taking on board the risk of 
individual failure. Initiative in the work force can be viewed as a positive resource 
under the RBV of the firm. Therefore its absence may lead to competitive disadvantage. 
Z East German employees will show relatively less initiative than their British or 
indeed West German counterparts. 
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Working assumption 3 is supported by national differences in Hofstede's 
individualism index (IDV), see Table 4-1 and power distance index (PDI). see Table 4- 
9. The perception that individual employees will hide in their group to escape 
responsibility for their actions is backed-up by relatively high levels of PDI 
- 
here the 
boss gives instructions, so he takes responsibility. Also by low IDV 
- 
here the group 
takes responsibility, not its individual members. As in the second assumption, 
individual responsibility in the work force can be viewed as a positive resource under 
the RBV of the firm. Therefore its absence may lead to competitive disadvantage. 
3. East German employees will show relatively less responsibilityfor their own actions 
than their British or indeed Mest German counterparts. 
4.4 Research Design & Data Collection 
4.4.1 Research Design 
Research design is defined as the overall structure needed to carry out the research. It 
addresses how one goes from hypotheses (in quantitative research) and emerging 
patterns (in qualitative, grounded research) to a full blown research process. Under a 
quantitative methodology thought has to be given into how to opemtionalise the 
concepts under review (measurement), how to collect the data bearing in mind the 
sample size needed and then how to analyse whatever data are collected. Qualitative 
methodology starts the analysis process as soon as the first data are available. Indeed 
this is necessary to refine the questions being asked, observe the emergence of patterns 
and go through the cycle continuously of conceptualisation 
- 
data collection 
- 
analysis 
- 
conceptual isation. The recycling process finishes when the returns any new data are 
bringing, i. e. new patterns or deeper understanding of known patterns, become minimal 
or exhausted. The methods available to qualitative researchers have been mentioned 
previously in Table 2-2. The more structured the design of the data collection, the more 
difficult it is to tap into something unexpected or "unpeel the onion" (Valentine & 
Evans, 1993). 
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4.4.2 Choice of Type of Qualitative Design 
The various research designs available for qualitative field research which were named 
in Table 2-2 will, in the manner of a Dutch flower auction, be discarded here if not 
relevant to the research goals. 
As a qualitative design approach has been chosen, experiments or large scale 
questionnaire surveys can be eliminated from potential methods of prime data collection 
due to their inherent quantitative basis. Remaining are: in-depth individual interviews, 
group interviews (or focus groups), case studies and longitudinal, ethnographic research. 
The longitudinal ethnographic approach would seem to be the most qualitative and 
phenomenological leaning choice. A longitudinal study i. e. returning over time to the 
phenomena under investigation is a useful technique to explore aspects of. in particular, 
processes. Normally in a longitudinal study a small number of field visits are made at 
different times but this can be expensive, and impractical especially as questions about 
the pre-fall of the %%ull, pre-acquisition values, beliefs and attitudes were being sought. 
Therefore all the information was solicited in the one interview session, obviously 
putting pressure on the interviewee's memory. The number of firms Avas limited to six at 
which time it %%-as assessed that new information and patterns were no longer emerging. 
There are several examples of studies which have examined participants' interpretation 
of key events over time (see Gephart, 1984 and Isabella, 1990). These researchers have 
focused on identifying the cognitive logic (Silverman, 1970) threading through the 
understanding of a particular situation. Isabella 1990: 9 uses the term "the articulation 
of organisational members' collective viewpoint on particular organisational 
occurrencee', a reference to the Jungian idea of collective unconscious memory, (Jung, 
1933). The frames of reference that individual members of firm's share arc created 
through social interchange and represent the dominant logic or reality of the group 
(Gephart, 1984; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). That is exactly the reasoning for asking 
historical, longitudinal questions about events adopted in this research. However as the 
acquisitions took place over past years and the major event (the fall of the Wall) over 
seven years ago, the longitudinal data would have been based on memory, thus ruling 
out this approach. 
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The case study method has also to rely heavily on memory of the participants of 
historical events and feelings toA-ards them. However these are backed up in a case 
study by artefacts, written documents and other collected items which aid recall. One 
needs here to relook at the research goals. Certain of the phenomena to be researched 
are best researched at the level of the fmn or at least no lower than the group. Meant 
here is the interest in two-%%my learning which, as will be explained in chapter 5, needs 
to be examined at above the level of the individual. Here the use of case studies is 
obvious. The discussion in this chapter concerning group and individual is best served 
by delving into individual and group consciousness of events, albeit within a case study 
setting. 
Thus interviews, either in-depth or in a group setting, were used for examining 
phenomena which are best reviewed at the level of the individual,. The pros for in- 
depth individual interviews include the ability to delve quite deeply into the causes of 
actions. In-depth interviews formed the main pillar of the research design. However a 
case can be made for group interviews and so the merits of both interview types are 
discussed below. 
One unexpected quandary turned out to be that in studying barriers to change and 
integration in a M&A, where integration did not go smoothly it was impossible to 
conduct individual interviews. The employees simply reftised to talk individually and 
so a group interview had to be hurriedly arranged. Six employees of the Firm 'T' 
therefore engaged in a group interview which of necessity had to be more structured 
than an individual interview. 
Similarly, to avoid just "successes" the argument was addressed of. "whether it is logical 
to obtain all field interviews from people who are working and have successfully 
integrated? " Surely the 60% of the East Germans who did not successfully integrate and 
lost theirjobs have something to offer? To include this valuable source of information 
but to keep the research practical, a second pillar of the research were therefore 
individual interviews with these unfortunate "losers" of the reunification. Luckily these 
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"losers" were washed up onto unemployment office training programmes and were 
accessible through contacts with one of the programs in East Berlin 
Pros and cons of individual as opposed to group interviews: 
The drawbacks to in-depth interviews form the positive criteria which favour selecting 
group interviews. Individual interviews are time consuming and expensive. One can 
obtain the views of 10 
- 
15 people inside one hour with a group interview. Certainly the 
data gained will be on a more shallow level as that from an individual interview, but its 
validity will be of a higher order. Also the breadth of viewpoints and hence potentially 
interesting linkages will be greater with a group. Offsetting these group advantages are 
the perils 'group think' and the fear of expressing oneself in the presence of ex- 
colleagues or even ex-superiors, just such an occurrence heavily affected the group 
interview. Here th. 
- 
R&D Director of Firm F hogged the conversation, constantly 
interrupted people of lesser status and tried to direct what was said to his way of seeing 
the situation. 
4.4.3 Data Collection 
The organisation and interview details of this chapter have been briefly reported in 
Executive Summary Tables I&2. Further information concerning the full extent of- 
case firms involved, number of interviews, positions, ages etc. is encapsled in the 
"Summary of Data Collection Techniques " Table 4-11 and "Details of M&As 
Researched", Table 4-12 below. The core details being 42 individual interviews, I 
group interview (6 participants) in a total of 6 East German M&As set out as cases. The 
M&As were mainly in one sector (engineering services), mainly of medium size (50-400 
employees), although there were outliers at each extremity (20 and 2,100 employees). 
Geographically the M&As were concentrated in the South East of East Germany in the 
chemical triangle, with once again an outlier in Berlin. 12 interviews were also 
organised with ex-employees of East German combines. 
The importance of the group interview and interviews with unemployed ex-combine 
employees needs underlining. The group interview took place in Company "F" and is 
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especi y relevant in this chapter for the following reasons. It was intended to 
interview individually employees of Company "F' in the same way as employees in all 
the other sample firms were canvassed. The employees involved at Company "F' 
refused to be interviewed, except in their work group. The reasons for this decision are 
not too clear but probably were a loyalty to the group, a fear of individual utterances 
being returned to the management and a feeling of them and us. Firm 'T' is the subject 
of a case study in Chapter 5 but was found to be the most extreme example of non- 
integration of the acquired work force into the new M&A. The group causes of this lack 
of integration are extremely interesting and would have maybe not been raised without 
the group interview. 
Interviews with workers who had lost thcirjobs are relevant because this is a potential 
source of information which is rarely tapped and they can be neutral and objective as 
they no longer are working for a firm. The drawback is that often they are angry at 
losing their employment and therefore are not even handed in their opinions. The 
unemployed interviewees tended to be all older workers (55 years +) and as such had 
great difficulty regaining employment but had long experience of life within the old 
combine system. 
What was done in the field research is summarised below in Table 4-11. 
Table 4-11 
Summary of Data Collection Techniques 
In-depth, unstructured interviews in the context of six cases with: 
A total of 48 people were interviewed. 42 in individual interviews, 6 in a group interview. The total 
includes 12 interviews with unemployed people. There were 29 interviews in 5 firms, and a group 
interview with employees of the sixth plus an individual interview with the firm's president. The case 
firms are summarised below: 
Relevant details about the case firms researched are displayed in Table 4-12 below. 
114 
Table 4-12 
Details of M&As Researched 
Data Source 
and location 
Acqu- 
irer 
Nation 
ality 
Size of 
M&A to 
total ops. 
Merger or 
acquisition 
Details or co- 
ownership 
Business 
Sector 
No. of 
Empl- 
oyees 
Co. A USA & >5% Acquisition 100% Utilities 2,100 
Saxony & GB acquisition 
Saxon-Anhalt 
Co. B GB >5% Acquisition 100% Heavy Elect- 400 
Berlin-East acquisition rical Supply 
Equipment 
Co. C Sweden >5% Merger East German Chemical & 50 
Saxon-Anhalt &GB CEO held stock Water sector 
Co. D Saxony GB >5% Merger 30% of shares Chemical & 240 
East German Water Sector 
managers 
Co. E GB >5% Acquisition 100% owned Agricultural 20 
All East West German Industry 
Germany subsidiary 
expansion 
Co. F USA 50% Merger 25% of shares Specialist 100 
Saxony stayed with Chemicals 
THA 
4.4.4 Diverse or Similar Sample? 
The case firms were of approximately similar size. Firms A and E were outriders as one 
was bordering on a large firm classification and the other a small one, however all the 
rest can be classified as medium sized firms. They were within similar sectors: utilities, 
chemicals and en gineering services, although Firm E was significantly different. The use 
of case firms in the same sector allows the variables of technology and market 
conditions to be discounted as similar. It also helps in reducing 'noise' if the age of the 
firms is comparable. As all the sample case firms were privatised around the same time, 
then age was assumed not to be relevant. In-depth interviews were conducted within 
similar functional areas e. g. sales, finance and operations. Western and Eastern 
supervisors and Eastern employees were selected in each of the case M&As. 
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4.4.5 Researcher and Subject Bias 
The effects of a researcher's presence on the setting is as inevitable as it is hard to 
gauge. An example is Van Maanen's study on urban policing (in Open University 
Research Course, 1972). Although he witnessed cops beat up a suspect, he refused to 
surrender up his case notes at the subsequent trial. His kudos were however mixed, as 
the cops subsequently became too hard in his presence, continually beating up suspects 
on the assumption that that was what he wanted. A good example of subject bias. 
Here in the Van Maanen paradox (Van Maanen, 1988), objective observation is 
impossible and understanding is derived from experience. So how can subject and 
researcher bias be offset?. To allow for this inescapable bias is the goal of correct 
confirmability. It is achieved by stressing how the findings of the study could be 
confirmed by others, i. e. place the evaluation on the data not on the researcher. This can 
be achieved by asserting the strengths of the qualitative study and meticulously 
recording the methods and the complexity of the context and any interrelations as they 
emerge. Notes and research diaries should be kept and made available and they should 
document design decisions and their rationale. The data should be kept ready for easy 
retrieval if re-analysis is required, (in Open University Research Course, 1972). The 
good advice contained in the Open University material was followed in the research. 
4.4.6 Language Problems 
The fact that the research took place in a foreign country, Germany, just heightens the 
possibility of methodological problems. One goal of the pilot study was to achieve a 
foretaste in this area. As mentioned in the section on the pilot study, it threw up some 
interesting cross-cultural problems. Certainly there is little captured in the literature to 
date on the problems of communication between West and East Germany. Christoph 
Hein, the East German novelist, reused George Bernard Shaw's well known slogan that 
Britain and America are separated by a cornmon language. According to Hein, now 
East and West Germany experience a similar gulf (Hein, 1992). The pilot study West 
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German CEO complained about his inability to make potential East German employees 
understand what he meant by personal initiative, as well as other things. 
Actually there is only a small number of words that do not exist in each other's 
vocabulary 
- 
mainly English terms which have crept into West German everyday usage. 
East Germans are described as using abnormal, unclear sentences in a very tense and 
stiff manner. The West German rhetoric can best be described as showy. They try to 
project themselves into the limelight in a manner that comes across as cold and arrogant. 
There seems to be an explanation. East Germans always had to compromise between 
dogma (party line) and what they really wanted. Out of this permanent tension 
developed very cautious, neutral speech patterns. Today this is viewed as a hindrance, 
yesterday it was pragmatic. The East Germans use the word 'we' (wir) all the time. 
'Wir sind das Volk! ' The individuality became lost in the totality (and hence the 
responsibility for results belongs to no one). I 
The West Germans however were brought up to be individualistic and in career matters 
highly ambitious. No 'wir sind das Volk! ' for them, rather 'I am Volker'. Often it helps 
to be forward and aggressive to climb the corporate ladder, so one explanation for West 
German pushiness can be advanced. 
Given the appearance that Germans have difficulty understanding one another, then 
what chance has a foreigner as field researcher? The question can be rearranged as 
'what effect has language on the credibility of cross-cultural research? 
The most accepted technique in the social sciences for achieving lexical equivalence is 
the technique of back translation. First the original translation is translated into the 
local language, and then another translator independently translates this translated 
version back into the original. The original and retranslated versions are compared and 
discrepancies clarified (Mitchell, 1965). Curiously this problem has been largely posed 
as one of comparability in asking questions, without a concomitant concern for 
comparability in listening to responses. 
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But back translation can also install a false sense of security in the investigator by 
demonstrating a spurious lexical equivalence. Language is a cultural artefact, and 
therefore it must be assumed that the researcher and the researched are immersed in two 
different cultural and maybe social milieu as will be the case in this field research. A 
simple example of the spurious equivalence is the English word 'friend' and the German 
'Freund'. Is in fact 'ein Freund' a 'friend'? Hardly! For the Germans the term is 
reserved for a few intimate associates of long standing. The English use the term more 
liberally including a much broader collection of associates (Deutscher, 1968). More 
complicated are expressions of degree, which can affect a simple questionnaire scale. 
An American truck driver may complain to the waitress about his 'warm' beer and 
cold' soup. Implied in the words is the assumption that 'warm' is 5 OT plus and 'cold' 
is 85T or minus. Anyone who has drunk British beer knows that these standards are 
relative and vary from nation to nation. A vocabulary then is not just a string of words; 
immanent within it are societal textures (Mills, 1939). The implication for interviews 
from language refledting cultural values is obvious, indeed an interview is a fairly new 
phenomenon. In prior centuries a meeting with a stranger would have raised 
insurmountable privacy and security problems. Will East Germans with years of Stasi14 
and local party officialdom interviews behind them, suddenly open up to strangers? The 
omens are not good. An innocuous questionnaire was sent to the Californian legislature 
and to the Lower Austrian legislature. 97% of the Americans returned their forms but 
only 62% of the Austrians (Lerner, 1956), indicating that Germanic people tend to be 
more suspicious of outside questions than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
How can these problems be overcome by a British researcher in the former East 
Germany? 
As the issues being researched were seen as being salient to the East Germans, and is 
was most definitely the case, then it was possible to cultivate trust and commitment. 
Secondly, the researcher as a foreigner was seen as 'neutral' and not a threat whereas a 
West German researcher would probably not have been. Thirdly, the maxim must be 
translate accurately not literally, rephrasing during the interviews is virtually 
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unavoidable. The target should be to achieve conceptual equivalence, (Mills, 1939 
quoted in Deutsche). See section 4.4.7 below to see how the actual field work took 
these points on board. 
4.4.7 Data Analysis Issues 
For the interviews an unstructured interview schedule was used. An unstructured 
interview schedule needs differentiating from a semi-structured or structured schedule. 
The difference is that the list (schedule) contained only topics and keywords, whereas in 
more structured interviews then whole pre-prepared questions would be on the schedule. 
The topics and keywords were revisited after each interview to cut out areas receiving 
no confirmation and add new areas where a pattern of phenomena seemed to be 
emerging. This is the essence of grounded theory research, (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Before each session with a new firm, the revised topics and keywords were discussed 
with an East German social science researcher to ensure that the words were in general 
usageý and would be understood by the interviewees. The results of the field work were 
initially in the form of cassette tape recordings in German of the interviews, both in- 
depth and group. These recordings were transcribed by the researcher and this very 
process of transcribing allowed the data to be rearranged so as to ease the analysis 
process. The first transcription was from the German dialogue on the tapes to German 
verbatim on paper. Even here refining took place, as the pilot study showed 
interviewees (and even the interviewer) do not deliver understandable, full sentences. 
The process of accurate not literal translation (conceptual equivalence) was already 
under way as these fractional or incomplete sentences were embellished to convey 
meaning. The German copy was then translated into an English transcript, once again 
using conceptual as opposed to lexical equivalence. This translation was also 
undertaken by the researcher, who is bilingual, and proved to be easier than the initial 
transcribing. Once again an East German social scientist (who speaks fluent English) 
was used to check the conceptual equivalence of a small sample of the translations. 
Modem word processing programs allow the English translation to be easily rearranged 
into columns where chunks of the replies from different interviews can be laid out 
14 Statsi is an abbreviation for the infamous State Secret Police in East Germany 
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together. The arrangement of the text can for example put all the answers of one 
question together or likewise group all references to the constructs of interest, e. g. group 
Vs individual. This process was used after the initial rough, sort had been made with the 
traditional use of colour coding crayons. - The original quasi 
-verbatim English 
translation can be given a blank column opposite each question or reply. Certain 
variables such as the purpose or intent of the questions can then be entered into the 
blank column. Alternately the description of the type of answer i. e. opinion, fact, rap, 
feeling, metaphor, metonymy (Valentine & Evans, 1993) etc. can be entered. The 
sorting against these variables allows what is called a manifest content analysis (Banaka, 
1971). Initial results in this research with manifest content analysis did not show many 
insights but as the technique is mainly for assessing an interviewer's strengths and 
weaknesses it was abandoned. Blind, independent reviewer, (Isabella, 1990: 13), who 
would assess if there was any disagreement with the categorisation of the statements at 
the colour crayon coding stage, were not used. 
Field notes were prepared in full from mental and jotted notes from the interviews and 
were examined for extrinsic influences e. g. the roles the interviewer or interviewee were 
playing, their agency contract and the physical setting. From the field notes an 
evaluation of the behaviour in the interview was performed. A feeling for the following 
questions was thereby developed: How objective or logical was the interviewee? How 
did the parties interrelate? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the parties? 
A final word goes to the topic of triangulation. In the research methodology, the 
following types of triangulation were used: 
e Data triangulation of a comparative nature. The six selected firms were similar but 
slightly different. The two cases were chosen to be radically different. 
Triangulation of methods. In-depth individual interviews, a focus groups and 
contrasting case studies were used. 
The next section describes how the data were handled and organised in this report. 
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4.5 Field Data 
The data gathered and stored initially on tape, consequently being transcribed, are 
organised here as quotes supporting or negating a particular theme. The quotes have 
been chosen not only for provocativeness and relevance but also to serve as a reflection 
of the general feeling of most interviewees. Once again, no general isability is expected 
from data gained in this research. 
4.5.1 Job Uncertainty and the Breakdown of Integration and Co-operation 
Every one of the 47 people talked to in the data collection phase commented upon, often 
with great passion and feeling, the new, unpleasant, reality ofjob insecurity. Obviously 
the 12 unemployed interviewees had first hand experience, but even those still having 
employment were almost equally vehement. The levels and distribution of 
unemployment have been addressed in the Chapter 1, section 1.2. Here we are dealing 
with people's reaction to these quite alarmingly high levels of unemployment, which 
have come about solely in the seven years following the reunification of the two 
Germanys. 
4.5.1A Views of those who had experienced job loss 
The views of the unemployed interviewees were, as would be expected, especially 
bitter. To the general situation of rising unemployment was commented as below: 
General rising unemployment 
Interview ti 31 
Paragraph # 4915. Herr W16 
.- 
The loss of employment was the 
worst possible misfortune from innermost feelings. A new 
phenomena as it was totally unknown and nobody was prepared 
for it. Now there is no other conversation topic than 
unemployment. We felt lost in the forest. I'm talking about the 
Wende time now or shortly there after. It happened so quickly. 
_ 
15 Note that the figure appearing before each quotation is the paragraph number of the relevant interview. 
16AII names have been shortened, as requested, for anonymity. 
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Interview # 34 
17. Herr S. 
- 
For me too there is a hard side. I had awaited that I 
would work right up to my retirement in the pleasant circle 
where I worked and lived. As a rule one could usually work on 
in the DDR. There was a labour shortage. That was caused by 
our low level of workers' productivity. Therefore, especially 
amongst higher level workers, came the question, now will you 
not work on. There were even by us workaholics. The best 
was well over 
In addition to the above descriptions of the fear of unemployment and its causes, there 
were also comments concerning proposition I's thesis that rising fear ofjob loss broke 
down the old group bonds. 
Rising job losses breaks down group ties 
Interview # 31 
50. Herr W.;. Yes it's very much this fear of losing the job that 
has destroyed the 'we' feeling of the work group. And frankly 
I'd react the same. When a work team get on well then they can 
be very productive, however when each thinks theirjob needs 
, 
Protecting then this productivity disappears. 
Interview # 33 
2. Dr. E. 
- 
I can say an unequivocal yes to that. We were a 
collective. 
13. Dr. E. 
- 
However what I've heard out of my circle of 
relations is different. I hear again and again that their 
experiences are always a catastrophe. The social intercourse of a 
collective based work, sticking together, partying together, 
experiencing successes and losses together, that is gone. Seems 
like it was never really an integral part of life in the DDR or it 
wouldn't have disappeared so fast. It may be possible to lay the 
explanation at the door of money.. 
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Interview # 34 
17. Herr S. 
- 
The group feeling was much larger. We used to 
speak about a collective. Obviously there were good collectives 
and bad ones. When very different personalities came together, 
people who couldn't stand one another, but that was very 
infrequent, then there were no firings, changes only took place at 
one? s own wish. I worked in the same area for 45 years, I never 
had the wish to change. I would have freely stayed on to my 
pension. 
Interview # 35 
57. Frau W. 
- 
The members of staff who were originally in my 
department and are still there now, all worked previously in the 
area. Amongst us little changed although its natural when its 
public that departmental workers will have to go that somehow 
or other its not quite so honest and easy between each other. 
Then one or other tries to obtain a position and its obvious. It 
was better in this last department where I worked until end '94, 
better than in other areas. 
58. Thomson 
- 
But all the same you noticed a difference? 
59. Frau W. 
- 
Yeah for sure there wasn't the old solidarity 
85. Frau W. 
- 
And that led naturally to a break in the 
identification with the firm as everyone asked himself why 
should I try hard to do something for the firm when tomorrow 
my job may be redundant. 
4.5.1. ii Views of those who are employed towards potential job loss 
Even those with employment expressed outright fear of the rise in unemployment and 
the potential risk to their own jobs. 
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Interview # 22 
98. Herr P. 
- 
We have a large circle of acquaintances and all 
those that became unemployed and have problems have from 
themselves cut off contact. Before unemployment was seen as 
something unusual, like a plague, something bad although it 
really isn't. We (ex-DDRs) don't know how to handle it, still 
cannot today even. It is a scandal really because one thinks one 
is oneself to blame. In the most cases that isn't true. In the 
private sphere the contact broke off and the interests are 
completely different. They have to. At work we try to deal with 
another sensibly and that makes for a big difference if the work 
is enjoyable or not. That is all changed now. 
Interview # 30 
18. Prof. B. 
- 
What's probably behind what Herr NiedergesaB just said is this unbelievably high level of fear about keeping 
one's job. That's probably much more typical of East Germans 
than it would be for workers in an established West German firm 
like Degussa, Bayer or BASF. Or maybe even for you, the size 
of the pay off you got from the Allies is something we could 
only dream about. At the time of the Treuhand if we got 
anything, and I really can't remember now what the rules were 
when someone was laid off. If someone were to be made 
redundant now, and it doesn't matter if you are a shift worker or 
a middle manager with a normal employment contract, one lives 
with a certain fear. OK one can have a nice quiet life if one is a 
civil servant (Beamler) but we're not all civil servants and in the 
private sector one is always faced with this potential misfortune 
of losing the job. One doesn't need to limit this theme to just 
our firm, the potential to lose one's job is a general one in East 
Germany in comparison with say West Germany. Many of the 
workers here have been in the same employment for 20 or more 
years, and then suddenly they are standing there with their 
unemployment application form. 
19. Frau B. 
- 
If I end up standing on the street, then its the end. 
20. Thomson 
- 
Because the rate of unemployment here in East 
Germany is so high? 
21. Frau B. 
- 
Yes, it's so 
Similarly to the group of unemployed workers, in addition to the above descriptions of 
the fear of unemployment and its causes, there were also comments concerning 
proposition I's thesis that rising fear ofjob loss broke down the old group bonds. 
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Interview 4 12 
30. Herr L. 
- 
There are still people here who started in the early 
60s and have now experienced the reduction process from 1,200 
to 240. Naturally that doesn't just pass over you without some 
effect. That means that everybody's chair is wobbly right now. 
And the recession in the building industry has brought about 
enormous pressure on planning offices. That means by the end 
of this recession there will be a lot fewer planning offices. And 
in such a phase the people try and arrange it that at least they 
keep their job. It doesn't have anything to do with whether I 
clap my colleague on the shoulder or not. The retreat from 
collective thinking depends on them thinking when I don't get 
by now, or I make a mistake then I'm on the job reduction list. 
This thought is pretty much hammered into the heads of the 
employees. That's always a problem when one goes from one 
extreme to another, then the work climate gets really bad. 
Interview # 13 
14. Frau H. 
-I have to agree that this trend is taking place. We 
used to have a good teamwork. However at that time the job 
insecurity was not there and the teamwork functioned well. I 
perceived the teamwork inside the group as very positive 
especially in the collective. My work group was between ten 
and fifteen people and I was the leader. However with the rise 
ofjob insecurity the teamwork became weaker. That was 
because everyone wanted to be in charge of their own area in 
order to protect their job and therefore they withheld information 
from the group and naturally that reduced the team work. 
Interview N 22 
96. Herr P. 
- 
What first of all occurs to me is that what we 
talked about at the start, the solidarity in the group. We spend 
60-80% of our waking time at work and that's what I enjoyed 
the most. There were friendships the type of which that don't 
exist anymore. It was very different then and that forms the 
major change to how it is now at work. In my private sphere 
not so much has changed. It depends on who one had contact 
with before, and who now, and how they have developed their 
careers, if they made the spring successfully. 
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Interview 4 30 
17. Herr N. 
- 
Now its so that each tries to finish his own work 
as well as possible, so that he is noticed, positively noticed and 
there is even a little Schadenfreude when someone lse makes a 
mistake. 
Interview # 31 
51. Herr W. 
-Yes it's very much this fear of losing thejob that 
has destroyed the 'we' feeling of the work group. And frankly 
I'd react the same. When a work team get on well then they can 
be very productive, however when each thinks their job needs 
protecting then this productivity disappears. 
Although fear of possible unemployment dominated the thoughts expressed in this area, 
at least some of the interviewees flagged up other reasons (i to iv below) for the 
declining importance and influence of the work group. 
i. Turnover 
- 
The previous extreme stability of the personnel making up work groups is 
bound to disintegrate as older workers retire, downsizing takes place and new, 
undreamed of work opportunities surface, e. g. move to West Germany. 
Interview # 21 
86. Herr L. 
- 
It was exactly in this time after the Wende, my son 
had studied information sciences. He was thirty one, wanted to 
stay here in the vicinity but it wasn't possible. He is now in 
Karlsruhe. My daughter went to technical college and learnt to 
be a nurse, she also didn't get any work in Halle. She lives now 
in Paderborn. 
Interview # 14 
60. Herr E. 
- 
Purely on the private level, I have two sons and 
they were exactly over the time of the fall of the wall doing 
their apprenticeships. One wanted to stop his apprenticeship and 
emigrate to West Germany. The older one had been to college 
and said what is there for me here. Both wanted to go to West 
Gen-nany, and that's just what they did. They utilised the chance 
in their own ways and it was totally new experiences as we had 
no relatives, contacts nobody in West Germany. As we worked 
in the building industry, we assumed that the changes wouldn't 
affect us so heavily. The building industry was in demand as 
opposed to chemicals, coal and agriculture. Now its the same 
for us. 
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ii. Generation Change 
- 
The rise in the employers' desire to employ younger people 
tends to break down the stable group structures. 
Interview ig 12 
30. Herr L. 
-That's definitely more so for the older workers 
than the younger ones. Look at the students or new graduates, 
they have a completely different approach. They don't spend so 
much time weighing up the consequences. They don't have any 
problems. An engineer in West Germany can utilise his 
education and training possibilities and work there, and he will 
know all the rules of the game. People from the East are always 
asking themselves how should I react, or act. West Germans 
never knew anything else, were always in a market system and 
so are not plagued with self doubt., This is for sure a generation 
problem. 
Interview N 35 
34. Herr S. 
-The people who worked with me both above and 
below knew each other for years. We wýre a stable group and 
because of that there developed personal relationships of a quite 
different kind. 
iii. The financial state of the firm. 
Interview 9 12 
30. Herr L. 
-Firstly the climate in the firm depends on the financial results the firm is enjoying. 
iv. Technology 
- 
It was noted at the start of this chapter that technical influences on the 
group and individual would be put to one side. The reason for this is that the six firms 
where interviews took place had relatively similar levels of capital intensity, (an 
exception must be made for the large utility firm in the sample). Based on this 
observation it was assumed that changes in technology would be similar amongst the 
firms sampled and therefore would not lead to technically caused differences in 
perceptions. 
However even if the firms were tending to move together in the application of new 
technologies, e. g. data processing, these new technologies did cause job losses and 
"Ludite" type fears of unemployment. The emphasis here is on the technology itself 
_forcing 
more individual work and causing groups to become less important. It must be 
mentioned however that technology can depend on teamwork. 
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Interview # 12 
14. Herr R. 
-.... 
actually it's kind of interesting, the technology 
drives the teamwork here in the fact that if you're working on the 
machine there's three men on a machine, then youre almost 
forced to be a good group, and they are a good group, they do 
work well together. The machines can be up to 300 metres long, 
right, so if one of them isift working correctly then the other two 
have to go like hell, right? So in fact the team work is still 
pretty good here and its probably been driven by the fact that the 
technology, the machines in place are driving it, right? 
... 
and if 
you notice on the machine that somethines not going very well, 
then they'll jump across and assist. 
The need for teamwork on assembly line operations is obvious, however in other areas 
the move towards more individual work was in full swing. 
Interview N 23 
45. Frau A. 
- 
The volume yes, but also the way the work is 
organised. By IAB17 we used to have technical drafters, we used 
to pencil in a sketch and the technical drafters used to finish it 
off I can still do technical drafting, so that when I now need a 
drawing I do it myse118. That means that now I make a draft 
plan on the computer, or none at all depending on the level of 
knowledge involved. I don't need anyone else to help me. It is 
also required from me, that when the operator of the plotting 
machine is away, that I print out my own prints. That is for sure 
not too good, because too many people working on a technical 
machine can soon screw it up. 
4.5.1. iii Uncertainty and Networks 
Many of the interviewees also commented upon the counter productive results ofjob 
retention fear shown in the increasing reluctance of employees to share their information 
and projects with other members of their work group. This increasing level of secrecy, 
mistrust and isolation from each other is leading to a break down of formerly well- 
functioning, productive work groups. Even out with of the firm, the breakdown of co- 
operation has had consequences as the following quotation highlights. 
17 IAB is a former abbreviation for the old combine 
" Highlighting added by author. 
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Interview # 14 
22. Herr E........ The group had the advantage that in certain 
areas one didn't have to become an expert yourself. One would 
fall back on others, someone was questioned, he was willing to 
supply information, he didn't write out a bill for the information. 
That was the group exchange which is missing now. One had 
contacts in other firms, one called up as one knew he had some 
knowledge in this area, and one got back information with a fax 
and without being charged. That cost money today. Its a current 
problem for us here in this firm as we have such a wide product 
group that all the specialist areas cannot be covered, we need to 
keep strictly to regulations from excavations to antennas and 
keep up to date. Thafs the problem. One has to have 
membership in many organisations o that one can get quickly 
specialist information. To pay for it or to take it is always the 
decision, but its even so still expensive. 
23. Thomson 
- 
Its interesting that you previously had an 
unofficial network of contacts which has now been broken off. 
Now you have an official network, but you have to pay for it. 
24. Herr E. 
- 
We were forced to build up such networks 
because we were not able to obtain all the j ournals containing 
information as there wasn't enough money available. The 
combines had a central place, the research department and using 
research as the basis for the request, one could get access to 
western literature. There was'a foreign exchange fund and one 
could use this fund to buy literature up to a certain limit. Then 
the literature was distributed and there was a very thorough 
register of who obtained which literature, which firm and then 
the firms could do an exchange. This system existed for a long 
time and one got used to it and many people here in our firm try 
to re-use this system. 
The above quotation highlights that in the old DDR there was a well-established, 
flourishing network of contacts, who supplied each other on a quidpro quo basis with 
information, material goods and spare parts. These networks covered industries and 
were based on the fact that, seeing all firms belonged to the state, any information given 
to another firm could not be seen as giving away a competitive advantage. Additionally, 
due to the general scarcity of everything, including technical knowledge, networks were 
essential for the manager in a combine to survive. 
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In the same way personal networks oiled the daily fight against shortages and 
mismatches of supply and demand. An example of this is given by Prof. B. 
Interview 9 30 
1. Prof. B........ the group had in my opinion in DDR times 
a completely different meaning which I talked about before. In a 
well functioning group with a good level of harmony, there was 
also personal dependence. I can use as an example: Herr Becker 
borrows from Klaus GroBmann a clutch for his car, and then 
never gave it him back. Becker wasn't mad about this, because 
in a well functioning group there was a solidarity and 
helpfulness which spread across the work into the personal area, 
a phenomena which in my opinion was extremely well 
_developed 
in the DDR. 
All-in 
-all there seems to total agreement amongst every single person interviewed, that 
there are immense pressures stemming from rising unemployment which give rise to 
fears about the loss of one's own job, even if other factors were acknowledged. 
4.5.2 Perceived Lack of Initiative 
Harry Maier in his analysis of the feeble DDR ability to show initiative and be 
innovative noted "The socialistic production machine discouraged radical innovation 
like the devil discourages decent living. Firstly because of the risk of failure, whereby 
painful sanctions could be expected from the centre. Secondly, even if the innovations 
were successful, then the result would be a higher plan goal in the coming year, which 
would be that much harder to achieve", (Maier, 1993: 806-818). A third reason depends 
upon the cohesiveness and stability of the group in the DDR. 
One of the reasons constantly referred to by ex-mangers in combines was the lack of 
differentiation in pay. For instance Prof. B. (an ex-Director in a combine) was quite 
outspoken on this issue: 
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Tricat Interview # 30 
1. PrA B 
............ 
The fact that possibilities for 
advancement in the Kombinat were limited, reduced the 
personal ambitions. This was so because in the DDR there were 
few people who were prepared to take on more responsibility 
and work which was never properly rewarded, at least up to a 
certain level. The position of General -Director was naturally 
attractive but positions in the middle of the hierarchy were in 
general unattractive. And I'll say it quite openly, when you 
found one dumb enough to take on the function of group leader, 
regardless of how the group is defined from 5-6 up to 20-25 
employees, then there was really no motivation to use your 
elbows in trying to out do others in the group or other groups. 
My memories of our times in the DDR are only an unbelievable 
solidarity and harmony within the group, be it to do with work 
or help with personal matters. 
2. ProE B. (cont. )- The lack of motivation to strive for a 
management position is another problem. The main cause being 
that one took on only trouble and this trouble wasn't smoothed 
by higher pay. 
In addition to pay differentiation, there was also the factor that it was almost impossible 
to get fired in the DDR. This lead to all kinds of lazy and problem workers keeping 
their jobs, with the concomitant dernotivation of other work group members who had to 
cover for them. 
Interview # 21 
40. Herr L. 
- 
Today the climate is harder, the work pressure is 
harder, it wasn't so before. Before there was the right to work, 
so that nobody was fired. The biggest layabouts and drinkers 
were not kicked out. Sure that is something negative but it had a 
positive aspect in so far as one didn't need to worry about 
keeping one's job. That doesn't exist any more. 
That groups did look after the weaker members and covered for mistakes is bome out by 
the following quote: 
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Interview # 13 
16. Frau H. 
- 
When mistakes were made, then whoever made 
the mistake must own up. And there was always enough team 
spirit in the group to take care of the mistake. There were 
certain disciplinary possibilities in DDR times but they were 
only utilised when it was a large mistake and that usually 
depended on the person involved. 
The hardest criticism of East German lack of initiative came from the West German 
Managing Director of firm E. 
Interview #1 
96. Dr. K. 
- 
Well we actually went there and explained how it 
was done in West Germany. If we came to the opinion that the 
man was OK then we hired him. Which leads me to an example 
of self-reliance. When I hire somebody in West Germany, I 
might say good, tomorrow you start there. I don't start thinking 
about whether he will be there or not, or how he will get there. 
For me the situation is clear. Then often I get a telephone call at 
the starting time "where must I go? How do I get there? " 
97. Thomson 
- 
WasWt it made clear at the start, whether they 
needed their own car? 
98. Dr. K. 
- 
Who had a car at this time? 
99. Thomson 
- 
Then how did you think it could work? 
100. Dr K. 
- 
We even did such things at the start as buying train 
tickets for the people. OK that was right at the start. Somehow 
or other they got here. But what is for us a matter of course, was 
for them a great adventure. From Mecklenberg, 2 hours in the 
car, now please! Another thing that I had to learn was that in the 
DDR many women had jobs, often single mothers with children. 
So when I organise training here and send the people from farm 
to farm, I don't overtax my brain in worrying how the people 
will organise their private lives to ensure the children are cared 
for. Often I hear from single mothers with two kids in the East, 
"now how can I travel there? What can I do about the children? " 
A more neutral viewpoint on East German employees' lack of initiative would be 
expected from an ex-DDR citizen'who now works in West Germany but previously held 
an important position in the East. 
132 
Interview #2 
54. Thomson 
- 
Would it be right if I were to describe the 
attitude here in the West as that each employee was expected to 
use their own initiative, in other words to say listen there is a 
problem, I need to speak to someone, whereas in the East it 
wasn't so. 
55. Herr S. 
- 
Yes, that's right. You always had to say what's 
to be done. If you didn't nothing would get done. You always 
had to clearly give instructions because if you diddt... The 
ability to work on one's own, initiate was always missing and 
anyway it was often impossible alone to change anything. 
4.5.3 East German Perceived Lack of Personal Responsibility 
Relatively similar criticism to the perceived lack of initiative was to be heard from non- 
East Gennans about taking responsibility for decisions and actions. Once again the 
hardest words came from the West German MD. 
Interview #1 
62. Dr. K........ The second point is constantly recurring. 
Often I observe that East German workers feel themselves to be 
paft of a collective, a group, and that group is anonymous, A 
group also has the advantage, in inverted commas, that. if 
responsibility is to be allocated it is never a personal 
responsibility. The term 'we' is not a personal pronoun. That's 
what is often missing 
- 
personal responsibility. Not from 
everyone, but many. many find it difficult to reflect on things 
that go wrong and to say, yes I did it. That's difficult for many, 
also for many in the West. 
63. Thomson 
-Would you call this individualism? I would 
expect West Germans to feel surer in personal work whereas the 
East Germans tend towards group work while they are used to it. 
64. Dr. K. 
- 
They are used to the collective life with two 
values: The one is the group, then there is a barrier on the other 
side, the personal life. That is not so now a days and to 
understand it is not very easy, that means for example, as I've 
often seen in management, when I'm the manager I represent 
both myself and also my workers, but I notice now and again in 
East Germany when pressure comes from above, then they move 
to the side and say, let it go through. 
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Just as with questions on initiative, the ex-DDR manager now in the West, who 
incidentally worked directly for Dr. K., gave an interesting and more measured 
response. He mentions the difficulty faced by people from East Germany when 
confronted with the extremely hard confrontations which seem to be part and parcel of 
taking responsibility in a West German setting. 
Interview #2 
45. Herr S. 
-I must admit I have problems here. I'm sure in 
my dealings outside the firm with breeders, that I am pretty goal 
orientated and can put my point of view over. Here inside the 
firm I sometimes have problems, for instance when discussions 
take place then I take them too personally, that's my problem. It 
wasn't a problem before in the East where the behaviour in 
contact was somewhat different. Although Herr Sa. and Dr. K. 
emphasise that I shouldnt see it personally but look at the 
factual background, the effect on one is often frustrating. 
46. Thomson 
- 
Of course it has a personal effect when one 
hears de-humanising things. When I go into a West German 
firm, I notice a certain coolness and rationality. I don't mean 
that as a critic its just the way I feel it and I'm sure its easy to 
understand it as a personal affront or critic. 
47. Herr S. 
- 
It can surely be traced back to my background 
that as an Ossi we have problems dealing with the West 
Germans or people from the West. 
Naturally, the East German employees saw things somewhat differently than the 
western managers. However even amongst them, a tendency to hide in the group was 
subtly expressed especially by those that held managerial positions, where they had to 
supervise and deal with the results of a lack of personal responsibility. 
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32. Herr F. 
- 
Yes, that's a hot theme. Its not too easy to 
convert the people to accepting more responsibility. That's a 
problem which I am aware of, what the new organisation 
structure has made very visible. Before any problems were 
shunted up the way, but even I had problems in solving them as 
the then structure forced the involvement of the General 
Director. Today all have the possibility of making their own 
decisions and carrying their own responsibility within certain 
borders. They can make decisions about financing, they can 
make personnel decisions, the main thing is that they do it. 
Many of them duck this new responsibility and still keep looking 
for answers from above. That's a problem where in some areas 
it's well done and in others the people need to consult more and 
take their own decisions. I feel we need to move more in this 
direction of more personal responsibility for decision taking. 
That's true right down to the workers' level. The worker who 
today sits at his computer and doesn't understand this is in the 
wrong place. They are all employees of this firm and must be 
integrated into the sales process. Before sales was never a theme 
because everything was supported by the state. Now every 
employee needs to pull their weight, that's difficult to hammer 
into some heads. 
Sometimes the lack of responsibility came about because of the way jobs were 
organised and the lack of commercial pressure. 
IntervieW 422 
30. Herr P. 
- 
No the freedom of action within my area, the 
responsibility is still the same. The responsibility for the 
procurement contracts in my projects is something new and 
didn't exist in DDR times. There were prices for bits of the 
plant but they were steered in another way. they weren't steered 
financially but were controlled through balances. There was a 
fictive figure at the start of the project and when new costs 
occurred this figure was simply raised. Its difficult to imagine 
but that's what happened. There was no problem involved in 
raising a projects cost from 15 to 16 million so long as it 
balanced and there were reasons. But returning to the 
responsibility, I had just as much authority as I do now. 
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3 1. Thomson 
-I meant freedom in taking decisions in 
comparison to now. 
32. Herr P. 
- 
For me only a little during 1989 and 1990 until 
I transferred to Firm P.. Before when I worked as chief engineer (something similar to project leader), I had much less authority 
than now. Project leaders now work with much more personal 
initiative than was the case in the DDR. For instance Herr L. (also interviewed) had the same job in both areas, he was chief 
engineer and now project leader, basically the same. 
The previously mentioned Herr L. also brought up the subject of more responsibility 
because of commercial pressures but also mentioned the ever present political 
interference that ensured responsibility and decision taking were channelled up the 
organisational hierarchy. 
Interview #21 
26. Herr L. 
- 
... 
The main point was that the Director of the firm, 
didn't have free hand there were two other institutions in the 
game, the party and the trade union. A MD didn't have the 
position authority he does today. The second thing is that before 
the question of costs never was very important, the deadlines 
were important, the costs were of secondary importance. 
Officially the costs were supposed to be minimised, but in 
reality they always landed in the second position. Because of 
that much took place on parallel tracks and there was much 
inefficient work. A third difference was that the employees 
didn't have to work so efficiently as they do today. That showed 
in the inflated number of employees. In our branch of the firm 
we had 400 employees and now we are approx. 45. Sure the 
amount of work is different but its not that different, its about 
the same. 
4.6 Analysis & Discussion of Results 
Though managers and workers differed in their assessment of the gravity of assumptions 
2 and 3, there was no lack of agreement about assumption 1: The higher thefeeling of 
job insecurity, the lower the level ofgroup cohesiveness. 
Examples abound, many quoted above, about the pressure to look after number one in a 
firm having faced and still facing radical downsizing. This phenomenon can be seen as 
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a major handicap to change and integration for two reasons. Firstly the breakdown of 
the group and increasing isolation of individuals in the organisation is not a fertile 
breeding ground for introducing long term change. Values become accepted at the work 
place, when the majority, or enough leading members, of the work force internalise 
them. This internalisation and acceptance process is eased when group pressure and 
dynamics parallels and supports the introduction of the new work values. An example 
will suffice. The US President of the chemical firm "F" complained that his employees 
involved with R&D were slow to see the need for, never mind actually achieving, the 
move to a customer demand driven R&D program. These same R&D workers were 
however heavily critical of the increasing dog-eat-dog and unfriendly tone which now 
prevented the flow of information in the research teams. It never occurred to either side 
to discuss these perceptions. Unfortunately so, because if the group had continued to 
function well, then the possibility of the group as a totality intemalising the new 
customer orientation would have been much higher. 
The second handicap of rising individualism and declining communitarianism is its 
effect upon learning, a subject area which will be greatly expanded in Chapter 5. 
Suffice it to say that organisational learning occurs when groups of people give the same 
response to different stimuli, (Weick, 1991). This occurs through the development of 
routines within the group (Nelson & Winter, 1982). If the group disintegrates, the 
routines go with it and organisational learning becomes more difficult. 
There is however a counter argument which needs assessing. Sometimes through 
poor management of the post-take-over phase, the move to increasing individual isation 
can be countered by a feeling of solidarity against new practices. This group solidarity 
sees the group acting as a retainer of prior thinking and as such forms a hindrance to 
new ways of thinking and techniques. The group in the R&D department of Firm "I"' 
seemed to have become active in blocking change, due to their feeling of alienation 
form the new US management and its goals. The R&D group here retreated back to the 
"safety" of their old chummy relationships, working practices, output norms and 
applicable science and technology. In such cases where group solidarity is actively 
hindering change, then reductions in group cohesiveness could be argued to be 
beneficial for the firm's survival. 
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The argument can be linked back to the more general question of whether acceptance 
of radical change is easier to achieve when attitudes are unfrozen or when stability 
forms a solid base for acceptance. Job security fears can be argued to have moved 
individual employees out of their comfort zones to where they are willing to accept 
radical change. On the other hand is change introduced under the duress of potential job 
loss, a long lasting and internalised change? 
Observations from the more successful sample firms, C&D, support the view that it 
is possible to achieve the benefits of unfreezing sterile, inflexible attitudes (Lewin, 
1947) through job uncertainty, but also to achieve acceptance of change by having the 
change internalised asa. norm within the still functioning group. 
The two patterns of behaviour (assumptions 2& 3) which emerged from the 
literature review are to an extent inter-linked. Personal responsibility for decisions 
taken and the initiative involved in actually taking them clearly affect one another. If an 
employee is worried about the consequences of a wrong decision, they may well: 
a. Never take a decision (i. e. show no initiative). 
b. Take decisions but then hide in the group (i. e. show no personal 
responsibility). 
Both options are counterproductive for the firm but both were supported by infonnation 
gathered in the interviews, albeit the prevalence and severity of these issues were seen 
as much higher by top management and especially foreign top management. 
It needs stressing again, that Frese et al, 1996 found an appreciable lower level of 
personal initiative in East as opposed to West Germany. The findings of this research's 
interviews and Frese's seem to coincide. Although there are some pretty strong 
historical reasons for low initiative and personal responsibility in East Germany, e. g. 
low pay differentials, school system, no-firing job policies, communist inspired top- 
down Communications and decision making, intolerance of maverick behaviour, just 
knowing these causes does not help the new managers in East German M&As. 
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These managers need to know whether and how they can change behaviour in the 
initiative and responsibility areas. If the traits are now so well established that they are 
inborn and self-producing, i. e. Schneider's nature, then it will be extremely hard to 
change them. Conversely if they have only been acquired during the reign of 
totalitarianism (nurture), then they may be easier to alter. The results from Frese et at 
supported nurture, therefore the task for M&A managers may not be insuperable. Given 
then that the counter-productive behaviour in the fields of responsibility and initiative 
can probably be changed, how is this then achieved? 
Change management literature as discussed in Chapter 3, section 2.1 is rich in tried and 
tested western originating advice. As Spender, 1992 noted, maybe these western 
developed programs will be ineffective in an East European setting. This researcher 
partially supports this view. 
On the one hand M&A managers in East Germany can develop incentive schemes, 
payment plans and review procedures which support the move to individualisation, as 
all these initiatives are individually based. This is quite easily done, but is no panacea. 
We will see in the discussion of the failed M&A (Chapter 5, section 5.2), that just such 
schemes were introduced but with little success. A counter scenario can be developed, 
where the existing (although decreasing) strength of the work group could be engaged as 
an engine of change towards more initiative and responsibility. Many western firms 
have been switching in the 1990s towards team, as opposed to individual, goals and 
hence incentive reimbursements. A discussion of the pros and ýons of collectivism or 
individualism took place in above in this chapter and is summarised in Tables 4-4 and 4- 
5. We see from this discussion and Schacter's theoretical contribution that with good 
- 
leadership, a highly cohesive group can achieve the best levels of productivity gains. 
The advice therefore to M&A managers in East Germany trying to break down the 
barriers of low initiative and responsibility could be to revisit the group. They could 
design group incentives and harness group dynamics to be the engine of change. Too 
often however the response of managers to lack of initiative is to "tighten the ropes", 
(Frese et al, 1996: 56) with more controls, thus provoking a vicious cycle of more 
control, more robot like compliance, even lower initiative. 
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A final point is necessary. In most firms the need for initiative and personal 
responsibility varies byjob function. Sales representatives, for instance, are on their 
own, off the firm's premises and probably need high individual motivation which will 
reflect on their initiative and responsibility. This point was very forcibly made by the 
sales managers in Firm E. Shift production workers however depend on each other, 
have very structured jobs with rules and regulations for safety and quality reasons. Here 
individual incentives seem to be a move in the wrong direction. Such workers were 
well represented in firms A, B and D 
4.7 Conclusions and Onward Link 
The unsettling influence ofjob insecurity has had, in the majority of M&As visited, a 
knock-on effect on group cohesiveness. The rising individualism in the work place is 
accompanied by a counter efficient trend in not sharing work, results and information. 
Whether the demise of the group and the rise of individualism is beneficial for the 
acceptance of radical change is not proven. Certainly, with the exception of firm 'T", 
the continuation of good intra-group relationships and cohesiveness seemed to be 
helping the acceptance and internalisation of radical change. 
The field data reported in this chapter support, to a limited extent, the widely held views 
about deficits in the East German stock of human resources. Based on the perception of 
upper level managers, the East German average employee brings comparatively too little 
initiative and personal responsibility to thejob. This perception is borne out by 
academic studies e. g. Frese et al, 1996. The situation appears increasingly bleaker as 
existing group cohesiveness is breaking down under the pressure of high unemployment 
and accelerating job insecurity. 
The potential for the future is not, however, all black. Firstly, the need for initiative and 
responsibility varies byjob and is not a necessity for all employees. Secondly, rising 
individualism may be the forerunner of increasing individual initiative and 
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responsibility. Finally, the remaining group solidarity can be harnessed by excellent 
management to facilitate change. 
In summary there is a tension between the increasing individualism and remaining 
communitarism. It is management's job to steer a strategic course through just such 
dilemmas (Hampden-Tumer, 1990), benefiting from the dynamism of the inevitable 
tensions. Given the correct choices there is the possibility of a rosy future. Another step 
towards coming up with a strategy to overcome barriers to integration and change will 
be the subject matter of Chapter S. The tension between individual and group 
investigated here, influences the key success variable of leaming, as we will soon find 
out. 
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Chapter 5- Two-Way Learning 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 5 is of necessity by far the longest chapter in this thesis. The over-proportional 
length is due to it consisting of three recent publications and being organised, as was 
Chapter 4, along the lines of ajournal article. Therefore literature and methodology 
sections are presented, followed by results, discussion and conclusions. 
As early as the introduction in Chapter 1, it was pointed out that the sub ect matter of 
this dissertation straddles at least four schools of academia 
- 
strategic management, 
organisational behaviour, mergers & acquisitions (M&As) and Central and Eastern 
Europe transformation. In our discussion of the individual Vs. the group in Chapter 4, 
the main literature basis was drawn from the field of organisational behaviour. In 
contrast it is the overarching theme of strategic fit from the strategic management 
literature (reviewed in 5.2) which predominantly forms the link to this chapter's subject 
matter of two-way learning. Within the concept of strategic fit, the congruence between 
a M&A's strategy and resources and its business environment, is useful. We have 
already seen in Chapter 4 that the human resource qualities inherited with the East 
German M&A were not optimum to fit the new needs of a market economy. However 
the potential was there to acquire new skills and thought processes. It is the ability to 
change skills and attitudes which this chapter addresses. 
The context of this chapter is set by reviewing in more detail than in Chapter 3, relevant 
theories from the literature in the areas of. - strategic management, change management, 
Mergers & Acquisitions plus the new subject of leaming. 
In East German M&As there are certain barriers to enhancing these work force skills 
and attitudes and hence easing integration and learning. One barrier which was 
investigated can be summed up by the proposition: the dominant culture always wins. 
If the new western owners and managers were to be viewed in a hostile light because 
their culture was imposed, then change may be hindered. The same would be true if the 
East Germanswere to be treated as simpletons. The above proposition is supported in 
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5.3 by three working assumptions which are investigated using data collection 
techniques explained in 5.4. 
Two cases were extended using the existing interviews, but revisiting the firms to gain 
artefacts, history, internal documents etc. One firm (discussed in 5.5-1) was deemed to 
be successfid. It was seen as fostering a climate for two-way learning. The other (in 
5.5.2) was at the opposite extreme and in fact failed. Material contained in three recent 
publications, one by the author the other two joint papers, are then applied in 5.6 to try 
and address the working proposition: the dominant culture always wins. These 
publications had as their base the field data as summarised in the appendix and Table 4- 
12. The subject area of acculturation is introduced and examined by using a model 
(Figure 5-7) which measures acculturative stress., The original acculturative stress 
model is extended in 5.7 to investigate implications for two-way learning. The most 
unexpected and therefore most interesting finding of the papers was the emergence of 
patterns which implicated a link between acculturation and two-way learning. Two-way 
learning is an important variable, because it can be critical in reducing barriers to change 
and integration and also can be used to develop competencies giving competitive 
advantage. The discussion of the results of the literature, papers and contrasting cases 
takes place in 5.8 throwing light onto the subject matter of two-way learning with or 
without a dominant culture. Here the three assumptions of 5.3 are revisited. The chapter 
closes with conclusions and onward link to the summary chapter, where amongst other 
things the testing out of the extended model is suggested. 
5.2 Setting the Context 
The context of the research was a country experiencing revolutionary change with 
existing networks breaking down and becoming irrelevant on a daily basis. This fits 
into the change management concept of breakpoints as opposed to turning points, see 
Figure 5-2 (Strebel, 1994). So with change breaking in a revolutionary fashion all 
around the East German firms, the internal strand of strategy literature provides some 
shelter. The internal resources of the firm are a given factor and according to the 
Resource Based View of the firm by coopting these resources a firm can identify its core 
competencies and exploit them to competitive advantage. These core competencies may 
well be in the area of knowledge and learning and it this area that emerges as a fruitful 
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research subject. Institutional theory may or may not apply in the new M&As, 
dependent upon whether or not the western ideas and structures are accepted by the 
existing workforce. This is reflected in the chapter's working proposition: the dominant 
culture always wins. This proposition will be investigated in the remainder of the 
chapter, but suffice it to say that one further influence from the literature plays a role 
here. As we move into the case studies, the importance of the existence of an agency 
problem and attempts to overcome such a problem becomes very relevant. 
5.2.1 Strategic Management Literature 
Specific strategic management literature plus similar material from three other schools 
is examined in the remaining sections of 5.2. Specific means here, as opposed to the 
general literature introduction of Chapter 3, that we concentrate on literature which 
delves into the relationship between the employees (the M&A's human resources and 
competencies), the new environment and competitive advantage. 
The general discussion of resource management literature in Chapter 3 ended with a 
statement about the theoretical starting point of this research 
- 
'As far as the internal 
context is concerned, the anti-Porter views of Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1992, that the 
firm matters, not the industry are the theoretical starting point for the research. That the 
firm matters can be explained by the resource based view of the firm, (RBV). 
Continuing on out of the RBV theory starting blocks, the main thrust of the thesis can be 
summarised somewhat negatively as: A valuable potential of human resources was 
acquired along with the East German firm, if these people, their talents and other 
inherent attributes they possessed were ignored, or not fully utilised, then a strategic 
blunder has occurred. 
A closer look at resources and particularly human resources is therefore necessary. 
"Looking at economic units in terms of their resource ndowments has a long tradition 
in economics. The analysis is typically confined, however, to categories uch as labour, 
capital and perhaps land. The idea of looking at firrns as a broader set of resources goes 
back to Penrose, 1959", (Wemefelt, 1984: 171). A firm's resources can be defined as 
those (tangible and intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm, 
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(Caves, 1980; Wernefelt, 1984). "Examples of resources are: brand names; in-house 
knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, 
efficient procedures, capital etc. " (Wernefelt, 1984: 172). Thus the traditional view of 
resources as comprising of land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship is expanded far 
into intangible areas. Each firm has different bundles or batches of such resources. 
"Finns can be seen as possessing heterogeneous asset bases (resource endowments)", 
Connor, 1991: 139. These resources can endow competitive advantage. Rumelt defines 
a firm's competitive position as depending on a bundle of unique resources and 
relationships, (Rumelt, 1974: 557). "Just having a bundle of resources is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for success", (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994: 43), many well 
endowed firms find it difficult to exploit their resource bases, (Grant, 199 1). Rumelt 
adds that "the task of general management is to adjust and renew these resources and 
relationships as time, competition and change erode their value", (Rumelt, 1974: 557). 
Adjusting and renewing are dynamic not static activities and it is this way that an 
organisation uses, supplements and upgrades its resources, a process which builds 
competitive advantage, (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990). These authors call the roots of 
competitive advantage, core competencies, which they go on to define as collective 
learning. It is the link between the acquired East German employees and the idea of 
collective learning which forms an underlying thread throughout this chapter. 
5.2.2 Change Management Literature 
The area of change management is one of the more developed topic areas discussed in 
this chapter, with regard to theory. Before launching into a review of the various 
theories, an explanation of the relevance of change management to the research may be 
worthwhile. 
The newly acquired East German subsidiaries had to change quickly or cease to exist. 
The reasons were discussed and listed in 1.1.2. The first reason was the sudden arrival 
of competition from the West. With the disappearance of the inner German border, all 
East German consumers were able to, and indeed did, fulfil their needs through 
purchases from western firms. Without a swift and revolutionary change to efficient 
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performance and a market dictated output, then the whole of East German industry 
could easily have disappeared. The need for quick change was thus omnipresent, 
unfortunately this seems not to have eased the transition. 
How then did existing theories of change stand up to the fall of communism? It needs 
saying right up front, that the literature and theories of change management have all been 
developed in the western, capitalist world. This ethnocentricity of thought may be a 
weakness as theory was developed using a mindset, and assuming a mindset, 
fundamentally different from that which had emerged under communism. The theme of 
. 
western dominated theory was discussed and further developed under the cross-cultural 
research heading of 3.4 and also in 3.7. 
Many of the views expressed in the change management theories seem at first glance to 
be divergent, indecd Gersick, 1991 argues that underpinning heterogeneous paradigms 
cause such diversity. However some commonality exists. - Firstly many of the theories 
are known by their countervailing extremes: Evolutionary or revolutionary, inertia or 
stress, top-down or bottom-up, imposed or negotiated etc. That the theories highlight 
extremes on a spectrum introduces the second commonality, that a tension exists 
between the extremities. Indeed it is this tension which, if properly exploited, can form 
the basis of acceptance of change. 
The first continuum of change pressure to be examined is whether change slowly 
evolves (Grinyer & Spender, 1979, Miller & Friesen, 1980, Nelson & Winter, 1982), or 
explodes onto the scene as a revolutionary transformation via catastrophe theory 
(Bigelow, 1982). According to Grinyer & McKieman, 1990 the 'slow change' models 
(Clarke & Stanley, 1988) have as parents Cyert & March's seminal work on the 
behavioural theory of the firm (1963), which itself incorporated detailed thought on 
bureaucracies from Max Weber, (1924). Bureaucracies are damned as being unable to 
adapt to a changing environment because of historically determined structures and 
power distribution. The belittling of bureaucracies is somewhat unfair because in 
mature markets, mechanistic (Bums & Stalker, 1961) or machine (Mintzberg, 1983) 
bureaucracies can operate efficiently. Not. only inherent structures and power 
distribution exert pressure to remain with the status quo, there has usually been a 
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substantial investment in human and financial capital, as would be expected from the 
resource based view of the firm, (Penrose, 
. 
1959), which is unlikely to be easily 
sacrificed. The pressure for change, often visible in the relative decline of the firm, is 
present to some extent in all organisations (Slatter, 1984: 61). Some firms areproactive 
and by a series of complementary, sequential small changes or logical incrementalism, ' 
(Quinn, 1978) are able to avoid a full blown crisis. Other firms wait too long and thus 
have to be reactive to the crisis when it arrives. 
A second body of change management literature which also very visibly incorporates the 
idea of pressure between extremes is the interaction of stress and inertia (Huff, Huff & 
Thomas, 1992). Inertia encompasses personal commitments, financial investments and 
institutional mechanisms supporting the current way of doing things. Stress arises 
between a mismatch between the demands/opportunities facing the organisation and 
current strategies. The environment may change through new methods (Van der Ven, 
1986), new entrants (Porter, 1980) or new employees (Clark, 1970). All lead to 
dissatisfaction with the misplaced current strategy, i. e. stress (Chandler, 1962). 
Surely it would be easy for management to switch the strategy and dissipate the stress? 
Unfortunately, management identifies with their past successes which become 
incorporated in the current strategy 
. 
They becom e committed to 'their' strategy 
(Ghemawat, 1991) and focus even more narrowly on a single theme, activity or issue at 
the expense of all others (Miller, 1993). The idea that organisations lapse into decline 
precisely because they have developed too sharp an edge is what Miller calls sim licity. P 
The link between Millers simplicity and inertia is obvious although Miller cautions 
about the following difference. Even though inertia is identifiable by resistance to 
change (Hannon & Freeman, 1984), the structures, process and systems causing inertia 
need not be simple and can be complex, (Miller, 1993). Regardless of the semantic 
quibbling, the fact remains that there is a tension between the changing environment and 
the inertia or simplicity of an organisation's response. Tension can be diagrammatically 
represented in force field analysis framework (Lewin, 1947), see Figure 5-1. 
Lewin's force field analysis framework is a split diagram with the pro and contra change 
forces on the left and right sides respectively. 
147 
* Source: Lewin, 1947 Figure 5-1 
Force Field Ahalysis Framework 
Present status quo 
driving forces 
Promise of money 
resisting forces 
Customer complaints 
New competition 
lack of knowlcdge 
,- 
Poor equipment 
employment woffies 
100% 50% 0 50% 100% 
New status quo 
Managers trying to effect change would well be advise to concentrate at first on 
reducing or neutralising the largest (longest) resistance force. Once there is no 
equilibrium between the opposing forces, then change will occur, just like supply and 
demand forces in the market place guide price back to the equilibrium market price in 
classical micro-economics. 
Here the opposing pressures of driving forces and resistant forces interact and produce 
(dependent upon their intensities) the possibility of four outcomes (Strebel, 1994): the 
4Rs, resistance, renewal, revitalisation & restructuring. Strebel's model incorporates the 
main points from the literature but is especially useful as it is based on tension in the 
change area (force field), an idea used in the research and shown as Figure 5-2. 
Figure 5-2 shows what is going on inside the change area with resistance to change on 
the 'Y' axis and the force of change on the 'X' axis. 
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* Source: Strebel. 1994 Figure 5-2 
Change area: 'Forces and Outcomes 
Strong 
Resistance 
Force 
Weak- 
No change Discontinuous 
Change 
--'ýBrcakpoints) 
Status Quo Agents 
dominate 
Sporadic Chang\e 
Change agents 
dominate 
(Turning Pointsl 
Constant change 
Weak- Change force Strong 
It is constructive to view and analyse research issues e. g. two-way learning and group 
Vs. individual, as change areas like that shown above. When the tension between the 
extremes becomes too great, either a breakpoint or a turning point will be passed. 
A further body of change management literature continues in a similar vein the idea of 
opposing variables in this case the trade off between stability and change. There is a 
wide difference in academic opinion as to the necessity of stability as the launching pad 
for change. This is not surprising as it has been proven that when a suggestion to 
change is broached usually 80% of the replies focus on the negative (what has to be 
given up) and only 20% of the replies mention the reverse, opportunities (Clarke, 1994: 
75). This reaction is to be expected as people know what they must give up but do not 
know what the future holds. Therefore it is perfectly logical, indeed almost a law, that 
change at first introduction will not be enthusiastically embraced. People who feel 
unsafe, retrench at least initially (Fink, Beak & Taddeo, quoted in Clarke, 1994). It 
should be borne in mind that East German society has experienced revolutionary 
changes in the last seven years, hence it is to be expected that employees within East 
German society will be busy retrenching. 
Others argue that change requires stability (Kanter, 1983: 122) "change also requires a 
measure of security and an understanding that the flow of resources will continue and 
that some areas will work without much attention, allowing energy and attention to be 
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directed towards the change effort. When everything is highly uncertain its difficult to 
believe in change". 
It therefore appears that some workers need stability at work to adapt to social change 
and prepare for different work practices. Other workers freed of old commitments by 
societal changes are ready to grasp new work practices as nothing is left to cling to. An 
offshoot of the divergence of views over change and stability is another trade off which 
became apparent from the interviews. There appears to be a trade off between youth and 
experience. The flexibility and adaptability of youth offset by contacts and institutional 
knowledge of older workers. The pilot study (Firm E) found that hiring older, more 
experienced workers seems to have been a failure. Younger employees who may have 
been rebels under the old system are more likely to become individually motivated by 
realising that under the western system it is possible to earn significantly more than 
someone who is not so motivated. This issue however was not pursued as an area for 
further research. 
On a practical level, change management programs need to address the expected 
resistance to strategic change. Johnson & Scholes, 1988 identify a three step approach 
to achieving change away from the accepted "recipe" and also the "cultural web" that 
supports and legitimises that recipe. They use Lewilfs (1947) ideas of unfreeze, move 
then refreeze and give examples of how executives can lend weight to the process 
during each of the three periods in the change process. In the initial unfreezing epoch 
there may well be an organisational trigger such as loss of a major client or threatened 
take-over. Alternatively, new top managers or management consultants may be brought 
in specifically to push through change. The fact that they are new and not linked to the 
old culture alleviates their task. 
In the moving to the new, post change position be it in strategy, structure, culture or 
whatever, the adoption process needs to be reinforced by highly visible top management 
action, i. e. showing through deeds. An example might be for the MD to personally man 
the switchboard for a few hours a week and guarantee customers who call an answer 
within a specified time. 
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The refreezing phase could well be accomplished by certain symbolic acts to emphasise 
the irrevocability of the change. Old high-level dqfenders of the past status quo may be 
sacrificed. 
However the implementation of change is not a purely mechanistic activity (Camall, 
1991). Ultimately successful change depends on changes in individuals and here there 
is an impact on self-esteem dependent on how much control the feel they exercise over 
the change process. Camall, (1991) shows that there is a five stage change cycle for 
each individual. Everyone in the change process goes through: denial, defence, 
discarding, adaptation and internalisation. The link to the more macro level, three-phase 
change process of Johnson & Scholes, (1988) is self evident. 0 
5.2.3 Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) Literature 
The general introduction to M&As which occurred in 3.2.2 split the literature on M&As 
into two groupings: pre- and post-acquisition with the acquisition process itself making 
the running for inclusion as a third grouping, (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). This section 
will concentrate on the post-acquisition phase, although'the ffects of the two preceding 
phases pills through. The overlapping nature of the phases can be shown 
diagrammatically, see Figure 5-33. C) 
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Figure 5-3 
The Three Phases of an Acquisition 
Acquisition 
deal process 
Pre-a isition Post- uisition 
The pre-acquisition phase is dominated by attention to the attractiveness of the target. It 
is important at this stage to differentiate between related (close fit) and unrelated 
(portfolio) type expansions. The deal making process phase attracts attention to closing 
the deal as quickly as possible. Consequently many urgent problems are put to one side 
and come back to haunt the M&A in the next stage. Managerial fit becomes important 
in this deal phase as the two sets of managers start interacting during the negotiations 
and battle lines or alliances are drawn up which continue over into the post-acquisition 
phase. The final stage, the post-acquisition stage, is the main focus of this research. 
Here attention is given to searching out and creating synergies, operational, resource 
transfer, accounting, financial or cultural. 
If the new organisation successfully navigates around the twin islands of ensuring a 
reasonable degree of strategic fit through careful analysis and selection of 
acquisition/merger targets, and not paying an exorbitant premium then the opportunity 
for synergy just mentioned is present. To capitalise on this synergy the firm must 
quickly and safely navigate the more subtle tides and currents of managing the 
integration of organisational resources, routines and culture without becoming so 
internally focused as to fall behind the market progress of competitors who's energy is 
not consumed with integrating a newpartner, (Baden-Fuller and Boschetti 1995). The 
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organisation must not only capitalise on scaleand scope economies achieved through 
effective integration it must also create new capabilities to stay abreast, or ahead, of the 
competition. This is done through the reconfiguration of the firm's old resources and 
capabilities and the learning which this process triggers. Thus organisational learning 
generated by the process of resolving the practical and cultural challenges posed by 
post-merger organisational fit and integration process becomes the real return from 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Thomson & Mc Namara, 1997. 
The pre-acquisition phase has an effect on the post-acquisition phase through the 
decision taken concerning the mode of entry., The acquirer can decide to gobble up the 
whole of the acquirer (100% acquisition) or at least enough of the voting stock to 
control strategic decision making. On the other hand the two firms may merge as more 
equal partners, especially where the voting stock is left in the hands of the existing (East 
German) acquired firm's management. Choosing this latter co-ownership route eases 
any agency problem associated with differing goals of management and owners. An 
example here is downsizing. The East German M&As were, even after Treuhand 
initiated slimming courses, over-manned. East German managers in a M&A who were 
involved in ownership were in a position to humanise the decision to make employees 
redundant. They were able to explain to employees with whom they had worked for 
years why they must leave, or for those that stayed on, why the changes were necessary. 
Their ownership stake forms a commitment to "champion" change as opposed to 
neutrality or outright opposition. 
The mode of entry has an effect on the speed of restructuring, a theme taken up later in 
the discussion of the results. Additionally, the mode of entry spills over into the 
66process" stage as the two management teams who negotiated the deal have to live with 
one another after its conclusion. Hence positive relationships based on similar styles in 
this phase auger well f6r post acquisition times. Datta (199 1) found differences in 
management styles negatively affected perfon-nance in acquisitions. 
All the sample M&As were expansions eastwards by foreign firms within the same 
industry, i. e. M&As were of similar firms not dissimilar. It has often been argued that 
similarity between acquirer and target firm is necessary for a successful M&A. Either 
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by market power gains (Montgomery, 1985) or strategic relatedness (Chattedee, 1986; 
Porter, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), 
. 
Harrison et al, (199 1) challenge this 
dominant similarities theory and champion differences in resources between acquiring 
and target firms as positively influencing performance. 
As already stated this research looks at horizontal M&As within the same industries, the 
expansion course most predicted to throw up synergies. It is therefore necessary to 
explore the concept of synergy. Harrison et al, 1991 quote Ansoff, 1965 and define 
synergy as "implying that gains accrue to the acquiring firm through two sources: (a) 
improved operating efficiency based on economies of scale or scope; (b) some kind of 
skills transfer". However the researcher's interest in the post-acquisition phase depends 
on the position that "synergy may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to obtain 
value for the acquiring firm", (Barney, 1988). What else is needed? 
An expanding area of interest is the effect of cross-cultural differences, both national 
and organisational, on post-acquisition performance. This research examined six cross- 
national M&As. A cross-national M&A being defined as "bringing together two 
companies which have different organisational cultures, which themselves are nested in 
different national cultures, (Very et al. 1997). Cultural differences have been associated 
with reduced co-operation of acquired employees, (Sales & Mirvis, 1984), financial 
success, (Datta, 1991) and executive turnover, (Walsh, 1988; Hambrick & Cannella, 
1993). The latter authors talk of the buying firm's culture generally dominating, a 
theme expanded by Baden-Fuller & Boschetti (1995). This research builds on the 
question of does the acquiring firm's culture generally pervade? A theme examined by 
developing a model based on Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, (1988). The model attempts to 
measure acculturative stress and thus the cultural dominance of the acquirer. Recent 
work by Very et al, (1997) found strong support for the view that similarity in the 
relative standing of the target firm management in comparison with the acquirer 
management brought a minimisation of performance problems. The results of this 
research support the conclusion of Very et al, 1997 that when the western management 
a. ct as partners with the eastern managers and not as conquerors, the resulting smooth 
acculturation augers well for the future. 
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Finally returning to the question of possible synergy in the post-acquisition phase. The 
overarching theory of this research, the Resource Based View of the Firm (RBV), is 
used to review implications for learning and knowledge transfer, (Wemefeldt, 1984). 
Indeed the mother of the RBV, Edith Penrose, (1959), went so far as to develop a theory 
that the pool of unused productive services, resources and special knowledge in the 
acquiring firm can be an internal inducement to expansion via a M&A. The M&As 
researched were not flooded with western managers, except for Finn F, so the alternate 
view is posited. Here western firms actually bought into East German firms which had 
a pool of under-utilised productive services. They may well have made the acquisition 
thinking that by sharing resources and activities synergy could be obtained, (Brush 
1996). However any such sharing and transferring was hampered by language barriers, 
acculturation in general and minimum eastwards management transfer. The 
implications from a RBV viewpoint are that organisational slack existed, and by 
leveraging the under-utilised resources through knowledge transfer allowing learning to 
take place. However the learning should have been bi-directional as the Eastern side 
had a lot to offer the Western acquirer. 
The overlapping circles of Figure 5-3 can be extended to incorporate the three specific 
research focuses of this chapter, see Figure 5-4. 
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Figure 5-4 
Research Focuses and'the Stages of Acquisition 
Framework of intearation: 
Merger or Acquisition 
Process of Integration: 
Manage Acculturate 
Stress and Expectations 
An Outcome of Intearation: 
Organisational Leaming 
Focus: 
5.2.4 Learning Literature 20 
a. earning and Knowledge in Organisations 
Knowledge has long been recognised as one of the key factors in the creation of 
economic wealth within societies (Hayek 1945; Marshall 1965; Penrose 1959; Stigler 
1968; Teece 1977). An increasing number of authors are coming to view the creation 
and/or application of knowledge as a key function of the firm (Argyris, and Schon 1978; 
Grant 1996b; Hamel and Prahalad 1990; Senge 1993). We can observe that 
fundamentally different knowledge creation and application strategies were employed 
by organisations in the East and finns in the West after World War 11. 
With the collapse of communism these two different forms of knowledge creation and 
application have come face to face through Mergers and Acquisitions, presenting 
opportunities and challenges for managers in the field. In this section we will first 
'9 Figure 54 is taken from the City University Working Paper "Companies that came in from the cold" by 
Thomson & Mc Namara, 1998 at the time of writing awaiting publication as part of a book. 20 This sub-section comes from Thomson & Mc Namara, 1997, EGOS presentation, but was mainly the 
work of Peter Mc Namara who has graciously allowed usage here. I 
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outline some of the basic elements of knowledge management, including the central 
issue of creation and deepening of knowledge bases. We will show how knowledge 
trajectories differed along these two elements in Eastern versus Western firms. We will 
then outline the opportunities and challenges faced by firms in merging these differing 
perspectives. The complexity of the task is increased by the-fact that knowledge transfer 
and integration across firms is generally viewed as considerably more difficult than 
internal creation and application of a firms knowledge base. Core to the transfer and - 
merging of knowledge across finns is acculturation, a theme which f6rms the centre 
piece of our empirical analysis which follows in later sections. 
b. Knowledge Management: Capabilities and Sustainable Competitive Advantage 
We view knowledge management as the process of creation, development, maintenance, 
expansion, contraction and decline of organisational capabilities. This is both because 
organisational capabilities are essentially knowledge based and they are the central 
element in the creation of Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA). Organisational 
capabilities are defined by Amit and Schoemaker (1993) as: information based, tangible, 
or intangible processes that are firm-specific and are developed over time through 
complex interactions amongst firms resources... unlike resource, capabilities are based 
on developing, carrying and exchanging information through the firm's human capital. 
The most important capabilities'are core capabilities. They are defined by Teece et al 
(1990) as: "a set of differential skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide 
the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular 
business". The development of a core capability is a difficult task which requires the 
creation of new and novel combinations of a firm's resources and capabilities. As Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994) note: it may take five, ten, or more years to build a world leadership 
in a core competence area, consistency of effort is the key. It should be noted here that 
East and West Germany were separated for over four decades. Within this time their 
respective producers had the opportunity to create distinctive sets of core competencies. 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA) cap be derived from resource or capabilities 
which are rare, imperfectly imitable, durable, and can be deployed in products and 
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services (Barney 199 1; Black and Boal 1994; Connor 199 1; Grant 199 1; 1 lamel and 
Prahalad 1990). The goal of SCA is to obtain returns in excess of the resource owners 
cost of capital. The central source of SCA is core capabilities. 
The opposite to core capabilities are core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 19927). They are sets 
of knowledge which have been valuable sources of competitive advantage in the past 
but are now inappropriate to the future competitive game. Over time capabilities which 
have heralded success in the past may no longer offer the route to future success. As the 
firm seeks to create new capabilities which can produce improved products and services 
the old capabilities can hamper the effort to develop new ones. We argue in section 
5.2.4. c below, that core rigidities gradually pervaded the majority of East German 
industry, thus widening the competitive gap between them and the wider market driven 
world. 
c. Learning Races: Assumptions 
Central to our argument are the following set of assumptions. 
The heart of knowledge creation is the individual (Argyris and Schon 1978; Grant 
1996b; Huber 1991; Klein 1989; March 1991; Polayni 1966; Simon 1991). The task of 
the firm in knowledge management is the co-ordination of individuals who alone could 
not have sufficient knowledge and resource to build the complex products and services 
required in today's society (e. g. cars) but who combined can efficiently and effectively 
apply their knowledge to deliver such goods and services (Grant 1996a). The firm 
appropriates its return in the knowledge management process from its co-ordination of 
groups of individuals who jointly apply (and to a lesser extent jointly create) knowledge, 
thus we can see that the heart of knowledge application is the group. The role of the firm 
necessitates that knowledge creation and application will thus occur in a social 
environment (Blacker 1995; Nonaka 1994), however the core of knowledge creation 
will remain the individual. 
Unfortunately communism showed a tendency towards intolerance of individuality. 
Individuality tends to foster mavericks, people who dare to be different, or have a 
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different view of how the world works. Mavericks may take contrary views in the area 
of what products and services firms should and could produce, a mixture of these are 
one of the key catalysts to avoid core rigidities (McNamara and Baden-Fuller 1997). In a 
communist society it is much less likely that mavericks would have publicly exposed 
themselves in the workplace. Hence the danger of core rigidities was greater than in a 
society which tolerates, and in some cases (e. g. USA) embraces maverick behaviour. 
Over forty years long there existed a competitive race between East and West across 
multiple dimensions from sport, to politics, to science and technology. This can be 
viewed as a learning race, where each society sought to best the other with superior 
knowledge which could be applied into products and services for all the world to see 
(e. g. the Space Race, the Arms Race, the Olympics etc. ). Some authors argue that the 
improvements in reliability that investments in leaming capabilities bring comes at the 
price of reduced variability within the firm (Levinthal and March 1993; March 199 1). It 
is argued that the price of such reduced deviation within the firm is the chance to gain 
primacy in the competitive race. With lower explicit individual diversity East Germany 
firms may have sought to increase reliabilily but at the cost of variabilily, and hence 
innovation and learning. Reliability and variability can be seen as a duality or dilemma 
(Hampden-Turner, 1990). The ability to manage these two conflicting pressures to 
obtain optimum results is a common problem for all organisations. 
Improvement in a firm's relative competitive position i's affected by the number of 
competitors in the market and the variability of the strategies to gain success (March 
1991). Thus if a firm wishes to maintain its relative position, employment of a leaming 
strategy based around deepening current knowledge will work because it improves 
reliability. However, in the race for primacy, the greater the number of competitors the 
greater the potential variability of strategies in the market, hence, the greater need for 
specific firms to encourage variability so that they might hit upon a successful strategy 
that attains market leadership. 
In the West there were many firms with competing strategies, hence creativity bubbled 
up. The East German system operated as a sort of single entity, GDR PLC if you like. In 
an environment where there are few firms the best strategy is that of specialisation. In 
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the GDR the outputs of one producer fed into the inputs of another, controlled by 
political economic plans, rather than the market forces of managerial ingenuity. Whole 
industries were vertically integrated, while links across industries were fostered by the 
state. In an ideal world GDR PLC might have been able to greatly increase reliability at 
the cost of variability. Even then over a period of 45 years separation from the West it 
would have fallen ever further behind in the leaming race, unless it allowed new ideas to 
filter into its system from the West. It did not generally allow this to happen, nor was the 
GDR PLC an ideal world 
- 
far from it. Based on the above assumptions we argue that 
ex-GDR firms would on average have much less to offer in a merger with a western 
firm in terms of strategic or operational creativity. 
However, there did exist factors in the ex-GDR which might suggest that on average 
they could have more to offer in the application of current knowledge in overcoming 
core rigidit . ies. We will now examine in more detail why these points should be so. 
d. Core Rigidities and their Solutions 
The development of core rigidities tends to be path dependent (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Collis 1991; Mahoney 1995). The core capability grows over time building onpast 
successes, reinforcing behaviours that have led to past success and embedding these 
deeper into the organisation. This enables the firm to refine its organisational routines, 
procedures and efficiency in knowledge integration. A problem emerges when new 
capabilities are developed by other fin-ns which more effectively deliver products and 
services which society wants and is willing to pay for. 
In East Germany where whole industries were vertically integrated the development of a 
core rigidity in one part of the value chain could inhibit the value adding tasks of the 
entire network. With a policy of full-employment and no real means by which firms 
could go bankrupt, and thus die, core rigidities could not be removed from the system 
other than by pro-active management. The problem is that the mechanisms management 
could employ to remove core rigidities from the firm, were strongly discouraged by the 
state. 
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There are good reasons why firms are reluctant to change capabilities without the threat 
of organisational death. The principle reason is the high switching costs which may be 
involved in moving from one capability to another (Kogut and Zander 1992). The 
interplay between bundles of resources and capabilities necessary to create a new core 
capability will, at the outset, be poorly understood since the creation of organisational 
knowledge is by definition a complex and uncertain process. Kogut and Zander (1992) 
articulate this risk in their study when they note that: Switching to new capabilities is 
difficult as neither the knowledge embedded in the current relationships and principles 
is well understood, nor the social fabric required to support the new learning known. 
This can be reinforced by the high levels of inertia within the firm and the high level of 
costs attached to investments in the exploration of new knowledge (Levinthal and 
March 1993; March 1991; Huff et al 1992). 
In East Germany the switching costs were very high due to the vertical integration of 
industries. If for example new production processes in coal production failed, then the 
knock on effect on electricity production would be considerable, and by extension the 
consumer production of the region. Switching costs, and the heavy cost of failure on a 
personal level when challenging the status quo, may have encouraged members of East 
German combines to continue to apply and expand their current knowledge to the 
problems the firm faced, rather than developing alternative solutions based on more 
efficient and effective knowledge bases. This very problem of sticking to old methods 
and knowledge in the power industry has been described earlier in Chapter I when 
discussing structural imbalance. 
In addressing the challenge of core rigidities the firm is faced with three primary 
strategies: First, take a population ecology world view, accepting the onset of 
organisational decline that core rigidities will eventually cause organisational death as 
the firm becomes increasingly divorced from its enviroru-nent. The East German system 
did not allow bankruptcy, hence this scenario was academic although that is no longer 
the case. Second, invest in the promotion of intellectual diversity. Third, invest in 
unlearning capabilities either, provocatively, or as and when the need arises. Wewill 
now outline these last two strategies. 
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e. Promotion of Intellectual Diversity 
-A Solution to Core Rigidities 
The process of exploration for alternative capabilities and organisational strategies is 
more likely to occur in a firm with differing perspectives on what the purpose of the 
firm is and what products and services it should deliver. The creation of new 
organisational knowledge is strongly influenced by the interaction between individual 
knowledge and the firm's knowledge base. The firm's knowledge is embedded it its 
routines, culture, group behaviours and hierarchy. On average the knowledge stored in 
these systems will be a more accurate reflection of reality than the individual's view. 
However, organisations are inanimate objects, it is only through the diversity of 
individual's knowledge that the firm can change its view of the world, and hence its 
capabilities (March 1991). 
Change is more likely to occur if the firm notices a gap between what its current 
combination of resources and capabilities can deliver, and what the customer wants over 
time. When noticing a serious value adding incongruity between market needs and the 
capabilities of the firm, individuals need to raise questions which highlight these 
incongruities. Such questions are more likely to come from organisational mavericks, 
people who have questioning minds, and the desire to express their ideas both to others 
and though the products and services they create. This is not a typical feature of people 
who seek to fit into the company or political party line. As such it is unlikely these 
managers would have lasted long in the old East Germany. 
Another way to promote change in a firm's organisational knowledge is to introduce 
new people into the firm (Carley 1992; Simon 1992). Personnel turnover can occur 
when'a firm is expanding, hence taking on new people, when people retire from the 
firm, or alternatively move onto other firms. The idea is that these- new people can 
infuse the firm with new ideas. If they have past experience in another organisation then 
they can bring insights into alternative ways of running the business, thus enabling the 
firm to envision new methods of working. In a way this is partially what has occurred in 
the M&As of Western and Eastern firms, where new staff have been brought in. 
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L Unlearning 
-A Solution to Core Rigidities 
Unleaming is defined by Hedberg (198 1) as a process through which learners discard 
knowledge which is misleading 
... 
This process of unlearning can be equated with 
Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. 
On the knowledge management front new M&As were offered a work force prepared 
for unlearning of old capabilities and acceptance of new. They also were also offered a 
capability at knowledge application which matched, and may have exceeded Western 
firms. There were reasons some firms over-looked this benefit. In a society where 
personnel turnover was much higher in the lower ranks, western firms had developed 
complex systems of organisational routines and procedures which enabled them to 
preserve their production knowledge. Otherwise the firms knowledge, upon which its 
capabilities are based, could literally walk out the door as employees moved from one 
job to the next. 
For example in McDonalds there exist very detailed written procedures on the cooking 
of burgers, how long they can remain on the shelves before being sold or thrown out etc. 
They are detailed and established rules on the sequential interaction of individuals from 
the kitchen, to cleaning, to the sales counter. Staff receive on the job training into these 
procedures, reinforced through constant repetition. Such written procedures were less 
necessary in an East German restaurant where staff remained in the same workplace, 
and often the same job, for life. In this environment, sequential interactions between 
individuals could have been ingrained in staff through organisational culture. 
In a way one could say that organisational culture is a complex routine, embedded in 
which is the tacit knowledge of the collective organisational mind. One of the 
difficulties of this type of stored knowledge is that the beliefs and assumptions it 
generates are hard to clearly identify given that they are subconscious. This can lead to 
difficulties where these assumptions become removed from the reality of the 
organisational environment over time, but major decisions continue to be made based 
upon them. In East Germany the assumptions about the relationship between capital, 
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labour and consumers became increasingly divorced from wider global realities, 
however the dogma of communism created a world in which broader realities were 
hidden from the populous. 
The surfacing and challenging of these assumptions is possible (Mason and Mitroff 
198 1), but real cultural change is a difficult task (Bate 1994). Hence, storage and 
integration of knowledge by embedding it in the organisational culture can be very 
efficient when first created, because it passes into the tacit knowledge bases of a wide 
number of individuals, however, as the environment alters the ability to unlearn such 
knowledge is a slow, laborious, highly costly, and often unsuccessful crusade (Hax. and 
Majluf 1984; Wilson 1992). Thus, in the long term, storage of large amounts of 
knowledge within the organisational culture can lead to very inflexible capabilities. 
Here we see that change in East Germany firms is difficult without a crude removal of 
culture, as many firms tried via mass redundancies, or a direct inclusion of culture in 
their Merger and Acquisition strategy. Firms which addressed the issue of acculturation 
head on were, in our sample, more successful. 
5.3 Emergent Questions and Working Assumptions 
To provide a seamless link the research problem and main research questions as 
documented in Chapter 2, section 3.2 and 2.4.1 are shown below: 
1. What pressures induced or negated change and integration? 
2. What strategic actions eased post take-over integration? 
3. What are the implications for learning? 
The literature chapter, backed up by the more specific literature review in this chapter, 
support three working assumptions which go some way to obtaining answers to the 
above research questions. 
To answer question Ia closer look at how each of the partners in a M&A perceived 
each other is necessary. Diff6rent perceptions and expectations will give rise to 
conflicts and stress. Also different power positions will lead either to a forced 
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acceptance of change or an agreed accommodation. In the chapter overview, this 
scenario was described as a barrier to enhancing employee skills and attitudes. Did this 
situation exist in the researched M&As? One situation where barriers were possible was 
postulated in the working proposition of this chapter now phrased as question 
- 
Did the 
dominant culture always win? We can examine this and the previous question by 
posing the following working assumption: 
Working assumption 1: "ere the acquirer (in this case a Westernfirm) isfinancially 
and technically strong, any acculturation takes place on the acquirer's terms. 
The second general research question looks at what management can do to ease 
integration after the take-over. There is a link to the first assumption as it can be posited 
that the power position of the Eastern firm is higher if there is some element of co- 
ownership. Given a more evenly balanced power relationship between the acquired and 
the acquirer the second working assumption is: 
Working assum)tion 2: There is more opportunityfor the Eastern culture to influence 
the incoming Western culture when co-ownership exists. Co-ownership means that 
enough shares stay in Eastern hands as to make it difficult for unilateral decisions to be 
made by the Western acquirer. 
Given a good mixture of the two firms' cultures and countervailing power relationships 
between the Eastern and Western management, the ground work for a learning 
organisation will have been laid. To look at the implications for learning the third 
working assumption was developed: 
Working assumption 3: "en there exists an equal relationship with low acculturative 
stress between Western acquirer and Eastern acquired, two-way learning and 
information exchange is the outcome. 
In investigating whether the dominant culture always wins, three published papers, one 
by the author and two co-written with Peter Mc Namara are used. These papers use the 
field data of this dissertation and build cumulatively in developing evidence for and 
against the research question. Firstly, the importance of the concepts of acculturation, 
foreigness and the Psychic distance paradox are given a viewing. A model is developed 
to attempt to measure acculturative stress in West-East M&As- Secondly, the argument 
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moves on a little fin-ther by extending the model and the implications of this extended 
model to the concept of two-way learning is given a more detailed investigation, as there 
is a direct link from two-way learning to a firm's competencies. The extended model 
takes on board the assessed level of two-way learning as an important variable in post- 
acquisition success or failure of M&As. 
5.4 Data Collection 
Twenty nine Western and Eastern supervisors and employees were involved in 
individual interviews at five case firms. Six Eastern employees at a sixth case firm took 
part in a group interview rounded off with a CEO individual interview. To avoid just 
"successes" the argument was addressed: whether it is logical to obtain allfield 
interviewsftom people who are working and have successfully integrated? Surely the 
60% of the East Germans who did not successfully integrate and lost their jobs have 
something to offer? To include this valuable source of information but to keep the 
research practical, a second pillar of the research was therefore individual interviews 
with twelve of these unfortunate "losers" of the reunification. Luckily these "losers" are 
washed up onto unemployment office training programmes and were accessible through 
contacts with one of the programs in East Berlin. The combined case set included: 
individual, group and unemployed interviews and was the same as that used in Chapter 
4 with an overview provided in Table 4-11. 
5.4.1 Individual or Group Interviews 
One unexpected quandary turned out to be that in studying barriers to change and 
integration in a M&A where integration did not go smoothly it was impossible to 
conduct individual interviews. The employees imply refused to talk individually and 
so a group interview had to be hurriedly arranged. Six employees of the sixth firm 
therefore engaged in a group interview which of necessity had to be more structured 
than an individual interview. 
Pros and cons of group interviews: The drawbacks to in-depth interviews form the 
positive criteria which favour selecting group interviews. Individual interviews are time 
166 
consuming and expensive. One can obtain the views of 10 
- 
IS people inside one hour 
with a group interview. Certainly the data gained will be on a more shallow level as that 
from an individual interview, but its validity will be of a higher order. Also the breadth 
of viewpoints and hence potentially interesting linkages will be greater with a group. 
Offsetting these group advantages are the perils 'group think' and the fear of expressing 
oneself in the presence of ex-colleagues or even ex-superiors, just such an occurrence 
heavily affected the group interview. Here the R&D Director hogged the conversation, 
constantly interrupted people of lesser status and tried to direct what was said to his way 
of seeing the situation. 
5.4.2 Contrasting Case Studies 
The most unexpected and therefore most interesting field occurrence was the emergence 
of patterns linked to the topic of two way learning. Here the variables being analysed 
were not at the individual level but were firm specific and therefore should be assessed 
at the level of the firm. The data however were collected by individual and group 
interviews inside the firms. For a discussion of why individual variables (individual' 
vision) can be analysed at the firm level (shared vision) ýsee Senge 1990, Chapters II& 
12. The outcome of this conundrum, for which thanks are due to the research 
supervisor, Professor Charles Baden-Fuller, was to revisit the most widely differing 
firms and extend the existing case studies by collecting additional firm specific 
documents, financial statements, press cuttings etc. (Yin, 1989: 85). The idea being to 
take the most successful firm at creating the preconditions for a learning organisation 
and the least successful and then contrasting the case studies of these organisations. 
Points of difference between the two case studies could provide valuable insights into 
cause of successful acceptance of change or the opposite (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). 
To use Yin's classification (Yin, 1989: 46) there would be a multi-case/embedded 
design. Embedded as there are multiple units of analysis (individual, group and firm) 
and multi-case as there is more than one firm. As we have found contrasting results, 
then the reasons for these can be theorised (theoretical as opposed to literal replication). 
An immediate problem is that firms tend to be less willing to allow case studies where it 
is perceived they have been unsuccessful. The number of well known cases dealing 
with failure are limited perhaps the best known being Burgelmann's INTEL case on 
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fading memories (Burgelmann, 1991). The INTEL case greatly impressed the 
researcher and has been used as a model example of how to write a case study. 
5.4.3 Acquisition Vs. Merger (Co-ownership) 
Details of issues mainly relevant to the pre-acquisition stage have been summarised in 
Table 4-12. In all cases the East German M&As were operating in the same business 
sector as the acquirer. Although quite sizeable by some standards, the scale of the 
purchase in both costs and resource terms added less than 5% to the acquiring firm's 
overall revenues and costs. The one exception being Finn F, where the East German 
expansion represented approximately a 50% increase in the acquirer's size. It is 
common to make no differentiation between a merger and an acquisition but we feel 
such aggregation hides important differences. For our purpose we define both forms of 
combination in relation to power over decision making. Acquisitions occur with the 
buying up of enough stock to have control over decision making in the boardroom. 
Mergers, on the other hand, are defined as the sharing of a firm's stock to the extent that 
decision making at the board level is not effectively in the hands of the acquirer. Using 
the above definitions we investigated 3 mergers and 3 acquisitions. 
5.5 Contrasting Case Studies of M&As 
Two case studies at the opposite ends of the spectrum of successful/non-successful 
implementation of a climate of integration, trust and knowledge transfer are shown 
below in 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. 
5.5.1 Case of a well handled M&A 
- 
Acerplan GmbH 
The medium sized engineering consulting services firm of Acerplan is located in Halle 
in the former East Germany, now part of the Neue Bundesland Saxony-Anhalt. The 
case study has been made possible by the generous interest shown by David J. Yaw, the 
firm! s British Director for Marketing & Business Development plus also Dr. Peter Wald, 
Personnel and Communications Manager. As well as the group and open-ended 
interviews which took place in November 1996, much of the material here was 
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contained in the MBA dissertation entitled: Managing Corporate Change in a new 
Market Economy: Case Study ofan Enginefring Services Firm in Eastern Germany, 
submitted by Mr. Yaw to the Henley Management College, Brunel University in January 
1994. Another source of written information was the article: Case Study: "y East 
Germany? in FT Mergers + Acquisitions International in July 1992, reproduced in Mr. 
Yaw's dissertation as an Appendix. The article was authored by Chris Bosker a Director 
of the parent Acer Group who negotiated the merger with the Treuhandanstalt. 
History of Acerplan. 
Acerplan's predecessor, IPRO Halle GmbH (IPRO), was founded in 1950 as an 
independent engineering consultancy with the primary role of assisting with the 
reconstruction of war-tom Eastern Germany. Halle was an ideal base because of its 
location in Saxony-Anhalt at the centre of the heart of the former East Germany. 
In 1970, as part of the increasing central ideological influence on USSR satellites, IPRO 
was absorbed into the massive construction conglomerate BMK Chemie. BMK Chemie 
was responsible primarily for the construction of chemical plants in the former East 
Germany and IPRO took on the planning and design role for BMK, alongside IPRO's 
sister company HMB, which fulfilled the contracting role. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, IPRO became a Treuhaiidanstalt (THA) administered 
firm and was separated away on I May 1990 from the former combine BMK Chemie as 
part of the pre-privatisation process. Since this date the company has undergone 
extensive rationalisation and restructuring, reducing the workforce from an original 
1,000 to 420. The THA appointed Herr W-D Hein as Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board and together with a management consultant the rationalisation program was put 
into being and the company was split. into 9 divisions, containing 29 individual market 
oriented offices. Although many projects tended to very small, the company profited 
from the post unification building boom and the strategy was generally successful, with 
IPRO recording a profit in 1991. On the 31st March 1992 IPRO was finally privatised 
with Acer taking a third stake along with the Berliner Bank and 17 members of the 
company's management. IPRO was subsequently renamed Acerplan in July 1992. 
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Why Eastern Germany? 
Acer Group, the 2,600 strong multi-disciplinary UK consulting engineering company 
formed in 1987 by a merger between consultants John Taylor and Freeman Fox 
(probably best known for its own work on Turkey's Bosphorous suspension bridges) is 
delighted so far with the DM 29 million acquisition it made in 1992 in East Germany. 
To Acer, East Germany was just another eastern European country needing to adapt to a 
market-led economy where management and marketing skills were required and the 
meaning of the words such as productivity and profit needed to be learned. Acer was 
looking to expand into eastern Europe not necessarily into East Germany but had little 
success looking themselves. They therefore employed Hill Samuel whose German 
affiliate came up with several possibilities which were whittled down to one, IPRO. 
Although the company had over 400 employees in a town which no one had heard of, an 
initial meeting took place in September 1991. Contact at IPRO was Herr Hein, who had 
been installed at IPRO by the THA as Chairman. East Germany was seen as a low cost 
way of buying into the German market as acquisitions in the old West Germany would 
have been very expensive. 
The Purchase Process: 
The THA is in interested in two documents. The first is the concept document, where 
the acquiring company sets out, in fairly broad terms, what it is going to do with the 
company when it has bought it, and how the acquisition is going to be beneficial, not 
only for the acquiring company but for the acquired company, the employees of the 
acquired company and for the region in general. The second is the legal contract of 
purchase, the first draft of which was produced and signed at the second meeting on 
16.12.92. The THA put on pressure by saying if the document was not signed the 
process would be opened up to competition.. There was initially no specific date on 
which the final contract was to be signed, to give time for due diligence. 
Putting the deal together: 
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The final price to be paid to the THA was DM 29 million, split three ways between 
seventeen of the firm's managers, the venture capital branch of the Berliner Bank and 
Acer. However as is often the case in a THA deal, the price itself was only a partial 
element of the whole deal, for instance employment guarantees for the 420 staff were 
equally important. Most of the company's assets were tied up in a 5,000 square metres, 
fourteen storey office block plus other miscellaneous buildings. Some 15 claims against 
ownership of these properties were submitted which made using the property as 
collateral against the finance loan a lot more difficult than it should have been. 
Ownership claims were a common feature of the post-wall East Germany. Many 
properties were requisitioned by the Russian Army after 1945, or later by the DDR 
government when the property or land was needed to further the industrial growth plans. 
Much property was left without owners when the owners fled to the West before the 
building of the boundary wall between the two halves of Germany., These owners, their 
children or grandchildren started coming out of the woodwork and putting in claims to 
get their property back. A government organisation was set up to co-ordinate the 
claims, but the process was made more difficult by the lack of legal documents (all 
German property should have a Grundbuch, much like a car's ownership log book). 
These Grundbfiche were in many cases lost or destroyed by the communist authorities, 
in addition many spurious claims by people hoping to make an illegal profit were 
submitted. The most famous and funny example is the 10 square metres on which the 
100 metre high television tower in East Berlin stands. 150 individual claims were 
received for this 10 square metres! In order to check out the validity and dispute the 
fifteen claims against Acerplan's property ownership, a German law firm was engaged. 
Likewise the task of due diligence was awarded to Coopers & Lybrand and financing 
was organised through the future part owner, the Berliner Bank and the Hypo bank in 
Munich. The draft THA contract turned out to have many unacceptable clauses but the 
THA proved to be less than flexible and indeed cut the amount of time allowed before 
going final. Completion eventually took place at the end of March 1992. 
Initial Strategies: 
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So the new company together with one Acer Group representative (David Yaw, 
bilingual in German and English) started the. task of consolidating in the brave new 
world of competitive markets. In contrast to the strategic decision to expand into 
Germany, which seems to have been quite unstructured and entrepreneurial, the strategy 
for turning the new firm round followed some text book type methods 
- 
SWOT analysis, 
change management methods etc. However one very positive development had already 
taken place which needs recognising. The M&A involved the existing firm 
management. This is critical to the argument in this dissertation, that two-way learning 
can take place in situations where a foreign firm acquires an East German one. If the 
existing managers actually own some of the new organisation, then a major, potential 
barrier to change has been eliminated up front. There can be no them and us mentality, 
as they are us! Likewise the ver y openness of the British Acer management to even 
contemplate sharing power with, what had after all been managers in a planned not 
competitive market, was the harbinger of an open and tolerant culture. The coopting 
through ownership of existing managers allows the acceptance of hard decisions without 
agency problems (Farma, 1980, Jensen & Meckling, 1976) upsetting and complicating 
the picture. 
Prior to acquisition and while under the THA administration, IPRO's basic strategy was 
one of survival pending privatisation. With the help of a management consultant the 
firm was reorganised into nine profit centres based on target markets (e. g. town 
planning, civil engineering). Key staff were given training in marketing but no formal 
marketing plan was established. During negotiations for the acquisition, a somewhat 
centralised, hierarchical and "top down" management style was encountered. Little use 
was made of management accounting information, which was treated with excessive 
secrecy. 
During pre-acquisition discussions (made up of questionnaires, discussion groups, 
individual interviews), it was noted that while some questions were readily and 
spontaneously answered, it quickly became apparent that such enquiries required 
handling with sensitivity due to: 
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1. Concern for job security. PRO staff went from 900 to 420 in the year to March 
1992. 
2. Conservatism. There was no history of middle level staff being consulted on 
marketing, or apparently any other issue. 
3. Distaste for personal interviews with questionnaires, perhaps reminiscent of methods 
of the former DDR State Security. 
4. A culture of secrecy. Under the DDR, staff were required to lock their personal 
workroom every time they left it, even to use the washrooms. 
Based on these pre-acquisition findings it was decided in further research into strengths 
and weaknesses to concentrate on group and unstructured interviews, the motivation 
effect was regarded as being more important than missing a few hard facts. The 
discussions commenced with a larger forum, and having established initial confidence 
with the Profit Centre Managers and their staff gradually worked down to the individual 
level. 
The internal strengths and weaknesses were perceived as: 
a. Rigidity of structure. The existing seven technical and two geographical divisions 
should have promoted a market oriented culture, but in practice the following problems 
persisted: 
e The background of most managers and staff was that of a very large bureaucracy, 
with defined procedures. 
Profit centres bid for work outside their designated fields, "cannibalising" certain 
market segments (e. g. office buildings). 
Vestiges of central planning still persisted in that the structure was rigid, and staff 
resources were not readily switched between profit centres to reflect fluctuating 
workloads. 
Under German legislation the Betriebsrat or Staff Association has rights of 
consultation in staff reallocation, compounding the problem of inflexibility. 
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b. Organisational form. The 1992 form of the organisation was largely one- 
dimensional with an emphasis on function i. e. specialisation by discipline. At that stage 
of the firm's development this form was probably appropriate, but a move to a matrix 
structure with some decentralisation seemed inevitable. An example was that all 
management accounting and job control costing was performed centrally, with the result 
that technical divisions did not identify with "the Commercial Departments numbers". 
c. Organisation culture. The immediate post take-over organisation culture could be 
typified as a "process culture bureaucracy" under Deal & Kennedy's 1982 model. There 
was a general concern with the group rather than the individual, not surprising given the 
findings already discussed in Chapter 4. There was an emphasis on tenure and rewards 
were not strongly linked to performance. Bringing about a more appropriate market- 
oriented organisational culture was one of the biggest challenges facing management. 
The aspects that needed attention were: 
* No appreciation of active marketing, only reactive selling in response to client 
enquiries. 
Although the firm changed its name to Acerplan, one office still called itself 
Acerplan/Architektenbiiro E. Magdeburg and Partner. 
Certain staff believed that the new political freedom allowed them to do what they 
wished or liked to do, not what they needed to do to fulfil a task. 
Marketing was a problem for the Marketing Department. 
Nearly two thirds of the staff were female, including many working mothers. There 
are limits as to what can be expected in raised motivation, commitment and 
productivity. 
* The formal communication structure is very dominant and the informal structure very 
weak. 111 
These two perceived weaknesses are very debatable. Firstly, are women with children more difficult to 
motivate? Secondly, later interviews showed managers complaining about the super swift jungle 
telegraph. 
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* Over industry average age profile. Many upper management and technical staff are 
typically 5- 10 years older than the Acer. equivalents in the UK and internationally. 
d. Office accommodation. Offices were structurally divided into small rooms, very 
different to the "open plan" style commonly used in British engineering offices. 
e. Marketing mix (the 4Ps, Kottler, 1980). 
Product: Acerplan's professional services can be categorised into 3 "products", defined 
by the broad stages in the typical construction project cycle. These are surnmarised 
below (Table 5-1) with conunon consultancy industry perceptions of their 
characteristics: 
Table 5-1 
Acerplan products and industry wisdom 
Concept and Outline High margin, uses fewer 
Design but "smarter" staff. 
2. 
Detailed design and High volume/ low margin 
tender/ contract Scope to use CAD 
documentation 
3. 
. On-site supervision Introduces risk of liability 
- 
Quality for construction errors. 
- 
Cost Staff in early 90s in short 
- 
Time supply. 
These three "products" give Acerplan a strong position as it can offer a "one-stop" 
service, quick response due to large staff numbers, nationally accepted quality assurance 
system and the parent company's world-wide track record. 
Price: In the Gennan consultancy business, price is largely driven by official fee 
regulations for architects and engineers (HOAl). This defines a scale of fees based on 
the construction value of the project, and related to project type, complexity, size and 
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type of service. It is mandatory on Government agencies, but merely a guide for private 
sector clients. As the vast majority of projects undertaken by Acerplan up to the 
introduction of the marketing plan had been based on the HOAI, then there was little 
experience in the firm on bidding using internal costs of production not external 
construction prices. Relatedly Acerplan staff had little experience in trading off price 
against other elements of the tender offer e. g. completion time or payment terms. New 
Europe wide procurement regulations meant that projects over ECU 300,000 have to be 
internationally tendered and must include both a price and technical quality element. 
Place: Acerplan was not sophisticated enough to take on the West German competitors 
in their own backyard. So the services need to be offered in the foreseeable future in the 
Neue Bundeslander. However Acerplan was extremely concentrated in Saxony-Anhalt, 
but based on UK experience a town the size of Halle (population 250,000) cannot 
support a 400 man office on local work alone. The design work formerly won in the 
CIS States fell dramatically, to 10% of the total, with the collapse of the former USSR 
and the transfer payments system under COMECON. That leaves the other five new 
Bundesander representing 80% of the market. As local presence is a leading factor in 
obtaining contracts, Acerplan decided on a policy of opening offices in the other Neue 
Bundesldnder. The market sizes for engineering consultancy work in the Neue 
Bundeslander are shown below in Table 5-2, it should be kept in mind that as at 1992, 
Acerplan had 92% of its staff in Halle alone and 99% in Saxony-Anhalt! 
Table 5-2 
Engineering Consultancy Market in the East German Regions 
Saxony-Anhalt 20% 99% 
Thuringen 15% 0 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 10% 0 
Branden burg 15% 0 
Berlin 20% 0 
Saxony 20% 1% 
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Promotion: The former IPRO Halle was extremely weak in promotion, a legacy of its 
irrelevance in a supplier dominated command economy. A quick look at the 
promotional pamphlets showed just a listing ofjobs done, even by German standards of 
modesty in advertising not very motivating for potential customers. 
The External Opportunities and Threats were perceived as: 
a. Macro level opportunities were the massive Government investment in the 
infrastructure of the Neue Bundesldnder. The required construction needs for East 
Germany up to the year 2005 are, according to IFI-Institut, Munich (199 1), DM 160 
billion per year. This massive sum is the same size as the whole of the British 
construction industry! Indeed immediately after reunification project opportunities 
came looking for Acerplan, often on the basis of local personal contact. Acerplan was 
therefore often able to secure a contract o: 1 the basis of direct appointment instead of 
competitive tender. Unfortunately the threat was buried in the opportunity as seven 
years on, we know that the excess demand 
- 
lack of supply scenario was a short lived 
bubble phenomena. Constructions share of GDP in East Germany went from about 
7.8% in 1990 to 10.5% in 1991. This high level of public investment in one sector 
proved to unsustainable due to the German government's rising budget deficit and the 
lack of parallel investment from the private sector. Acerplan's structure did not match 
the Government demand driven structure of the market. Specifically civil engineering 
projects were being pushed but Acerplan was relatively under-represented in this area in 
comparison to building. 
b. Competitive threats. The German architect and engineering industry is highly 
fragmented with large numbers of 10-50 strong staff firms operating in conditions akin 
to perfect competition. Theoretically the previously mentioned HOAI set of fixed fees 
should reduce competition but in the private sector discounts of 10-25% are common. 
Seconded West German government officials who decide on the successful contractor, 
tend to favour using West German firms who are familiar to them and perceived as 
being technically superior. The relative overmanning of Acerplan was exasperated by 
currency union. Acerplan needed to raise annual productivity per head from DM 
100,000 to DM 120,000 worth of revenue. New competition was being experienced 
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from plant suppliers and contractors who offer turnkey solutions, foreign M&As similar 
to Acerplan e. g. UTAG, new founded East German start-ups and West German 
expansion into the Neue Bundesl5nder. 
Change at the firm level 
Forces for change. There were several internal and external stimuli to change. The 
main internal one was the requirement to increase productivity, as already mentioned, to 
an industry "received wisdom" figure of DM 120,000 revenue per employee per annum. 
The increased productivity figure was introduced through a revised budgeting process 
which moved away from "top down" budgeting to a "bottom-up" method whereby the 
individual middle and profit centre managers shaped their budgets to obtain the 
productivity increases. The coopting of support through a "bottom-up" budgeting 
system brings with it a positive force to accept change, as alterations are seen as ours 
not those of an impersonal Commercial Department. Added to this is the fact that one 
third of the company was owned by its management, therefore acceptance of hard 
decisions, such as layoffs, received backing out of pure financial self-interest. External 
forces for change included client requirements, technology and the labour market. In 
pre-reunification times errors and inconsistencies were tolerated as payments for the 
extra work usually gave the contractor an extra source of income and the customer was 
just glad to get anything done at all. The delivery time of the work has gained in 
importance. Formerly it was just the state's money that was tied up, now the opportunity 
cost of this foregone interest is well understood by the customer. To cut into delivery 
times required a move to CAD technology, indeed some customers started insisting on 
delivery of documents on diskette. In the immediate aftermath of reunification and as a 
result of the massive government infrastructure transfers, there was a shortage of 
qualified people in the construction engineering industry. Several years down the road, 
the demand has dropped substantially, but as in most industries it is the unskilled, or 
semi-skilled workers who felt the pinch first. Skilled workers were lost when they left 
to form their own offices and thus became competitors. Although in the mid-90s the 
labour market is very Much a buyers one, it behoves any firm to protect its human 
resource competitive assets. The best way to do this is to simply offer some form ofjob 
security in the face of mass redundancies all around. Here Acerplan have been 
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relatively successful, as the major cuts were made just prior to take-over and subsequent 
cuts have been smaller and justified by market conditions, not just endemic 
ovennanning. 
Barriers to change. Once again it is helpful to group these variables into external and 
internal headings. According to Mr. Yaw, one of the greatest external barriers to change 
is German worker participation and employment protection legislation. A firm like 
Acerplan with over 300 staff is legally required to establish a Betriebsrat or works 
council with full time representation paid for by the company. The Betriebsrat has legal 
,, 
right of consultation and in many cases power of veto on issues such as organisational 
restructuring e. g. the merger of two divisions or transfer of staff between divisions. 
There were other companies researched in the course of this dissertation which looked 
upon the Betriebsrat as a communications possibility to get the message right down 
through all the layers of the organisation. The Acerplan attitude reflects one extreme of 
the debate occurring in the late 1990s in Great Britain about the pros and cons of signing 
up for the European Union's Social Charter. The Social Charter embodies in law the 
rights of workers to have works councils, similar to the laws already existing in 
Germany. Employment protection legislation provides effectively last in 
- 
first out 
policies in redundancies. This means that younger, more adaptable staff must be laid off 
before older, less flexible time servers, hence the average of 10 year older employee in 
the German Acer affiliate. Maternity leave is generous with requirements forjobs to be 
held open for two years, maybe one reason why the Acerplan management were 
concerned about the high percentage of female workers in their firm. Sick leave 
entitlements in Germany are also generous, which could become critical given the age 
profile just mentioned. 
Internal barriers to change included a total lack of staff in the Personnel Department 
with any training or experience in staff appraisal and development and also familiarity 
with change management programs. This was a common problem amongst East 
German M&As. Under the old regime there was a sort of Personnel Department - the 
Direktorffir Kader und Bildung (Directorate of Leadership and Development). 
However its tasks were quasi-political, ensuring political education in the workforce and 
an adequate supply of labour for the combine, (Lang & Lippert, 1990). Additionally 
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certain social service obligations were handled by this'department within the firm, e. g. 
supply of housing, nursery school, medicine, holiday homes. These obligations are in 
the western world the problems of government or the individual, not the firm. 
Interestingly even academics in the DDR had little idea that these functions were 
different from those performed in a modem western firm's Personnel Department. 
Stieler, 1990 explained the East German Direktorate oj'Kader & Forschunlz 
concentration on a process called Arbeitsvernibgens. This concept, roughly translatable 
as workforce potential, is made up of the planning of each individual's potential work 
capacity via a complicated check list of physical and psychological factors. These 
factors are then given a numerical weighting which is divided into the combine's output 
needs to give manning levels. The efficiency of this mechanistic approach to ensuring 
adequate labour supply is probably reflected in the average 80% reduction in manpower 
witnessed in the privatisation of most combines. 
The Marketing (or change) Plan 
Having conducted the classic audit of internal strengths and weaknesses, the SWOT 
exercise, plus external opportunities and threats and identified the internal and external 
support of, and barriers to, change, Acerplan moved forward into the "unfreeze", 
"move" and "refreeze" sequences of their change plan, in this case called the marketing 
plan. The choice of name for the plan seems not to be of coincidence. Management 
saw as critical the need to incorporate marketing and attitudes appropriat e to marketing 
in a competitive environment into the company culture at the end of Ihe three phase 
change process. The active involvement of Acerplan staff implied the first stage of a 
more participative management style and a step towards becoming a more market- 
oriented company. Output from the marketing plan affects future changes, including the 
adjIustment of the existing organisational structure, e. g. to respond to newly identified 
market segments. The marketing plan was prepared between June and I)ecember in 
1992, and, after Board approval, was implemented in 1993. 
In all there were 7 elements to the change plan. 
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1. Marketing element 
- 
The firm should reinforce efforts to differentiate itself as a "one- 
stop" multi-discipline firm. It should focus on 16 market segments defined by technical 
discipline as presented in Figure 5-5. 
Figure 5-5 
Stages of development of Acerplan Services 
New 
Capabil 
ities 
Existing 
Key to services as shown in Figure 5-5: 
1. Industrial Building 
2. Commercial & Residential Building 
3. Service Buildings 
4. Building Services 
5. Basic Civil Work 
6. Construction Supervision 
7. Town and Regional Planning 
8. Eater and Waste Water 
9. Major Roads 
10. Bridges 
11. Environmental (non-scientific) 
12. Transport Planning 
13. Railways 
14. Environmental (scientific) 
15. Tunnels 
16. Ports & Harbours plus Canals & Waterways 
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Existing Clients/Contacts New 
The prioritised targetg of the marketing element of the plan were: 
Priority I- Market Penetration. Maximizing the current staff utilisatiop by selling more 
of the existing product to current and potential clients in fields 1-7 of Fig 5-5. 
Priority 2- Service Development. Improve Acerplan's e mbryonic skills by using Acer's 
strongest international track record in supporting current and potential clients in fields 8- 
12 of Fig 5-5. 
Priority 3- Diversification. Introduce services where Acerplan had no know-how but 
where the parent Acer Group had an established and growing reputation. i. e. current and 
potential clients in fields 13-16 of Fig 5-5. 
2. Structural and Cultural Element. 
As the organisation structure had been altered under the THA regime to include such 
innovations as profit centres, the resultant structure was deemed relatively, compatible 
with Acerplan's strategy and therefore "reorganisation" did not form part of the change 
plan. However as already stated it is difficult to move staff resources between profit 
centres, so the plan detailed early and active involvement of the Betriebsrat in , 
smoothing moves. To achieve cultural change a batch of educational, recruitment and 
reward structure initiatives were proposed. Quality was to be emphasised by the aim of 
achieving a company wide quality assurance system which could be sanctioned by the 
independent DIN 9001 external certification. 
3. Product. 
The plan aimed at securing a higher proportion of work in the more profitable "front 
end" via improved contacts to developers. This means being prepared to undertake 
conceptual design for which one or two western trained architects would need to be 
recruited. Investment in CAD had already taken place but training was necessary, not 
for the hardware operators, but for engineers and middle management. 
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4. Pricing and Cost Control. 
Tendering has to move from price (set charging) to cost. Managers had tended to abuse 
the job costing system by evening out results between profitable and unprofitable jobs. 
This practice seems to be a typical hangover from the old combine system, where most 
of the costs were artificial transfer costing between vertically integrated elements of the 
combine. As such costs were seen as relatively unimportant and a good opportunity to 
smooth results out to the ultimate goal of plan fulfilment. 
5. Geographical Diversification. 
The heavy reliance on the home, base of Halle should be reduced by transfer, non- 
replacement of retiring and leaving staff and outplacement. The priorities for 
geographical expansion were: Upgrade the existing Dessau and Dresden offices, open a 
Berlin representative office, by 1994 open one office in the old Bundeslander to counter 
the image of an "East" firm and one project related office in the CIS States. - 
6. Promotion. 
The quality of corporate documentation has to be improved. 200 professionally printed 
description sheets of finished projects would form the base of tailored presentations to 
target clients. Staff enrolment in professional bodies and activity at conferences needs 
to be bolstered by reimbursing professional membership fees and offering an internal 
prize for the best company produced paper. 
7. Systems. 
Reinforce the following systems: Quarterly action plans for each Division, Client 
contact reports, tendering analysis to include results, tender/contract onversion success 
rates, tendering activity by Division. To induce more "bottom-up" involvement, the 
responsibility for formulating quarterly action plans and generating monthly reports 
should be delegated to the profit centre managers and bureau leaders. 
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The Market (or change) Plan Results 
. .. 
The point is usually forgotten but survival is a positive result. Acerplan still is operating 
in 1997, even though the relatively positive construction market demand immediately 
following reunification has given way to a buyer's market. The market plan set 
priorities about which market segments the firm should be in. The market plan was 
introduced just as the change to a buyer's market was underway. The 16 market 
segments have developed in a different way than was expected. Specifically, the 
Government civil engineering work did take place but increasingly on the basis of 
competitive bidding. The expected parallel growth in private sector investment never 
occurred. Against this negative trend in the external environment the achievements of 
the market plan are probably like opportunity costs. Without the change program, 
Acerplan could well have disappeared. Rationalisation of property holdings has taken 
place, but the expansion to other Bundeshinder has not been a success. New office 
openings coincided with a depression in the construction market and the for example the 
new Berlin office had to be retrenched. The one time relatively important trade with 
CIS countries disappeared as these countries could not summons up enough hard foreign 
currency, formerly the trade had taken place in transfer roubles. 
Internally the plan seems to have had some success. A far greater number of people 
within the organisation have come to understand the importance of marketing and their 
role in it (this was bome out by comments in the personal interviews). The cultural 
changes have, however, not been fully achieved. - This is hardly surprising given the 
difficulty involved in changing ingrained, long-held values and attitudes, (Bate, 1994). 
A new round of the cultural change program was in the planning stage during the 
researcher's visits to Halle in November 1996. What the interviews did show was that 
the staff felt free to offer their opinions, thought that their suggestions were listened to 
and generally seemed to identify well with the goals of the firm. These points are 
important for this research as they show that not only is two-way leaming, possible, at 
Acerplan it has been practised. Although financial profit figures are not available, they 
are probably only fairly modest. So why is then Acerplan used here as an example of a 
successful M&A? The answer is plain when it is contrasted with what has happened in 
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other similar East German M&As, such as UTAG (Thames Water) or Tricat the subject 
of the next comparative case. 
5.5.2 Case of poorly handled M&A 
- 
Tricat KatAleuna GmbH 
As has already been pointed out, it is much harder to obtain agreement to carry out 
research and receive co-operation from a firm that is not doin g too well. Consequently 
the case on Tricat Kataleuna GmbH is not backed up with company documentation, nor 
does it have the blessing of the management for reasons which will become obvious. 
The case is structured into contradictory views about what went on. The very fact that 
there exist such opposing views of a common reality, split between American 
management and German staff, says mountains about the depth of the problems. No 
criticism of individuals is intended and although the M&A was terminated after three 
frustrating years, it is possible that the rump firm will raise like a phoenix from the 
ashes 
History up to the purchase: 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Professor B. of the firm expressed it so: "Kataleuna! s history is that they were naturally 
part of the Leuna Kombinat producing and developing catalysts. But in 1995,01.01.95 
or actually at the end of 1994 as it was back-dated, the division of the Kombinat making 
catalysts was split off by the THA and set up as a stand alone GmbH 
- 
Leuna 
Katalatoren GmbH. That happened in many areas of the combine here in Leuna. The 
THA then privatised the new GmbH in such a way that the American firm Tricat was 
able to take over our firm. Since 15.08.1995 we are part of the Tricat Group with a 
peculiarity in that the organisation which took over the functions of the THA, The 
Bundesanstaltffir vereinigtebedingte Sonderaufgaben (The Federal Office for 
Reunification Issues), kept 25% of the shares in this GmbH. That means that the BVS 
has a minority right in boardroom decisions. That's a very short history of this firm. 
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May I throw in a few figures. We had 470 employees in 1990 at the time of the 
introduction of the DM. After privatisatiojý We took over 130 no 100 of these 470. Last 
November (1995), there was the last batch of redundancies where another 30 people lost 
theirjobs. These ex-colleagues who lost theirjobs, and we've already mentioned this, 
had to leave without anything approaching the pay-off that you received or that a 
comparable West German firm would offer. " 
From the American management viewpoint 
- 
Tricat is a private American company with HQ in Baltimore, Maryland and was 
attracted to East Germany by the THA offering a site at Bitterfeld. As part of the 
industrial resurrection of the heavily polluted, smoke stack region around Bitterfeld, the 
THA was developing industrial parks on reclaimed ex-industry land. Tricat was offered 
a green field site (actually re-greened) to build a factory to reprocess used catalysts. 
During the negotiations for this Bitterfeld, green field site, the company's President Dr. 
K. Maher was offered the possibility of viewing a portion of the massive Leuna Refinery 
complex that had been split up and belonged to the THA owned firm Kataleuna GmbH. 
The THA were very keen to keep the firm's large research team together and as such 
were prepared to invest quite a lot of money. The business at Leuna produced catalysts 
as opposed to reprocessing them. As the THA were prepared to foot the bill, the deal 
when finalised included the THA being a 25% partner and they brought in their own 
Managing Director. The green field site at Bitterfeld was also purchased, this time as a 
100% Tricat operation. A new reprocessing factory was built and operated as a separate 
firm. This operation has been quite successful and continues under Tricat ownership. 
Post Purchase History: 
From the American management viewpoint 
- 
The THA installed a MD who was in the words of the American President, incompetent. 
The West German MD worked only on a part time basis and never moved to live in the 
Leuna area. Although the THA had reduced the workforce to around 100 employees 
from 450 when the firm was part of the combine, a further reduction was found 
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necessary within a period of sixty days. This short period was all that was allowed for 
due diligence and so the personnel reductiqns were made with no idea about who was 
worth keeping and who wasdt. Additionally it was almost impossible, as was the case 
in many other take-Overs, to obtain dependable revenue and cost figures. Cost and 
revenue accounting just didn't exist, and those figures that were available were not 
dependable and included impenetrable cross subsidies and transfers to the parent 
combine. The American management quickly came to the conclusion that the old 
industrial plant that they had inherited was not worthy of upgrading and began work on 
designing a new production facility which was to be built on waste land available after 
knocking down some of the many derelict buildings, i. e. it was a brown field site unlike 
the green field one at Bitterfeld. The money for any upgrades was coming from the 
THA. However the American president of the parent Tricat wanted to bring in new 
product lines which entailed investment in new plant and the hiring of American and 
West German experts. The THA whose wish it was to protect what was there, stopped 
funding anything to do with new products needed for diversification. The M&A 
folded, and Tricat Kataleuna GmbH went back to 100% THA ownership and is now 
once again up for sale, although the West German chemical concerns who would be the 
obvious buyers have already turned up their noses at a purchase before Tricat came on 
the scene. 
- 
Contrasting views of strategic decisions 
As already stated the American management came to the opinion that the existing 
factory buildings and plant were not worth upgrading to meet modem standards. The 
reasons and necessity did not seem to have been communicated to the employees,, 
witness the following quotations out of the group interview: 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 30 
5 8. Up to now we've had no new investment (interjection from Dr. G. ). To get 
used to the computers was an easy process for all. It just wasn't a problem. There are 
new measurement techniques in our laboratories, we had to introduce these as we have 
such a reduced headcount and we wanted to remain efficient. What about you in 
Ebert? 
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59. Herr N. 
- 
We don't have any new process to make the work any lighter. Its 
remained exactly so as it was before. 
60. Prof. B. 
- 
(ironically) Not too many new files have arrived either. 
61. Dr. G. 
- 
What we've got we already had. There not been anything new up to 
now as its expensive. Its the firm's philosophy to build a completely new plant. They 
don't want to invest anything in the existing plant. 
There seems to have developed an extreme attitude of mistrust between the American 
management and East German staff. To an innocent question about learning English, 
the following bitter exchange occurred: 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 30 
66. Thomson 
- 
Do you still have to learn English? 
67. Prof B. 
- 
Yes, especially those who were chosen to be part of the graemium 
who have a lot to do with management, we had to. I think that's the biggest problem 
we are facing, at least here on this floor of the officeý, the fight to understand what on 
earth they are saying. It is possible with those who speak a clear English, but those 
who often use a southern states slang are often difficult to understand and therefore to 
reply to. 
68. Thomson 
-I only have heard of Dr. K-M and assumed he was the only one. 
69. Frau B. 
- 
Ha, ha. (everyone laughs ironically), the top management is full of 
Americans. 
70. Prof B. 
- 
The whole K. 
-M. family is here, his wife, nephew, son in Bitterfeld (also belongs to us), then Manfred, Singer, McAlan, McAuley, but Mrs Kass she 
speaks German, yes its packed with Americans. 
71. Thomson 
-I am somewhat surprised as that doesn't sound like the normal 
actions of Americans. 
72. Prof B. 
- 
We are getting more and more Americans 
73. Thomson 
- 
OK, but honestly I had expected the complete opposite. I've been in 
firms which were taken over by Americans, they sent over perhaps a managing director 
and that was all. Have you had any West Germans hired? 
74. Prof. B. 
- 
One, Herr Schmitt 
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It is probably to be expected to see some bitterness at watching the workforce be 
decimated from 450 to 70, but at the same time seeing the plum jobs going to 
Americans, with a whiff of nepotism seemed to have raised active hostility. There may 
have been good reasons for this development but they certainly were not understood by 
the staff. The feeling of mistrust was obvious to the researcher. Tricat Kataleuna was 
the only firm in this research where staff had refused to be individually interviewed. 
The researcher had the feeling at the start of the group interview that he was classified as 
collecting data for the management and it took some time to build down this feeling of 
antagonism and prove neutrality. The fact that Tricat did not bring in one top manager 
with German language capability seems to have been a big mistake. Not only were the 
top jobs seen as going to foreigners but to affect strategic decisions it was necessary to 
talk English, which immediately made the East Germans feel at a disadvantage. 
Interestingly in some areas the problems were seen in the same light from both sides. In 
talking about the reductions in the workforce and how the people were selected for 
severance, the consequent over-ageing of the workforce was recognised by the 
Kataleuna East German staff, even though they were all "over age". 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 30 
26. Thomson 
- 
How did you go about seeking out the 100 people that were 
taken-over from the 470. Did the people volunteer? (ironic laughter). I mean there are 
probably enough grounds for someone to think I'm going to be the next one on the line. 
27. Dr. G. 
- 
Social factors were taken into consideration, also there was the 
normal turnover fluctuation plus some went into a well earned early retirement. The 
consequences of this policy are that we now have a very unhealthy age structure. 
Young people cannot be hired, as an example the youngest comparable mployee to Dr. 
John working in product development is 46 years old, a 'young' academic. The next 
one is perhaps 50, in reality the whole workforce, with the exception of a few 
production workers, is in a layer from 50 to end 50 years old. 
The ability of older workers to accept change has been the subject of much debate, but 
based on the need to forget or discard past knowledge as discussed in the learning and 
knowledge sector of this chapter, it is probably easier for younger people with less 
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investment in the past to more quickly accept a new order of things. The same problem 
of a "heavy" age profile was present in Acqrplan but the consequences eem to have 
been less severe. Certainly the staff at Kataleuna. thought they were still capable of 
adapting. 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 30 
63. Frau B. 
- 
At the time of the Wende and the introduction of the DM, the most 
intensive changes took place in the commercial areas through such things as new tax 
and cash flow systems. The normal rule of thumb was that in the natural sciences, 
which I don't wish to belittle here, they were carried on before the Wende in exactly the 
same way as afterwards. We only have to pay more taxes. We had to learn and 
understand quickly as a lot was totally different with the change of block allegiance, 
and that was at its most intensive in the commercial area. 
64. Dr. G. 
- 
The whole tax thing, the insurance stories, controlling etc. etc. 
65. Frau B. 
- 
Yes naturally we lead into the things. There were commercial 
firms that set up shop here, which introduced us to certain things or showed us way 
how to bring together the primary data, how to work with it, and its my opinion that 
even at our age we are still capable of learning. We did a lot on the job and I'm not too 
sure if some of those people in the old Bundesldnder could have handled so much at 
such an advanced age. We even had to learn English as well. 
Paradoxically, the American management were of the opinion that the staff could learn 
and adapt, it is therefore doubly disappointing that the distrust developed as there was 
really no logical reason for it. 
From the American management viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 43 
21. Mr. B. 
- 
Well I think there are a lot of things. By and large, the situation 
which we found and which we classify as problems; business or organisational problems 
are not of their own doing. Its the society that they came out of and by and large Ifound 
a lot ofthem, most ofthem, willing to learn 21 
. 
Of course there was resistance to change, 
it gets you out of your comfort zone but they wanted to and new they had to learn. I 
found them once we broke down the reluctance to communicate, I found them very open, 
honest, quite honestly more friendly than West Germans. 
... 
Like I said, their technical 
training was good, they needed help with what to do and how to do things. They learned 
very 
21 Emphasis added by author 
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The American management also seemed to. have a realistic and sympathetic view about 
why there were barriers to learning new methods. 
From the American management viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 43 
12. Mr. B. 
- 
... 
before in the past there were these little empires, little kingdoms and the 
flow of information was very, very low, in terms of R&D for example, you would go to 
R&D and say, we need this, you would establish a project and it would kind of disappear 
into R&D, whereas in most western companies, you would get monthly reports against 
goals and objectives, you have periodic communications meetings. They never did any 
of this, you would never see a report, it would just kind of disappear and hopefully one 
day they would come to you and say "well we think we've solved the problem and we are 
ready to talk to you about it". But along the way, they would never give you a status 
report, because I think they were afraid that if they reported half finished work, that with 
open communication other people could have input and say "have you looked at this and 
what about that and we know our competitors doing this and maybe the market has 
changed a little bit or maybe there is a lack of communication here". I think they were 
afraid that that was going to be seen as a criticism of what they were doing so they just 
closed it off as a box and waited until in their mind they had done all the work. Then 
they would report to you and you would ask for data and information, well it was 
difficult to get it, OK it was basically, well trust us, we know we are right, trust us. To 
me it was a fear mechanism and I think a lot of it was that they were afraid that what they 
had done in former times was so really inferior to the west, particularly on technology 
and how to do things that they didn't want to admit to that and so they tended to hide all 
this, they were just afraid to be open and communicate because they thought it would 
open them up to criticism. Which wasnt meant to be directed personally at them, it was 
meant to be 
- 
hey look we as an organisation have a problem or an objective and to get 
there we are all in this boat together and we have all got an oar and every one of us needs 
to row this boat. 
15. Thomson 
-... 
But I didn't get the feeling that the people were stupid, they tended to be 
quite well educated people, I don't know what level their technological expertise was, in 
comparison to US researchers. 
16. Mr. B. 
- 
No the people were very, very intelligent had very technically 
knowledgeable, the average research scientist would be impressive wherever he was. I 
saw it as the management of an organisation issue, in terms of how do you manage the 
research process. In the former times it was more or less from the bottom up, in other 
words as technologists they would say well we want to do work in this field, so they 
would do work in this field hoping that maybe something would come out of it. In the 
western world, one starts from the market and you are looking to serve that market. That 
was the thing they had a problem with, in terms of saying'this is what the market needs 
how do I organise and manage the R&D process to deliver what the market needs, that 
was the failing, they had no experience of that, they didnt know how to do that. So they 
were used to an environment where they would invent and develop something, the 
191 
customer had to buy it from them as they were the only source. They basically used their 
customer as part of the R&D process, they would keep throwing it at the customer and 
throwing it at the customer until finally it sort of worked and then they would say OK its 
done. Once they developed something that a customer said OK this pretty much gives us 
what we want, then R&D, would stop, they would never see what they could do to make 
it better for the customer, no follow up, and never any what can we do to make it cheaper 
and easier inside of our factory. Itjust became cast and youjust by rote did the same 
thing over and over again. So the thing that surprised me more than anything else is I 
had this vision that here this society for forty years where science was premium, all these 
people working on science, I knew the plants were going to be crude and had to be 
closed, I knew they had no experience in selling, but my vision was that there was this 
tremendous volume of technology just waiting for someone coming in and managing it. 
When you really get into it, there is very little there. There is a lack of understanding of 
why the things they make work. It was kind of like they stumbled on things, suddenly 
they worked and so OK that becomes product XYZ and you do the same thing over and 
over again. Never developing the basic understanding of why does this product work, 
relating the properties and the characteristics to this product to its use by the customer. 
So if a customer came back to them and said well I've changed my process, I want 
something different for my process give me a different catalyser, our people had 
difficulty in saying well what is it that we have to change in order to get him what he 
wants because they had never developed that fundamental link between what they were 
making and what the customer wanted. That was the biggest surprise that I had and 
when I really got into it, there was a lot of facts and unrelated stuff but not this 
fundamental understanding of the technology c., * 
A reason for barriers to the transfer of knowledge was also forwarded by the staff in the 
group interview. As already discussed in Chapter 4, the rising fear of retaining one's job 
was accompanied by a drop in the willingness to share knowledge. 
From the German employees' viewpoint 
- 
Interview # 30 
53. Frau G.......... I used to try and delegate my work, now I prefer to finish it myself. 
54. Frau B. 
- 
One tries to do it oneself in order to become indispensable, but that's 
probably not the right way to do things. The trend is there, he said it quite plainly. Its 
not only the production areas but in other areas as well, one keeps one's knowledge to 
oneself in order to somehow or other to become indispensable. Once again that's this 
fear of losing thejob that is always in the background. Prof. B. went through our age 
structure, we are all at such an age that if we were to have to leave the firm, for whatever 
reason, we would be almost impossible to place in a new position. And we9ve all got a 
long way to go to retirement. 
There was also a parallel growth in competition at work between the individual workers 
who had formerly been an unsplitable tearn. 
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From the German employees' viewpoint 7 Interview H 30 
17. Herr Ni. 
- 
Now its so that each tries to finish his own work as well as 
possible, so that he is noticed, positively noticed and there is even a little 
Schadenfreude when someone else makes a mistake. 
5.5.3 Review of differences and similarities in the two cases 
Both Acer and Tricat seem to have "fallen" into East Germany without expanding 
internationally using any definite internationalisation policy e. g. the Uppsala model, 
, 
(Johanson & Vahne, 1977). It would be interesting to speculate whether a more 
structured strategy in expanding internationally would have flagged up East Germany as 
opposed to other Central and East European economies as the best country to found a 
M&A. 
Once the country decision was taken however, the paths of the two companies diverged. 
Acer took on board the existing East German managers as equity holders. This act 
alone highlighted to the existing workforce in Halle that they were valued, equal and 
were dealing with a merger not an acquisition. The effect on integration and 
acculturation of this initial act cannot be overstated. Tricat on the other hand went into 
equity partnership with the seller, the THA. Unfortunately this proved to be not such a 
lucky marriage as the two organisations had different goals and cultures. The THA, or 
more specifically its successor organisation, the BvS, is more interested in whether the 
terms of the sale contract are being met. Specifically whether the agreed employment 
guarantees and also investment levels are in place. That means that a very bureaucratic 
attitude is taken, described by one interviewee as dealing with a bunch of bookkeepers. 
The Americans on the other hand were taking aI very entrepreneurial attitude, albeit with 
the BvS's money, and wanted to talk and formulate "big picture" and future strategy. 
The outcome was divergent views at Board level of the raison d'elre for the company. 
The high level mistrust trickled down to lower levels of staff in the firm. An example 
being that both Acer and Tricat tried to develop strategy using classic western business 
school techniques. The results however differed as Acerplan staff felt co-opted into the 
process, whereas Tricat staff viewed the whole process as "top-down" driven from a top 
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that was anyway not united. In these days of world travel and international business, it 
is easy to forget the importance of being able to communicate in a common language. 
Acer installed a bilingual high level executive, Tricat didn. 'ý. Acerplan had much fewer 
communication difficulties than Tricat Kataleuna, it could be just chance but the 
interviewees at Leuna indicated an irritation at being forced to learn English just to have 
their opinions heard, in what is after all a German environment. Both firms had the 
common problem of an over-average age staff, the result of the last in, first out 
redundancy policy of the THA. The market conditions were hardly mentioned by 
anybody, including the American management at Tricat. They were the main topic of 
conversation at Acerplan. Actually both firms were luckier than others in that the' 
market had not completely dissipated on monetary reunion. Acerplan faced high 
demand in the first few years, followed by quite drastic reduction in customer interest 
and higher competitive pressure later. Tricat Kataleuna, as far as can be fathomed, 
faced a relatively constant demand with perhaps rising competition over time. The 
catalyst market tends to be a relatively international market like commodities. 
As far as the subject matter of this chapter is concerned, there were large differences in 
the perception of the two firm's work forces over whether they were listened to, and 
could influence outcomes. The underlying basis for two-way learning. 
Interview 9 30 
6. Frau B. 
-... 
Now we are working for a private GmbH or American firm, new 
managers are there, new leadership, that means that in principle our circle of influence 
has been demoted to the second layer of the firm and we have to bow to decisions made 
by this new management. I won't express it quite so hard as you did in your 
introduction, but I'm sure we can make suggestions to affect decisions but they always 
seem to come back different to when they went up. 
Compare the above quotation with that from an employee of Acerplan, who realistically 
sees the process is not finished or accepted right through the workforce, but never the 
less acknowledges the process is going on. 
Interview # 12 
46. Herr L. 
- 
Initially talking about decision making in the combine: 
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That was a political decision and it didn't work. It was also what was passed down to 
the brigade or collective with the explanation that is what the leadership of the combine 
has decided. That was impossible for the 6m*Ployees to understand and theyjust did it 
out of discipline. There was no identificationwith the work, because they had been 
told just do it like so. it was this discipline type variant and it didn't motivate the 
employees. They said, OK when they have decided so, then we'll carry out the pathetic 
stupidity. I'm sure there are still people who think like this. However the possibility for 
individual success within the overall success now has a much larger role. One is 
always well advised to listen to someone, to say OK he has made me aware of this or 
that and bring it into your decision making, but I believe that is what we do. There is 
now more freedom of individual responsibility and contribution when solving problem. 
That then brings sometimes more motivation and innovation to the work. Although I 
must say, as someone who knows the firm quite well, that these new attitudes are not 
completely shared within the workforce. I cannot judge it but it may take another 6 to 
10 years to bring this process to 
, 
fruition. Then there are further possibilities to 
introduce new methods and mechanisms. 
Or acceptance of flexibility in making decisions: 
35. Thomson 
- 
Do you notice any difference in the latitude you have to make 
decisions now in comparison to before? 
36. Herr E. 
- 
In principle there is more freedom there, I cain nowadays argue in a 
different way. I am not forced to use certain building materials, I can choose them 
freely together with the builder. Previously it was dictated e. g. one storey buildings or 
hall constructions, there was a very small number of types because the cement works 
dominated. The architects, project leaders had to build using whatever was produced. 
There were hardly any individually planned buildings. Now one can take all the 
decisions individually, wood, steel, bricks, stone etc. 
37. Thomson 
- 
Does that make it more difficult? 
38. Herr E. 
- 
Makes it more 
Or the need to consult others on a team basis: 
1 52. Herr E. 
-. 
Only now it is more complex as previously we had sealed off 
areas. The excavation builders for instance just did their thing at the start and that was 
that. Now however a statistician or a constructor doesn't have to do too much new but 
he has to agree with others. Thafs the project team and that is needed more today. 
Things need to be finished quickly, inside a cost budget all that is important oday. 
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5.6 Acculturation and two-way learning in a M&A 22 
Does the dominant culture always win? The following section assesses whether 
differences in foreigness of the dominant culture to the culture in the East German 
M&A affects outcomes. The difference between two cultures can be observed by 
assessing psychic distance and extending this to measuring acculturative stress. A model 
will developed to assess the impact of acculturative stress on the effective 
implementation of post-merger goals and extended even further to view the implications 
for learning and success. The model will be based on that of Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
(198 8) which is shown below in Figure 5-6. 
FIGURE 5-6 
Acculturative model for the implementation of mergers 
(The Nahavandi & Malekzadeh Model) 
Acguired firm 
Desire to preserve own 
culture and practices. 
Attractiveness of the 
Acquirer 
Mode of acculturation 
- 
Integration 
- 
Assimulation 
- 
Separation 
- 
Deculturation 
Congruence 
Acculturative stress 
Successful implementation of the merger 
Acguiring firm 
Culture: tolerance for 
Diversity and multi- 
culturism. 
Diversification strategy: 
. 
degree of relatedness of 
the finns 
Mode of acculturation 
- 
Integration 
- 
Assimulation 
- 
Separation 
- 
Deculturation 
*Source: Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) Academy of Management Review Vol. 13, No. 1, (p-B-)) 
22 The whole of section 5.6 consists of sections taken from: 1) Thomson, J. N. (1996), Journalfor East 
European Management Studies, (JEEMS), Volume 1, Number 4; 2) Thomson, J. N. & Mc Namara, P. 
(1997), EGOS Conference Proceedings, CD-ROM; 3) Thomson, J. N. & Mc Namara, P (1998), City 
University Working Paper, presented 22.04.98, to be published in 1998. 
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However even where acculturative stress is low a paradox can emerge which is called 
the psychic distance paradox. The variablcs in the Nahavandi & Malekzadeh model are 
now explained before assessing its limitations and reasons for extending it in this 
research. 
5.6.1 Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions 
- 
The intermingling of two cultures 
is called acculturation, a term borrowed from anthropology (Berry, 1980). When two 
firms combine then two cultures do so as well. These cultures can be either national, 
organisational or as in the case of this study, both. Cross-national M&As have by 
definition to combine differing national cultures with varying levels of psychic distance 
(O'Grady & Lane, 1996) alongside differing firm cultures, a process called double 
layered acculturation by Barkema et al (1996). Psychic distance is not synonymous with 
nationality. O'Grady & Lane (1996: 312) extend the normal view of psychic distance as 
a measure of national cultural divergence to include structural (legal and administrative 
systems) and language differences as well. There seems to be an appreciable psychic 
distance between West and East Germans although they both now have common 
German passports, see (Lang, 1994; Thomson, 1996). Because of this inter-German 
psychic distance paradox, there are inherent difficulties in trying to simplify the 
measurement of psychic distance in East German acquisitions down to West German 
and non-West German (foreign) take-overs. Many of the foreign M&As were 
negotiated, co-ordinated and operationalised by the West German subsidiary of the 
mother company. Can such a take-over be then categorised as a foreign purchase? 
Even if this is the case, does this necessarily mean large psychic distance? Even when 
no West German subsidiary existed, the foreign firms often hired in West German 
professional managers to run key areas in the acquired company. There is obviously a 
continuum of foreignness reflected in psychic distance measurements, running from 
extremely foreign through to almost West German. Each of the M&As therefore fits 
onto a psychic distance continuum reflecting: 
(a) the number of imported managers 
- 
the bigger the number of home country and third 
country managers, not very prevalent in the sample, the more foreign the classification. 
More relevant was the number of imported West German managers which reduced the 
foreigness classification. Latest research (Lang, 1997) shows that even though absolute 
numbers of foreign or West German managers operating in East Germany may be small, 
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they tend to be operating at the highest level and in the most critical areas (finance, 
marketing, strategy). Also in the formula Was: 
(b) the influence of any West German subsidiary, both at the time of the M&A and also 
at the present. 
Even this differentiation between national and organisational cultures does not 
encompass the whole complexity of foreign M&As. Very et al (1996: 60) investigated 
the matter ftirther under the heading of acculturative stress. Acculturative stress being 
not just the difference between 'what was'before the M&A and 'what is' afterwards. It 
occurs when expectations of some proper state of affairs as to 'what ought to be'are not 
fulfilled (David, 1977). Acculturative stress need not be a negative factor, as is well 
known some sort of stress is necessary for life in general and commercial development 
in particular. Indeed Very et al (1996) found that 'to the extent that the buying firm's 
culture better addresses the acquired firm's normative expectations, differences between 
the two cultures may sometimes signify sources of acculturative attraction, not stress'. 
So the forces at work depend upon expectations not necessarily on the reality. 
Interviews in this research showed again and again that the East German expectations of 
what western firms could offer in the way of new machinery, equipment, training, 
technology etc., were utopian. The idea that everything was better and more modern in 
the west was a typical phenomena of forced isolation and the resultant lack of 
knowledge. The reality of mass lay-off, disappearance of customers and western 
managers who proved to be fallible, like all humans, was a shocking rcalisation (Maaz, 
1993). 
5.6.2 Types of Acculturation 
There are four possible types of acculturation according to Mirvis/Sales, 1984 as shown 
in Table 5-3. Each typology has two variants and although there are only certain 
variants which were identified in the research data, all are explained for thoroughness. 
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Based on Mirvis/ Sales (1984) 
Table 5-3 
Types of acculturation 
Integration 
- 
The acquired firm has pride in its distinctiveness and lives in 
peaceful co-existence with the new owners. 
- 
Pluralism, when more than one cultural group is present in an 
organisation. 
- 
Multiculturalism, in addition to pluralism the diversity of cultural 
groups is valued. 
Assimilation 
- 
Assumes that keeping the institutions and cultural patterns of 
the dominant group is standard. 
- 
Melting pot, when the acquired firm moves freely to the culture of the 
new owner. 
Pressure cooker, when the movement is coerced. 
Rejection 
- 
The premeditated separation of the two cultures either by the 
acquirer or the acquired. 
- 
Withdrawal, self-segregation or flight. 
Segregation, group distinctiveness and separation are enforced by the 
dominant owner. 
Deculturation 
- 
Giving up the original culture but not taking on the new 
dominant culture, thus remaining outcasts to both groups. 
- 
Marginality, people in the acquired firm chose to remain outside both 
cultures. 
- 
Ethnocide, people in the acquired firm are forced to remain outside 
both cultures 
Each acquisition was discussed in the field interviews used to form cases andwas 
classified using the Mirvi§ & Sales typology. This was the starting point of extending 
the Nahavandi & Malekzadeh model for measuring acculturative stress and successful 
post-acquisition goal attainment. 
5.6.3 Operationalisation of the Data 
The data, which are summarised in Table 5-4 below, were analysed using the following 
criteria to assess different degrees of foreigness or different classifications of 
acculturation. 
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Foreigness (Psychic Distance) 
High Foreigness: 
-% of non-German top managers imported to run the 
firm is above 25% of all top managers. Not found in any of the 
sample, but almost so in Firm "F". 
- 
No West German subsidiary influence. 
Low Foreigness: 
-% of non-German top managers imported to run the firm is below 
25% of all top managers. 
I Presence of a West German subsidiary which involved itself in the 
affairs of East German acquisition. 
Acculturation 
-A subjective classification based on the comments of interviewees 
Integration 
-over 50% of the interviewees reported retention of original firm 
culture and few power struggles with new owners 
Assimulation 
- 
over 50% of the interviewees reported loss of old firm culture and 
imposition of new owners culture. 
Rejection 
- 
Both acquirer and acquired interviewees mentioned separateness 
of cultures as being a problem. 
Sub-divisions of Acculturation 
Pluralism 
- 
over 50% of the interviewees stated their original culture still 
existed 
Multiculturalism 
- 
Pluralism plus managers reporting that they valued the diversity 
Melling Pot 
- 
over 50% of the interviewees accepted the move to a new 
organisational structure and culture as inevitable 
Pressure Cooker 
- 
over 50% of the interviewees said they were forced into a new 
organisational structure and culture. 
Withdrawal 
- 
"Them and us" tenninology used by both management and 
employees. 
5.6.4 Stress and Change 
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According to Huff, Huff & Thomas, (1992), change takes place when stress (the 
dissatisfaction which signals the need for renewal) overcomes inertia (commitment to 
current strategy). The idea of change being the outcome of the interaction of forces of 
stress and inertia is based on the concept of force field analysis from Lewin, (1947). 
Here change is evolutionary and incremental (Quinn, 1978) in nature, so long as the 
opposing forces are matched and moderate. However with major environmental or 
internal change forces occurring, stress and inertia will be anything but moderate and 
will not cancel out. Here change is sudden and revolutionary. Miller & Friesen, (1984) 
call it a quantum leap. Strebel, (1994) created an example of a' general model which 
shows both revolutionary and evolutionary change together but separated by having 
break or turning points. 
CEE firms subject to M&As have been exposed to massive, levels of both external (due 
to the fall of the command economy) and internal (take-over by foreigners) stress. East 
Germany is probably the most extreme example of abruptness, due to the factors 
discussed in the introduction. At the other end of the spectrum some CEE countries 
have, until now, experienced levels of stress which have only caused evolutionary 
change, e. g. Slovenia (Whitley et al, 1997). 
To summarise, all East German M&As have experienced massive external stress and 
thus have the potential, if they survive, to successfully accomplish revolutionary change 
or transformation. Incidentally it can be theorised that comparable M&As taking place 
in western economies have lower levels of stress (especially external) and thus less 
potential to transform themselves. However the six M&As researched showed varying 
levels of post-acquisition internal stress (acculturafive stress). What level of 
acculturative stress is needed to complement the high external stress to ease the 
transformation process? A model based on Nahavandi & Malekzadeh will now be 
developed in 5.6.6 to address the link between acculturative stress and possible future 
success. 
5.6.5 Limitations of the Nahavandi & Malekzadeh Model 
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The Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) model. as shown in Figure 5-6 was based on 
purely theoretical consideratiptis. The facts that the authors did not test out the model in 
the field is a major shortcoming. Secondly, the Nahavandi & Malekzadeh model does 
not specifically address M&As crossing national boundaries. Finally, the model 
assumes a 100% take-over, whereas maller percentages of share holdings are possible. 
Given these shortcomings it was decided to extend the Nahavandi & Malekzadeh model 
to overcome these limitations which are critical to the research in hand in East Germany. 
The Nahavandi & Malekzadeh model used Mirvis & Sales (1984) typologies of 
acculturation and these have been explained above in Table 5-3. These are used for a 
starting point for refinement and extension. 
5.6.6 5 Forces Influencing Acculturative Stress 
Five forces were identified from the literature and field data which were found to act on 
and influence the type of acculturation described by Mirvis & Sales (1984). It should be 
duly noted that from here onwards the model has been extended by inducing 
connections from results in the field as well as from the literature. These forces are 
overlaid on the original model shown in Figure 5-6. They are all independent variables 
modifying the type of acculturation (the dependent variable) but also influencing one 
another making it impossible to assign weightings reflecting their importance, causal 
effects etc. The inter-connected five forces are: mode of acquisition, psychic distance, 
new managers, varying expectations and time since acquisition. The first four have 
already been introduced and discussed above in 5.6. L The fifth (time since acquisition) 
is important for all M&As as time allows other forces to run their course achieving a 
type of acculturation which either helps or hinders integration. However in this 
research, the time force was not too relevant as all the six cases were privatised at 
approximately the same time (1990 
- 
1992), i. e. 4 
-6 years before the research took 
place. This average of five years elapsed time did allow the other forces an adequate 
chance to influence acculturation. 
Although Nahavandi & Malekzadeh mention the culture of the acquiring/acquired firms, 
they do not try to measure it. Their model was extended in this research by questioning 
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the opposing sides as to their own views on the organisation culture of their own or 
acquiring firm. These questions included ones slanted towards assessing readiness for 
change, as well as classifying the reigning organisational culture. 
I. Although it is not possible to say which force is most important (due to their inter- 
connection), some of the five forces are more tightly intertwined than others. Mode of 
acquisition, for instance, probably influences the existence of large or small differences 
in expectation. Co-ownership by definition includes some of the acquired firm's 
management in setting up and running the M&A. Therefore the expectations of these 
stakeholders tend to be more parallel with those of the acquirer as they have been, 
exposed to each other throughout the negotiation process and face a reduced agency 
problem. Similarly psychic distance and the presence and background of new managers 
are probably closely associated variables. The existence of a West German subsidiary 
-%Nhich took part in the negotiations and supplied managers to operate the M&A can 
reduce psychic distance, although the psychic distance paradox is always lurking in the 
background. 
5.6.7 Asýumptions for the Model 
Section 5.3 produced three working assumptions which can be summarised under the 
general question; Does the dominant culture always win? The three working 
assumptions are repeated at this point just prior to starting discussing the model, to 
stress their relationship with the model and vice versus. 
Working assumption I.: "ere the acquirer (in this case a Westernfirm) isfinancially 
and technically strong, any acculturation takes place on the acquirer's terms. 
Here the model needs to be able to measure type of acculturation present in the acquirer 
and also in the M&A. The model achieves this via the operationalisation of the data as 
discussed previously in 5.6.3. 
Working assumption 2: There is more opportunityfor the Eastern culture to influence 
the incoming Western culture when co-ownership exists. 
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The model includes the existence of co-ownership or not and additionally through 
measures of acculturative stress addresses the ability of the Eastern portion of the M&A 
to influence the Western portion. 
Working assumption 3: When there exists an equal relationship with low acculturative 
stress between Western acquirer and Eastern acquiýed, two-way learning and 
information exchange is the outcome. 
The model exists to measure acculturative stress be it high or low. 
-It will be even 
further extended in section 5.7.2 to address the topics of learning and information 
exchange. 
So the first two of the three working assumptions will be examined using the model 
shown in Figure 5-7 and assumption 3 using Figure 5-8. 
5.6.8 Model for Assessing West/East M&As 
The model itself is an extension by the author of Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) and 
contains: the culture & outlook of the acquiring/acquired firms; the mode of 
combination (merger with co-ownership or acquisition), the type of acculturation and 
five other forces on the M&A. 
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FIGURE 5-7 
A model of factors affecting acculturative stress 
(The Original Model) 
Acguired fign: 
Desire to preserve own 
culture and practices. 
Attractiveness of the 
Acquirer 
Outlook: 
Ready for change 
Acguiring finn: 
Culture: Tolerance for 
Diversity and multi- 
culturalism. 
Diversification strategy: 
Degree of relatedness of 
the firins 
Outlook : Outlook: Outlook: 
Resistant o change Multicultural 
III 
Ethnocentric 
Forces. 1-5: 
1. Mode of acquisition, merger or take-over 
reflecting the power of acquirer Vs acquired 
2. Psychic Distance, includes a West German subsidiary'i 
3. New Managers 
- 
foreign, West German East German? 
- 
Coming from acquirer? 
4. Varying expectations of the two parties 
5. Time since acouisition (constant for samt)led M&As) 
Types of acculturation: 
Integration 
Congruence 
Low levels of acculturative stress 
Types of acculturation: 
Non-integration 
- 
Assimulation 
- 
Separation 
- 
Deculturation 
I Lack of congruence I 
High levels of acculturative 
stress 
I 
* Adapted from that shown in: Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988); Thomson (1996) 
The outcomes of assessing'each of the six researched M&As via the model introduced 
above in this section are shown in Table 5-4 in the results section 5.7. 
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5.7 Results and Analysis 
This sections contains not only the results of assessing the six M&As via the original 
model and their subsequent analysis, but also an extention of this original model to 
include factors deemed important in affecting the long term health of the M&As. 
5.7.1 Results 
Table 5-4 summarises, for each case interview source, the various categorisations of the 
input to the model. The output being a measurement of acculturative stress which is 
assumed to then run on to cause success or failure. Actually this last stage is not so 
simple, hence Table 5-4 does not show success/failure. As would be expected in 
qualitative social science research, claims of causality are extremely suspect. The link 
between acculturative stress and success or failure will be visited in more detail shortly. 
We need to pay more attention to the final column in Table 5-4, intensity of 
acculturative stress, as it turns out to be an imprecise predictor of success or failure 
The results in Table 5-4 are analysed in section 5.7.4, however it is worth noting here 
the split between independent and dependent variables and the directional arrows at the 
top. 
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Table 54 
Summary of Factors Determining Acculturative Stress 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Direction of 
influence 
Source co- Psychic New External Varying Acculturation Intensity 
ownership Distance %Ianagers Expectal- plus Of 
or ions of ISub-Division Accultur- 
Acquisition Differences alive 
without any Stress 
Company A Acquisition High, no CEO only US, Large Integration/ Medium 
(US) West rest East Multicultural 
German German 
subsidiaries 
Company B Acquisition High, no Very small Not too Integration/ Medium- 
(GB) West number of large Pluralism High 
German West/East mgrs 
subsidiaries 
Company C Merger (co- High, no At start one Low Integration/ Low 
Sweden ownership) West Swede. Now Multicultural 
German only East 
subsidiaries Germans 
Company D Merger (co- High, no One British rest Low Integration/ Low 
(GB) ownership) West East German Multicultural 
German 
subsidiaries 
Company E Acquisition Medium, Several from Not too Assimulation/ Medium 
(GB) West West Germany large Pressure 
German especially in key Cooker 
Subsidiary areas 
Company F Merger (co- Medium, no Top managers Large Rejection/ High 
(US) ownership West from US or Withdrawal 
but the THA German West German 
not subsid. but via the THA 
management) West 
German 
input 
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5.7.2 Extended Model to Predict Long Term Success & Failure 
The field data, which were analysed using the model in Figure 5-7 developed earlier in 
this chapter, included a mixture of companies, equity holdings, nationalities and styles 
of management. The results of the model i. e. acculturative stress are not that useful to 
practising managers. Managers concerned with operations want to know if there is an 
onward link from acculturative stress to success or failure. Here the predictions do not 
seem to be always correct, e. g. Firm A is doing very nicely, although the model 
prediction based on the Medium high acculturative stress would be for a mixed future. 
The reason for the lack of accuracy is that external environmental influences can 
sometimes be most critical not just the dominant culture. The important point which this 
emphasises is that potential success orfailure can be uncoupledfrom the dominant 
culture issue. An example from the literature chapter exemplifies this point. MUller, 
(1993 & 1994) reviewed the case of Hochhinauf, an American acquisition, where the 
dominant western culture surely won and acculturative stress was high, however the 
firm was extremely successful. Market conditions for its lifts (elevators) products have 
been heavily in favour of the supplier since reunification. So although the model would 
have predicted potential failure, the actual turnout, up to date, has been otherwise. To 
put it another way, positive market conditions (the external environment) can 
temporarily override negative human resource trends (the internal environment). Now 
much of East German industry faces difficult market conditions. The continued 
existence of M&As like firms B, D&E, who are experiencing these negative 
environmental effects shows that the reverse is possible 
-a positive internal 
environment can temporarily override a negative, external one. The parallel here to the 
opposing viewpoints attributed (often falsely) to Porter (1979) that "the market matters, 
not the firm" and Stopford & Baden-Fuller (1992) that "the firm matters, not the market" 
is obvious. It is interesting to note that the results from this research, although totally 
unrepresentative, do not support or negate either viewpoint. 
Does acculturative stress run on to cause success or failure? To investigate this question 
the model is even further extended by adding in the external business environment and 
the existence or not of two-way learning. The model in Figure 5.7 ended abruptly after 
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measuring the acculturative stress. In Figure 5.8 below, the original end point forms the 
starting line for adding in further variables. culminating in long term success or failure. 
Figure 5-8 
Long Term Success or Failure: 
The Role of the Environment and Two-way Learning 
(The Expanded Model) 
I Low Acculturative Stress I I High Accultu 
Forces 6-10 
cceptance of: Non-acceptance ol 
1. Diverse perspectives 
2. Shared language 
3. Lack of information hoarding 
4. Organisational slack 
5. Freedom to experiment 
I Two-way leaming 
-I 
Positive 
Business 
Enviromnent 
I No two-way leaming I 
Negative Positive Negative 
Business Business Business 
Environment 
II 
Environment 
II 
Environment 
Short tenn Short tenn Short tenn Short term 
success survival success 
Long term-s-uccess-ýý Longtermfailure 
------------------------ equals theoretical possibility 
5.7.3 Operationalisation of the New Variables 
The various intermediary boxes in Figure 5-8, which lead up to long-term success or 
failure need explaining and if possible quantifying and measuring. The subjects to be 
reviewed are: two-way learning, positive/negative business environment, short & long 
term. The forces 6-10 will be discussed in section 5.8. 
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Tko-%-a), leaming 
- 
How can two-u-ay learning be identified and measured? The 
presence of two-way learning seems to need the following five factors: acceptance of 
diverse perspectives, shared language, lack of information hoarding, organisational slack 
and freedom to experiment. The importance of these factors and their interdependence 
%%ill be discussed in section 5.8. In the six cases investigated in this research, no formal 
attempt was made to measure and quantify these factors. The subject of two-way 
leaming surfaced late in the research process, partly as a result of returning continuously 
to the data and reassessing it. It %%-as only after completion of the data gathering that the 
importance of two-way learning %%ras noticed. It was by then too late to ask specific 
investigative questions, or develop units of measure. Reassessment of the 36 discourses 
to find mention of the five factors gave tantalising hints that they were present to some 
extent in companies having low acculturative stress whilst not present in high 
acculturative strm companies. 
Another potential way to measure two-%%-ay learning is by looking at the output, as 
opposed to its constituent factors. What does two-way learning produce? It will be 
argued in section 5.8 that new capabilities should be the fall out from a functioning 
regime of two-%%-ay learning. Once again revisiting the data on the six cases gives 
indications that new capabilities were appearing in the more successfully integrated 
firms (C & D). The opposite being true in Firm F. 
Based subjectively on a combination of the above five factors and the appearance of 
new capabilities, the six case firms were classified as having high/medium/low levels of 
two-%%my learning. Obviously further research in this area will benefit from more 
specific, as opposed to the current subjective, measures of these variables. 
Posifirelnegative environmeril 
- 
The six cases were all subject to the macro level 
economic effects experienced by the post-, A-all East German economy. However some 
were operating in markets protected from the general collapse in demand, e. g. Company 
A enjoyed a cosy utility monopoly, Companies C&D benefited at least early on from 
the construction boom whilst Company F had a hard to make and duplicate product with 
stable demand. Poor old companies B &- E were being put through the mangle of 
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dramatic competitive pressures, aswell as plummeting demand. Subjective weightings 
were given to each of the six companies' environments. 
Short-termflong-term 
- 
It is useful here to revue definitions of short term and long term. 
The classical economic example of the long term is the time in which it is possible to 
change the most fixed factor of production, often to build a new factory, (Lipsey, 1983: 
223). Under this definition the short term is probably only one year or so and 
concomitantly the long term an)1hing beyond that. We have taken a more generous 
definition of long term 
- 
the period of time long enough for all the firm's sunk 
commitments to come to an end, (Baumol & Binder, 1991: 493). We feel that this 
definition %%ill increase the short term time span considerably, which is necessary for the 
conditions existing during our study in East Germany. Commitments made with the 
privatisation authority (the THA) locked in many new owners of M&As to certain 
investment and employment quotas forcing the short term in these cases up to the 
millennium. 
Success1failure 
- 
The end stages of the above model need some explanation. What do 
we mean by success and failure in the long term. Many take-overs and mergers are not 
successful, over half fail (O'Connell, 1985). Here the firm does not still exists after 5 
years and/or has changed the original purchaser. The opposite of failure is success. 
Success has many definitions depending on whose viewpoint is used. Profits are 
success for shareholders in neo-classical economics. Even under the financial definition 
of success, failure seems to be the norm for M&As. A study by Mercer Management 
Consulting published in the Economist, 04.01.1997 found that 57% of merged firms 
lagged behind their industries in terms of total returns to shareholders. Continued 
existence (longevity), Barkerna. et a) (1996) and hence employment is success for 
employees and other stakeholders e. g. local government. The aim of this section of the 
research is to attempt to gauge the basis for future success, both profits and longevity, by 
looking at differences in the intensity of acculturation. The higher the intensity of 
acculturation, the more likely is a level of empowerment and shared vision of the 
remaining original management and work-force upon which future success is dependent. 
The intensity of acculturation partly depends on the ability of the new acquirer to 
recognise that there even exists differences in culture. The term psychic distance 
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paradox (O'Grady4Lane, 1996) has been used to throw light on this phenomena in the 
area of international business expansion. Psychic distance is defined as factors 
preventing or disturbing the flow of information between potential or actual suppliers 
and customers (Nordstr6n-dVahlne, 1992). The paradox is that psychically close 
countries are not necessarily easy to manage, because assumptions of similarity can 
prevent executives from learning about differences. Nordstr6m/Vahlne, 1992 quote the 
example of 32 Canadian retailers companies which expanded into the USA and 80% of 
which failed, mainly because the incoming management assumed similarity of 
conditions in the country next door including having the same language. The parallel to 
West and East Germany is obvious. 
So as per our above dcf inition, we have been talking about short or medium term (up to 
5 years) results. What then are the critical criteria over and above acculturative stress 
that dictate long-term success or failure? The literature on learning links successful 
two-%Nmy learning to the achievement of competitive advantages. However these 
competitive advantages are very probably achievable mainly in the long term. So when 
we assess the future of these East German M&As, we predict that those with a good 
basis of two-%vay learning, %%ill pull a%vay from their competitors and survive even in 
poor market conditions, i. e. the firm matters not the industry in the long term. Doubters 
who make reference to farricrs, ice makers and other extinct businesses and professions 
please note, that in the social sciences at least, the exception can prove the rule. 
A summary table 5-5 sho%%s anassessment of present success of the various firms, the 
degree of domination of the western company culture and the existence of two-way 
learning. Note there is no column for predicted success in the future, the end point of 
the extended model in Figure 5-8, however, those firms having high two-way learning 
are tipped as likely long-term successes. 
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Table 5-5 
Assessment of M&As Researched 
source Assessment ofpresent 
success (short-medium 
term) 
Assessment of 
Domination of western 
culture 
Assessment of Degree 
of two-way learning 
Company A Quasi-monopoly position Half and half Medium amount (US) gives current success 
Company B Not too successful. dire Medium-High level of Medium amount (GB) mark-et conditions. opposition 
Company C Relatively successful Excellent acceptance High 
Sweden of multicultural ism on 
both sides 
Company D Relatively successful in Excellent acceptance High 
Acciplan (GB) increasingly malevolent of multicultural ism on 
market both sides 
Company E Environmental jolt from Half and half Medium amount (GB) BSE crisis meant very 
difficult market conditions 
and little success 
Company F Although the market Western culture Low 
Tricat (US) conditions are not too bad, rejected 
the f irm is very near 
failure 
According to the logicjust described, companies C&D will have bright, long-term 
futures, possiblyjoined by companies A, B&E. Company F (Tricat) has in the 
meantime failed. 
5.7.4 Data Analysis 
Company A 
- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Phase: The new acquisition was immediately 
SN%Umped with US/GB managers to obtain a starting position management assessment. 
Also present %%-as a West German consultant who gave technical advice using 
comparisons %%ith similar West German operations. This phase was quite short (9-12 
months) as language difficulties, cost and the quick realisation that the existing 
workforce, %%-as well educated and proficient led to the installation of a per7nanent 
American CEO (who did not speak German). 
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CompanyA 
- 
Consolidation Phase: Although the workforce and organisation 
had been substantially reduced by the Treuhandanstalt before sale, fiulher reorganisation 
%Nras necessary. The multi-layered, non-functional organisation structure was severely 
delayered and standardised over all sites. All remaining managementjobs were offered 
up for filling from within the existing workforce by ballot. The motivational effect of 
feeling part of the selection process %N-as deemed high. An overarching theme (safety) 
was chosen so that everyone in the organisation could identify and agree on a common 
goal. 
'First we shipped some over to America to see how the work was organised there, but 
also so they could go to shopping malls and seefor themselves thefuture. Thenwe 
asked them to rotefor new management within the new structure. They certainly had 
thefeeling a new era had started and they could controlpart ofit' 
Quote CEO Company A. inter%iew 4. 
- 
Company, 4, Implicalionsfor karning. Company A has benefited from 
external factors such as being positioned in a market segment which is protected and 
stable. These positive market trends give the firm time, a vital ingredient in short 
supply during the transformation process. Also it allows long-term planning and 
negates the need to practice kneejerk, crisis management. The problem is that the cosy, 
oligopolistic world of German electricity production and distribution is under attack 
from regulators (the EC Competition Commissioner) and alternative energy sources 
(Russian natural gas). There seems to be an acceptance by the American top manager 
and the East German employees of each different culture, but this is not the same as full 
acculturation. Some two, 
-%vay teaming is taking place, but the US president still speaks 
no German after 5 years and looks to the US for solutions to problems. It would seem 
that most of the teaming takes place on the East German side, a situation which if 
extended well into the future could lead to East German employee frustration at their 
inability to affect decisions. On the other hand this relatively protected and slow 
changing industry has a high percentage of unskilled or semi-skil led jobs. Here the 
necessity for initiative and responsibility (discussed in Chapter 4) is not too high and 
likewise the need for two-way teaming is lower. 
COMp2ny 
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- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Period. The Post-take-over period in company B 
lasted somewhat longer (9-12 months). A leam of British managers ran the company 
but lack of German language capability, cost and once again the realisation that the 
workforce could cope led to a total British management withdrawal. The company was 
governed by a combination of old East German incumbents and new hire West/East 
Germans. 
Company B- Consolidation Phase: Market conditions turned extremely difficult 
and further redundancies over and above the THA restructuring were necessary. 
However, a large investment %%2s made in modernising at least one of the several 
production sites even though the increasingly competitive environment was causing 
losses. Workforce investment took the form of on-site English lessons, a vastly 
expanded internal communications ystem for introducing new techniques and getting 
across the market place problems. 
'Its nothing to do with the company (B), itsjust thefact that the market has turned so 
bad andpeople are losing theirjobs, Quote Herr F., interview 10. 
Company B. Implicationsfor Learning. Company B has many similar facets to 
Company A. However the market conditions are cut-throat due to heavy Eastern 
European and West German competition in an over-capacity industry. The ability to 
practice two-way learning is unfortunately s%-amped by the very logical fear of having 
nojob next week. The decision to expand into East Germany seems to have been taken 
spontaneously, and the full rarniflications; of the fall of the wall (more Eastern European 
competition) and monetary union (instantaneous adverse labour costs) are only now 
sinking in. Here the dominant culture argument is not very relevant. Survival is the be 
all and end all. 
Company C 
- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Period. Company C differed from A and B as the 
THA were unable to reach agreement with the Swedish company interested in buying it. 
Consequently a new firm was founded and people were transferred over to this new 
entity once they had been terminated from the old combine, which was wound up. The 
core of the new management (including the new CEO) and workforce came from the old 
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organisation, however less than I (r/o of the original workers could be economically 
taken over. During this time the Swedes stationed a home company Deputy MD 
alongside the new CEO,, %vhoA-as the old combine Director. Much training was given 
in Sweden to introduce new techniques and allow first hand experience of Western 
methods. 
'Afost of the impulse and suggestions camefrom Sweden at that time. Afy Swedish co- 
director. was a great supportfor me, a big help. Me also had the opportunity to review 
the Swedish organisation structure, working conditions and work customs. 
Quote CEO, Co. C. interview number 20. 
Company C- Consolidation Phase: The new company began to win contracts 
and prosper. The Deputy Swedish MD went back to Sweden and the firm continues on 
its successful way %ith a very high percentage of old combine employees in all positions 
and no Swedish or West Germans present. 
-Company C. Implicationsfor Learning. Company C has made a good start to 
becoming a successful learning organisation. Its market has been benign allowing 
emphasis to be placed on sorting out internal resources. The Swedish management 
influence has been extremely supportive. They have succeeded in coopting support at 
all levels in the organisation, not least from the East German CEO. Much learning had 
taken place on the East German side, e. g. how to make presentations, bidding, CAD 
implementation etc. However it %N-as notjust a one way street. The Swedes had 
encouraged the East German management to bid for international contracts even in 
competition with other o%vned subsidiaries. The very existence of an East German CEO 
showed a willingness to invest in trust on the side of the Swedes. 
Company D 
- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Period. Company D was the subject of a case study 
in section 5.5. A number of higher level East German managers in the old combine 
managed to raise money to buy a participating stake in the new merger with the British 
engineering consulting firm Acer Group. A bilingual marketing director was the only 
new management recruit from the British side, showing a high level of trust in the old 
guard. 
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"'The previous Leiter or top managers were no way so dependent on a commercial 
attitude and thefollow-on economic consequences. The managers weren't always 
technically the best people. TodV a manager must be on top on the technical side, not 
any old body, can do. " 
Quote Herr E. Co. D. interview number 14 
Company D- Consolidation Phase: The firm experienced mixed results due to 
certain sectors enjoying relatively buoyant demand, driven by Government funded 
infrastructure investment programs. Other sectors fell on hard times especially those 
that depended on trade with the old COMECON countries. A marketing plan was 
implemented which mapped out the way forward, but further redundancies were 
inevitable. 
-Company D, Implicationsfor Learning. Company D (Acerplan) was our 
successful contrasting case company and has already been discussed in detail in that 
section. Very definitely there exists in this finn true two-way leaming, fostered in a 
fully integrated, low acculturative stress envirorunent. 
Company E 
- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Period. Company E differed from the other M&As 
as it %vas in reality an east%%-ard expansion of an existing West German operation. As 
such the new cmployces %%rre not the old employees but hired specifically for thejob. 
Many of the initial jobs especially in sales went to West Germans as they were assumed 
to have more marketing know-how and some track record in selling. Those East 
Gennans who were hired were chosen for their contacts, usually of a political nature. 
Yes, and ive tried to take these highly specialisedpeople. You probably know the 
hierarchical system that existed in East Germany, well we tried to concentrate on 
people is-ho is-ere somewhere higher up the ladder, to utilise their connections. 
Quote Dr. Kling. Co. E. interview number 1. 
Company E- Consolidation Phase: The firin experienced poor results due to 
outbreaks of s%ine fevcr and the realisation that the pig farms in east Germany were so 
back'%%mrds as to be almost unusable for modem pig breeding techniques. Additionally 
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the western marketing people all left as they couldn't settle in the East and they had no 
success in selling due to assumptions of cultural similarity which were not reality. They 
fell into the psychic distance paradox trap. The East German new hires proved equally 
as disastrous as their contacts became worthless after national and local elections saw a 
major clear out of pre%ious politicians and political appointees. 
-Company F, Implicationsfor Learning, Company E was the pilot study 
company and much smaller than all the others. An unexpected environmental jolt (the 
BSE crisis) meant that market conditions were very tough. Mistakes had been made, 
especially early on, by the western management. However it seems that lessons had 
been learned and the hire-fire mentality when dealing with East German employees had 
beenmodified. Still however most impulse came from the west, there was not even one 
office in the New Bundeslander. Two-%%-ay learning is not much in evidence, rather the 
transfer is all in an easm-ards direction. 
Company F 
- 
Immediate Post-Take-over Period: Company F is the second case study. There 
was a quick influx of American managers to top positions and also as advisors. 
Unfortunately, none could speak German and they started to clash not only with the 
inherited work force but also, and more critically, with the representatives of the 
Treuhand who retained 25% of the stock of the company. 
'The biggest problem we have is to communicate wilh theAmericans, specially those 
from the South who, speak a slang. 
... 
The whole top management isfullofAmericans. ' 
Quote Prof. B., Co. F, interview number 30. 
Company F- Consolidation Phase: Despite its problems the firm experienced 
relatively good demand for its products. However the acculturative stress showed in the 
development of a -them and us" mentality between the old East German employees and 
management and the new US managers. Major strategic direction disagreements also 
developed between the US managers and the Treuhand representatives. 
-Company F. Implicationsfor Learning. Company F (Tricat) was our 
contrasting case cxamplc of low two-way leaming. It has already been discussed but it 
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is worth reiterating, that the company had a large, technically well qualified R&D 
presence before the M&A. The R&D staff were not co-opted, indeed seemed to be 
positively antagonistic to the new American management team. External factors such as 
the existence of an outside shareholder (the THA) with different goals from the 
Americans lead to agency problems. 
Ex-employee of non-German M&As 
Interviews were carried out with unemployed workers as well as those who had work at 
the six M&As. These ex-employee interviews have been split between people who 
worked, albeit only briefly, for West German M&As and those who worked for foreign 
(non-West German) M&As. 
.% 
By the very fact that the employees had lost theirjobs it could be expected that they 
would have less than a positive attitude to the foreign take-over firm. The views 
expressed were paradoxically the opposite. They were all surprised at the amount of 
latitude given to them by the new owners to act and take decisions alone. Additionally, 
the old management, and in many cases the old organisation structure, was left in place. 
The blame for theirjob losses was very realistically placed on market conditions. In 
many cases the purchaser had hoped to use the East German firm as a bridgehead to 
Eastern Europe and the GUS countries. The collapse of COMECON trade usually 
heralded the collapse of East German operations as the remaining export business could 
be more economically handled from other European locations or from the home base. It 
seems that although they misjudged the market possibilities, the non-West German 
purchasers were better at informing their employees about the market conditions. 
Additionally, several of the interviewees expressed their pleasure at being listened to 
and having the feeling that their experience counted in the new set up. The author was 
left with an unexpected feeling of goodwill, or more accurately understanding, towards 
the new owners, whereas one would expect the opposite. 
'So they had a plant in the Netherlands and I often went there. As the Eastern 
European market collapsed, the old connections were not so important as they didn't 
bring in business. So the Dutch subsidiary started selling to what was left. It made 
sense, it was however our death knoll. " 
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I Quote Frau G., interview 42.1 
Ex-employee of West German M&As 
Seven of the interviewees had worked for a short 'Period of time for a West German 
take-over. There was a definite feeling from a majority of those interviews that the type 
of acculturation experienced here was assimilation. In most cases the West German 
purchaser changed the management, by bringing in West Germans to key functions and 
reorganising the structure to a standard German (West German) layout (Bischoff et al, 
1993). The views expressed by these interviewees towards the new purchaser were 
mixed. Many complained about the arrogant, telling not listening style of the new 
management. However it is only fair to say that at least two found their immediate 
supervisors relatively open to advice using their institutional knowledge. Interestingly 
one of these new supervisors was an East German escapee who volunteered to return 
after the fall of the Wall. Much mistrust was expressed about the perceived hidden 
agenda of the purchasers. In a high proportion of the cases, the East German operation 
was eventually closed and the whole of Germany was then serviced by the original West 
German operation. The underlying market factors that may have made this a rational 
decision did not seem to be communicated too well to the workforce. Consequently 
many of the ex-employees felt they had been used in a pawn in some colonisation game. 
'.. From one day to the next. We came back after the New Year break and our 
dismissals lay on the table. 
... 
I've no idea of the reasons, you'd have to ask the 
publisher. 'Quote Frau Schd, interview 32. 
5.8 Discussion of the Results 
The results will be discussed using an assessment of the validity of the three working 
assumptions. The usefulness of the original plus extended model in isolating factors 
which can be of use to practising managers will then be addressed. 
Does the dominant culture always win? This question preceded the three working 
assumptions of sections 5.3 and 5.6.7. As part of the discussion of each of the three 
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assumptions, the five factors in the extended model having influence upon two way 
leaming are explained. 
5.8.1. Working Assumption 1: "ere the acquirer (in this case a Westernfirm) is 
financially and technically strong, any acculturation takes place on the acquirer's 
terms. 
This assumption cannot be supported by the results. All the East German acquired 
portions of ex-combines were financially and technically weak relative to the Western 
acquirer. However in some cases, the Eastern culture was accepted, lived on in a 
modified form and the resulting cultural mix formed a dynamic bedrock to build up 
competencies. Firms C&D are the best examples of such successful acculturation, 
resulting in integration and multiculturalism. The reasons why this occurred in firms C 
&D and not the other firms seems to depend on co-ownership (to be discussed below 
under working assumption 2) and good management of the post acquisition 
acculturation process. 
Why is acculturative management so important? Its important because much of the most 
valuable knowledge and capabilities of East German firms are deeply embedded in their 
past organisational and societal culture. To successfully tap into these capabilities and 
leverage them across the new East-West organisations, it is vital to engage in a process 
of creating a shared understanding of what the purpose and abilities of the firm is. This 
cannot be achieved without identifying the tacit knowledge bases of the East and West 
partners and their relationship to the performance of the firms. And that cannot be' done 
without the creation of a common language and organisational slack, both of which 
require successful acculturation. Firms who were culturally aware in their take-over 
strategies and addressed the issue of acculturation head on achieved low acculturative 
stress. The Swedish managers involved in the early days of Company C exhibited 
exceptional listening skills and patience and exemplified such cultural awareness. 
What smoothes the acculturation and hence integration process? Three variables are 
important: 
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Common organisational language 
- 
It is necessary for people to be able to efficiently 
and effectively communicate with each other the knowledge which they wish to share. 
Shared experiences will offer some common grounds for understanding. A shared 
language, including culturally bound terms, is also require. Shared language enables 
people to express their knowledge in terms that others understand. 
Low personnel turnover, high slack, coupled with high degrees of socialisation inside 
and outside of work was likely to foster common language. Some combines in the old 
East Germany employed whole towns, e. g. Leuna. There was a very high degrees of 
social interaction between work mates when compared to the average Western firm. All 
this was likely to give the employees a relatively high degree of shared personal 
experiences, fostering transfer of tacit knowledge, coupled with a lower need to rely on 
relatively more inefficient explicit knowledge transfer mechanisms. Within the 
established group the potential to apply current knowledge bases is likely to have been 
relatively high, given the right motivational elements. However now with teams 
completely broken up and many new owners not recognising the need to develop a new 
common language for knowledge to be accessed and employed efficiently, then the 
opportunity to combine two unique capabilities may have passed. The East's knowledge 
management capability was in application, created through its high group orientated 
culture. The West's knowledge management strength was in its diversity of strategies 
and technology, created through its intellectual diversity, which avoided system wide 
core rigidities. Combining these knowledge management capabilities with access to new 
markets, technology, and capital could enable firms to develop a winning sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
The existence of diverse social and technological perspectives in the new firm will not 
lead to the generation of positive learning in of itself. If new capabilities were to be 
generated then each side needed to be able to communicate to one another. The 
development of a shared language with which different perspectives can be 
communicated is a key element of both successful acculturation and organisational 
learning. Organisational learning theorists here in the UK, such as Frank Blacker (1995), 
as well as those from the American continent, such as Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and 
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Pentland and Reuter (1994), have recently argued that for knowledge to be created and 
transferred there needs to be a minimum level of shared language amongst the 
individuals involved in the knowledge creation and transfer process. 
At its most obvious there was the physical language barrier of German and English. 
Company B only realised that their German colleagues did not speak English, and that 
the British managers they sent to East Germany did not speak German, upon the arrival 
of several managers from the UK after the completion of the acquisition. 
Use of ex-patriot managers 
- 
One strategy used to overcome the problem of psychic 
distance was to employ West German experienced managers. The same strategy has 
been employed in other reforming economies by importing ex-patriots who had 
emigrated to the USA, GB etc. As these managers tend to be at the higher echelons and 
in the most critical areas (finance, marketing, strategy), their influence tends to be 
greater than their small numbers. The danger here is that these imported managers 
assume they know the culture, both national and organisational, but actually they do not. 
Similarly many West German buy outs in East Germany imposed Dilsseldorf structures 
on Dresden. A policy of imposing West German structures on East Germany may have 
worked initially but the question is for how long? 
A cculturative stress 
- 
The differences in national cultures produce acculturative stress, a 
phenomenon most people experience on foreign holiday. As already mentioned in 5.6.1, 
Acculturative stress occurs when expectations of some proper state of affairs as to 'what 
ought to Ware not fulfilled. The R&D staff of firm F expected their technical 
knowledge to be highly valued. The new management perceived it as irrelevant causing 
high stress as the outcome 
Finns C&D built up a common language, used ex-patriot managers paringly, took 
care in choosing those used and concentrated on reducing acculturative stress by 
excellent cotninunications. The other M&As did not follow these criteria and 
consequently e'nded up with higher acculturqtive stress. Company A for instance, 
although only having a few, but high level, American managers had not succeeded in 
developing a common organisational language, partly due to the lack of German 
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language capability of the CEO. Company F used many American managers, all 
without German language ability who made it obvious that the beliefs and attitudes of 
communist times were not appropriate now. There is nothing wrong with that view, if it 
is tempered by the acceptance of some aspects of what went on before, such as the 
group solidarity and inter-personal dependence and helpfulness. Unfortunately the 
acceptance did get communicated to the eastem employees. 
5.8.2. ' Working Assumption 2: There is more opportunityfor the Eastern culture to 
influence the incoming Western culture when co-ownership exists. 
This assumption was supported by the data collected with the familiar proviso that they 
represented a small, unrepresentative sample of East German M&As. Co-ownership is 
linked to the chosen mode of entry of the market and usually decided before the take- 
over takes place. We disc-ass below several aspects of the pro or contra co-ownership 
debate. 
Pace ofrestructuring 
- 
a. Without co-ownership (acquisitions) - problems of governance (who is in charge, 
which strategy will be followed) are of limited importance because the acquired firm's 
shareholders no longer have any influence. This allows swift restructuring and the 
possibility of some return on the investment in the short term. The typical Anglo- 
American penchant for quick financial returns is probably best served by an acquisition. 
Company A in our sample was a good example, here the relatively protected market 
position enhanced the free hand of the new western management to allow quick 
restructuring and a speedy movement into profit not withstanding large capital 
investments. 
b. Co-ownership (mergers) 
- 
the negotiations and manoeuvring associated with at least 
two sets of stakeholders slows the introduction of restructuring. However this very 
tardy process is essential in producing a climate of mutual trust and acceptance 
necessary to make long term changes in work force attitudes and organisational culture. 
When the in-situ East German managers were included in the merger deal, i. e. they 
224 
became shareholders, then the ability to make long lasting changes was enhanced. 
Company D was a good example, here 25% of the shares were purchased by existing, top 
East German managers and so instead of the acquiring culture dominating by virtue of 
ownership, the East German managers were involved and co-opted. There is always 
stress involved when two cultures interact, suffice it to say here that in a merger, 
especially one where there is staff equity involvement, the level of stress tends to be 
lower than when the acquirer imposes his culture on the acquired who have no co- 
ownership. 
Negotiations process 
- 
Many M&As fail because the actualities of meshing the two 
organisations together prove impossible based on conditions imposed, and personal 
prejudices formed, during the negotiations process. By having East German co- 
ownership, the people most involved with post merger operations will have been 
involved in the pre-merger talks. The possibilities for misunderstanding and lack of 
trust are therefore reduced. The CEO of Company C was a good example of this factor. 
Organisational slack 
- 
The more sedate progress experienced in restructuring within 
mergers as opposed to acquisitions allowed the retention of some organisational slack. 
Finn D in our sample had departments which were 'heavy' in personnel which was 
useful when others became busy due to structural changes in the market. It is widely 
recognised that slack permits a higher degree of interaction between people, thus 
facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge across individuals (Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995). Much of what we know cannot be easily communicated. This is tacit knowledge. 
It is a vital component of our day to day lives. If a capability relies upon tacit 
knowledge, it is more likely to be a source of sustainable competitive advantage. This is 
because the elements that drive the cap ability forward will be difficult to identify by 
competitors, and hence copy. If carefully managed, organisational slack can foster the 
transfer of tacit knowledge between individuals and, in a merger, across organisations. 
It is important to initially identify what knowledge is tacitly stored inside the purchased 
unit. Once this knowledge is identified then it would be important Ifor the 
M&A to 
develop strategies to nurture this knowledge and transfer it across the old organisational 
boundaries, embedding it in the routines, hierarchy, and culture of the new firm. Instead 
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the firms investigated viewed slack, or overlaps in employees duties and knowledge, as 
completely surplus to requirements and hence engaged in hasty mass redundancies. This 
phenomena is not confined to the East, there is anecdotal evidence in the stories of the 
privatisation of the UK water industry that suggests this many also occur ina, long-term 
member of the western economy, (Baden-Fuller & Hunt, 1996). 
Freedom to experiment 
- 
New owners of East German firms have the freedom to 
introduce experiments, as usually the East German operation is small in relation to the 
overall group size, see Table 5-1 for the relative size of the M&As in the sample. The 
real return emanates from developing techniques to surface hidden capabilities in East 
Germany and then if they prove successful to export them to other countries or regions. 
If the capabilities prove to be not much of a gain, then the mistake can be isolated at the 
periphery of the company. Due to the lower fixation on instant financial returns, 
mergers have more leeway to experiment. 
In summary the time frame of the stakeholders matters. Quick returns and fixation with 
income seems to be better served by an acquisition i. e. without co-ownership. The 
counter arguments in favour of mergers and co-ownership, is introduced and supported 
by this research. 
5.8-3. Working Assumption 3: nen there exists an equal relationship with low 
acculturative stress between Western acquirer and Eastern acquired, two-way learning 
and information exchange is the outcome. 
The third assumption remains exactly that, an assumption. We have collected 
sentiments and opinions of managers and employees, both German and non-German 
supporting the assumption. It has also support from the literature. We argue that a key 
outcome of attention to organisational fit and acculturation is that value is created and 
distributed across the new organisation in the form of leaming. Synergistic leaming 
occurs through the blending of two very different organisations into a cohesive unit. 
However, the argument is ripe for further research to prove a positive correlation 
between acculturative stress and two-way learning. The data gathered in this research 
seem to point in the direction that a link exists and the assumption umber 3 is correct 
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but the results are of a very exploratory nature. However we can say something about 
the idea that the real return of an East German M&A is learning. 
Learning 
-a Motivefor a M&A. There can be many motives for acquisitions and 
mergers. Past researchers have surfaced motivations such as growth, entry into 
concentrated markets where organic growth is slow and laborious, managerial motives 
such as increased visibility or an enlarged power base, bandwagon effects where 
mergers and acquisitions come in waves, and increases in shareholder wealth. As 
expected the original motivations for entry into the East by our sample companies were 
varied. The argument in terms of growth is clearly seen in Company F, a small company 
who merged with an East German speciality chemicals company. This acquisition 
doubled the size of the Western partner in terms of employee numbers. The motive of 
access to a concentrated market can seen in the case of Company A, in power 
generation, which is a regulated market. In the case of Company C managerial motives 
are clearly in evidence. Seeing the writing on the wall one of the senior managers inside 
the old East German combine set about pro-actively searching for a western acquirer 
without any prompting from the Treuhand. The question of bandwagon effects is rarely 
so pronounced as in the case of the early years following German reunification. The East 
Germany privatisation authority, the Treuhand, was operating on a tight timetable. In 
essence their remit was to develop a private economy quickly, where there was none 
before. To do so it marketed its 'product' (split up, reorganised sections of East German 
combines) primarily in the form of acquisitions or mergers with West German and 
overseas organisations. Only later did it expand its interest to other variations. 
We believe that in retrospect once our sample companies acquired, or merged, with an 
East German firm one of the principle advantages of the expansion may have become to 
capitalise on access to scarce resources and capabilities. Such resources included 
technical knowledge and to a lesser extent knowledge about the workings of the former 
Eastern block economies. This advantage ssentially views the firm from resource based 
perspective, which is strongly linked to our learning argument, which in turn is linked to 
organisational fit and acculturation. To tap into complimentary resource bases and 
harness their power in the form of products and services which add shareholder value, it 
is essential that the firm not only knit the two firms resources and capabilities together 
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via the process of organisational fit but create new ones which more efficiently and 
effectivel y deliver value to the customer. This whole process could not be achieved 
without careful attention to the points outlined above. 
Learning 
- 
Generation ofNew Capabilities 
Diversity 
- 
Why is learning such an important outcome? The principle reason is that 
organisational learning generates new knowledge and capabilities'which are the keys to 
the long term survival of a firm. Organisational capabilities are a greater source of 
potential profit than resources because they are the glue that binds the organisation 
together and that glue is much harder for competitors to ascertain and copy than 
. 
resources. To harness a firm's resources organisational capabilities are needed which 
combine resources in novel and unusual ways. More formally capabilities can be 
defined as: 
'information based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm specific and are 
developed over time through complex interactions among firm's resources 
unlike resources, capabilities are based on developing, carrying and exchanging 
information through the firm's human capital. ' (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). 
The development of new capabilities is a vital task of the firm. Researchers have long 
observed that the capabilities of today may be the straight jacket of tomorrow (for a 
compelling insight into this line of though the reader is referred to Dorothy Leonard- 
Barton's (1992) article and subsequent book). If firms rely exclusively on their current 
way of thinking then over time they will become ri: moved from the changing needs of 
the marketplace and die. One of the key mechanisms to avoid such a fate is to maintain 
a level of intellectual diversity inside the company which challenges current orthodoxy, 
exposing the firm to new ways of doing things. In this way the firm can experiment with 
alternative methods of organisation to improve efficiency, and new ideas on what the 
appropriate technologies and markets the firm should develop and address, thus 
improving the effectiveness of the organisation. Acculturation, triggered by post-merger 
integration, is an excellent source of intellectual diversity and as such an ideal hunting 
ground for the emergence of new organisational capabilities. 
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Evidence from our interviews suggest that. the mergers and acquisitions triggered an 
injection of fresh perspectives on how the organisation should operate, in addition to 
valuable new technical insights. This clash of perspectives is strikingly illustrated by the 
comments of one American manager who commented that there were clear differences 
in perspectives and knowledge creation methods between the Western and Eastern wing 
of the two firms. 
"In former times the firm was managed more or less from the bottom up. In 
other words as technologists they (the East German employees) would say well 
we want to do work in this field, so they would do work in that field hoping that 
a product would come out of it. In the western world, one starts from the market 
and you are looking to serve the market. " 
Learning 
- 
Communication. The process of integration sought to combine excellence 
in technological perspective with a market perspective. To do so new organisational 
capabilities needed to be created. The existence of diverse social and technological 
perspectives in the new firm will not lead to the generation of positive learning in and of 
itself. If new capabilities were to be generated then each side needed to be able to 
communicate to one another. The development of a shared language with which 
different perspectives can be communicated is a key element of both successful 
acculturation and organisational learning. 
Shared language, as stated before, is required so that people can express their ideas in 
terms that others understand. This was a major challenge in the case of our sample 
firms. At its most obvious there was the physical language barrier of German and 
English, e. g. Company B. 
Learning 
-fear ofjob loss. If the acculturation process is not carefully managed then 
communication breaks down and learning is impeded. This may in part be a response to 
a failure by the two parties to understand each other's differing perspectives. If 
understanding emerges then some of the key ingredients of learning, such as trust, 
shared world view, and ability to communicate across disciplinary boundaries to 
develop inter-disciplinary products and services can develop. If not functional 
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specialists may retreat into information hoarding. A clear example of this occurred in 
our sample Company F. One of the German managers noted that a culture of fear 
emerged where German employees worried about the security of their jobs and 
responded with knowledge hoarding. As she put it: 
"... one keeps one's knowledge to oneself in order to somehow or other become 
indispensable. Once again that's this fear of losing yourjob that is always in the 
background. Professor B. went through the age structure of the firm. We are all 
at such an age that if we were to have to leave the firm we would be almost 
impossible to place in a new position. And we've all got a long way to go to 
retirement. " 
Yet these people had deep reservoirs of technical knowledge which the new partner's 
wished to access, but were hindered in doing so by the German employees' fears. The 
German employees felt that they were going to be sold out, however interviews with the 
Western managers indicated that this was not the case and they believed that the 
German employees had a lot to offer and despite their age profile were most willing to 
learn. Acculturative stress based on expectations was in this case acute and so the 
opportunity to develop synergistic learning never occurred. 
Overall the key lessons we believe that have emerged from our data from a learning 
point of view is that if management pay close attention to acculturation a natural 
breeding ground for learning will occur though'the mingling of diverse perspectives. To 
capitalise on this breeding ground the M&A needs to reduce the level of actual 
communication problems by not destroying the existing shared language and 
consciously attempting to understand it. The retention or development of a basic 
common language with which the new management and existing employees can 
communicate and work together is important as it allows the development of a shared 
understanding of the purpose of the business across functional disciplines. 
5.8.4 Usefulness of the Model 
Do the original and the extended model have productive potential which can be used by 
managers in East German M&As? Knowing the independent variables which make up 
230 
acculturative stress (Table 5-4) allows managers to put together programs which can 
ease the post acquisition process. Some of the variables in the extended model (Figure 
5-8) can also be influenced by managers, e. g. the five factors signifying two-way 
learning. Other variables are arguably not so easy to influence. Can a firm influence its 
business environment? By selecting its markets and developing new products for new 
markets, the answer is yes. In the short term however, the firm is probably stuck with 
the conditions prevailing in its marketplaces. 
The predictability of the model needs further work. Certainly the original model (Figure 
5-7) can measure acculturative stress. However as managers are interested in hard 
results, the accuracy of the extended model (Figure 5-8) is of more practical interest. 
Here the lack of objective measurements for two-way learning plus the, at least, short 
term vagaries of the market mean the predictive powers can only be tested over the long 
term. 
5.9 Conclusions 
Expansion through international M&As creates challenges at both the pre- and post- 
purchase stages as well as during the negotiation process itself. All three stages are 
important and although this research concentrates on the post-purchase phase, the 
knock-on effects of the previous stages cannot be ignored. 
The assumption that acculturation takes place on the terms of the stronger party, i. e. that 
the dominant culture always wins, can be negated. To avoid western dominance entails 
a practical strategy for smoothing integration. It is achieved by managing the 
acculturation process through sensitive acceptance of useful elements of the old eastern 
firm's culture, the judicious use of ex-patriot managers and import managers with 
language and cultural awareness capabilities. The process of integration seems also 
eased by allowing co-ownership and top positions to some of the original East German 
management. Such decisions are usually taken at the pre-negotiation or during the 
negotiations phase. 
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Where the Western partner acted as such and not as a conqueror, the management of 
acculturation and co-ownership was achieved effectively. In such situations there are 
implications for the future through the engine of two-way learning. Through two-way 
learning, the human resource capabilities of the M&A are enhanced which is a great 
investment in the future. What this future may promise and how trends mentioned here 
can be fin-ther investigated is the subject matter of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6- Contribution, Speculation and Future Research 
6.1 Contribution 
The main advantages of attempting this empirical, qualitative research project in East 
Germany during the mid-1990s included: the timing, the qualitative desire to surface 
new theory (given the potential inapplicability of existing theory), and finally the 
neutrality of a non-German but long-term resident researcher. It may be useful to 
explore these advantages a little further. 
There was a plethora of academic interest in East Germany in the immediate aftermath 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall, (Assmann et al, 1991, Wuppertaler Kreis, 1992). The 
results were mainly prescriptive advice on how to transform the moribund combines and 
a lesson in how the language of East and West German academics had diverged. In 
other words not much substance. Also many of the combines were in a holding mode, 
under THA control but not being reorganised and waiting for some white, mainly West 
German, knight. The field research in this dissertation took place 5-7 years after the 
collapse of communism and more importantly 4-6 years after the merger or acquisition 
of existing combine parts with western interests. This not inconsiderable length of time 
has allowed the ramifications of currency union, competition and new management 
vision and practice to have had some effect. There should be something new to review 
and analyse. There is in reality plenty new to report and therefore it was not too difficult 
to report some contribution, i. e. the timing was opportune. 
Although multinational corporations have been expanding overseas for decades in the 
western world, they have been moving into areas where the economic system shared at 
least similar principles of competition and the rule of the market as in the home market. 
Tbeory developed in the international trade area was therefore based on continuing 
scenarios as just described. The collapse of the command economies uddenly 
introduced a new element into the equations and there was immediately recognition that 
new theory was urgently necessary. Coupled to this need for new theory was the 
growing realisation that the theory being applied was westernbased and may not be 
relevant to a situation in which a move from command to market economy was 
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underway, (Spender, 1992). The researcher set out to try and raise new theory and 
therefore chose to use a qualitative research methodology. Additionally a model from 
established Western theory, (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988, Figure 5-6), was 
embellished and expanded to form the search mechanism within M&As for 
acculturative stress and even to potentially predict future success. Any new theory, see 
following speculation section, can be counted as a contribution with the proviso that 
substantial testing out is still required. 
The problems of research abroad have been discussed in Chapter 4. The initial 
academic interest in East Germany came naturally from West Germany, but it brought 
with it a problem. The psychic distance paradox as discussed in Chapter 5, applies just 
as well to academic research as to acculturation in M&As. Do British researchers have 
deep, ingrained insight into US industry, or vice versus? Oh course not. Must they 
beware of assuming things are the same given the common language? Oh course. That 
is the problem of psychic distance in intra-German academic research. The researcher 
here brings also bias to the research. The research is inevitably influenced by Anglo- 
Saxon ways of thinking about business. So it therefore should contrast nicely with the 
more Germanic slant inevitable from German researchers. Another potential area of 
contribution. 
Due to language difficulties, much foreign research inevitably took the form ofjoint 
research projects between German and universities abroad. There are certain 
disadvantages attached to joint research projects, like differing goals and lack of clarity 
on underlying terminology. An example of terminology is that there was for instance no 
understanding of the word "management" in East Germany in 1989. Although West 
Germans have used the term in its English form for decades, East Germans used the 
German term "Leitung" which has a different meaning (that of directing information 
down to the lowest level). An advantage of one individual, researching alone is that 
problems of differing terminology as well as cross-cultural team work are reduced. 
One contribution that the researcher firmly expected from the research at the beginning 
was that any findings could be used as advice for similar expansions by foreign firms 
further eastwards into Eastern as opposed to Central Europe. This aim was even 
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included into the transfer document after year one of the study. However there are three 
large problems associated with taking advice gained from research in East Germany and 
applying it to privatisations or M&As further eastwards. 
Firstly, the research here makes no claim to be generalisable to East German industry at 
large never mind CEE industry. 
Secondly, can East Germany be used as a basis for comparison? There are many 
authorities who regard East Germany as a one-off-case, Gros & Steinherr, (1995). It is a 
special case due to the speed of change, as well as the big brother transfers of money, 
legal and administrative structures. No other Eastern European country has had to 
change so quickly and likewise no other ex-communist country has had so much 
assistance. The other side of the argument is that by studying East Germany one can 
gain an insight into what may happen in other reform economies in advance of it 
happening. Rather as California is supposed to be a leading indicator for trends in the 
USA and the world in general. If this latter view proves correct then indeed findings in 
this research may be claimed to represent a contribution. 
Thirdly, and related to the usefulness of East Germany as an indicator for other reform 
countries, is the worry that the end product (assumed to be a market economy bedded in 
a democratic political system) may not be the end product in East Germany never mind 
elsewhere. The ideas involved in transition as opposed to transformation are discussed 
below in the speculative section of this chapter. 
What then was found that was novel or could be termed a contribution from the field 
findings? 
Before listing the contributions claimed for this research, mention should be made of 
their relevance to the problem statement and research questions and their origin in the 
resource based view of the firm (RBV). The research followed an almost SWOT 
analysis approach -a strategy term, thought to stem from the Boston Consulting Group, 
meaning looking at strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Working on the 
assumptions of the RBV and using SWOT, the human resources available in East 
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German M&As were investigated. Each of the six contributions will have their 
connection to the research problem and questions spelt out, sometimes the contributions 
relate to more than one. The problem statement from 2.3.2 and the research questions 
from 2.4 are repeated here to ease reference: 
2.3.2 Statement of the Problem: 
- 
(1) "at were the key hindrances to integration and learning? 
2.4 The Research Questions: 
- 
(2) nat strategic actions eased the take-over process? 
(3) nat were the implicationsfor two-way learning ofany actions taken? 
For instance in the first contribution, problem statement (1) is addressed by isolating and 
measuring acculturative stress, but additionally an answer to question (2) is formed. 
1. Concentration on reducing acculturative stress helps in the long term and doesn 't 
necessarily hinder in the short term 
Results from the case data being run through the model showed firms with high 
acculturative stress were not achieving integration, e. g. Finn F. Firms with low 
acculturative stress were observed as being actively involved in preparing their 
competencies for the future. They had survived just as well, if not better, than their 
competitors the rigours of the post reunion marketplace. However they were exhibiting 
greater employee involvement and integration, which was showing itself in an 
accelerating acceptance of commercial thinking necessary for survival and expansion in 
a market economy. Acerplan is a prime example. Workers were constantly in and out 
of each others office and also that of the imported managers. They were giving 
opinions, listening to advice and exhibiting the five factors in the extended model 
(Figure 5-8) showing the whole process of two-way learning was definitely in full 
swing. Even in a very competitive and increasingly depressed market, the firm was 
expanding. 
One of the causes of high acculturative stress was poor cultural management of the post- 
acquisition process. Here factor number 3 in the model (Figure 5-7) is crucial. 
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Z Choice of imported management is crucial 
The contrast between the American managers in Tricat (the unsuccessful M&A) and the 
Swedes in Company C or the British bilingual Marketing Director in Acerplan is stark. 
The lack of any attempt to learn the host language by certain foreign managers sends 
very strong negative signals to the employees in East Germany. Villinger, (1996) notes 
that the knowledge of the partner's language and a sensitivity towards cultural issues 
seems to be crucial, though undervalued factors for successful learning processes on 
both sides. A link was observed between what Hofstede misleading terms feminine 
aspects of managerial behaviour and the success of the foreign import managers in 
achieving low acculturative stress. Maybe people like Jack Welsh and Lee Iacocco 
would make lousy managers in Eastern European M&As. One substantial reason why 
this could be so is that they would stifle any two-way learning with their telling, 
aggressive styles. 
A run-on effect of culturally insensitive management was the blanket application of 
Western "modele'of motivation. Using the model (Figure 5-7) force number 4, varying 
expectations, we can see that the assumed desire of Eastern employees to react to 
individual assessments is maybe erroneous and the desired behaviour, personal initiative 
and responsibility, is not automatically present waiting to be tapped. Here agreement 
was seen between interview findings and the findings of other researchers, e. g. Frese et 
al, 1996 
- 
low initiative or Pearce et al, 1994 
- 
responsibility and individualism. The 
third contribution claim is therefore: 
3. Individual incentive plans have limited applicability 
In most of the six firms investigated, managers were most proud to emphasise how they 
were implementing certain forms of person based incentive schemes. There seems no 
critical assessment of whether this imported idea is necessary or not. There are certain 
jobs where such schemes can be positively counterproductive. Shift workers in Firm B 
complained about the increasing backlog of routine maintenance on the 24 hours in 
usage machines. Previously each shift had spent some of the eight hours ensuring 
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correct settings, greasing and other routine maintenance was performed. With the move 
to piece rate payments, the machines were-often handed over in such a state that the 
following team had to stop production for several hours. When machines were occupied 
by only one worker, this problem was even worse. However in areas such as sales, the 
move to individual incentives had produced mainly increased efficiency. 
A strategic action enabling smooth integration which actually needs addressing in the 
pre-acquisition stage is the governance issue of co-ownership. This factor fon-ned force 
number I in the model (Figure 5-7). 
4. Eastern ownership involvement, especiallyfor East German managers, reduced 
agency probleins and in afl cases had a positive effect. 
The top East G%-rman managers in the successful M&A case firni (Acerplan) were 
offered at the start of the merger process the possibility of obtaining 25% of the stock. 
Although difficult for them to raise the money in the underdeveloped banking sector of 
the just deceased DDR, they were able to obtain a loan. The motivational effects of 
having a very direct interest in the future policy of the firm were regarded by all as very 
high. Likewise in Firm C, the former boss of the original section in the combine, sought 
out the foreign, Swedish, partner and was offered the top job and a stake in the 
enterprise. The difference between an outright acquisition e. g. firms A&B and a 
merger with East German management involvement is great and was obvious from the 
interviews with not just the Eastern managers in possession of stock. 
Contributions I through 4 have been related to questions I and 2. The fifth contribution 
addresses (2) but also has great importance for the implications for learning (question 
3). Here the expanded model (Figure 5-8) is of use. All the forces 6-10 affecting two- 
way learning are exaggerated in a group setting. The research found a continued 
existence, albeit in a weakened form, of the work group. The tenacity of this institution 
suggests that it is highly ingrained into East German worker's psyche and continues to 
provide some usefulness in the times of revolutionary change. It is in this area that the 
fifth claim for contribution is made. 
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S. There is latentpotential in the group t9facilitate learning and change 
The rush to apply western accepted wisdom by introducing individually based incentive 
plans and reducing slack by redundancies was never questioned. It is here. Naturally 
when on average 80% of the work force has been cut in East German industry and the 
firms, or some of them, still survive, then massive featherbedding must have taken place 
previously. However often the baby gets thrown out with the bath water. Redundancies 
were often based on the last in, first out principle. Some of those younger workers who 
were released could have formed the backbone for future stability and expansion. 
Whole teams were disbanded or dissected because what they were working on no longer 
made economic sense 
- 
Company F's R&D. These teams had a wonderful, functioning 
system of trust and networks which disappeared along with the team. Imagine the 
motivational impetus that entrusting at least some of these teams, as a group with new 
projects which fitted the company's new goals. The motivation would come from 
having an established group as the change agent, supporting the new management. 
Integration of new practices and strategies would be assured, naturally at a price. The 
price is that the labour costs would remain high longer than under a system of rigorous 
employee pruning. In the section on organisational learning in Chapter 5, the 
importance of the group in internalising routines as stores of knowledge was mentioned. 
That is the link which would go missing if the group were to be abandoned in favour of 
individual based work. 
The final contribution is linked directly to question (3). 
6. Unlearning as a solution to core rigidities 
The idea that unlearning is a critical element in modernising an organisation is viewed 
in the West as an interesting, yet slightly irrelevant academic point. In Eastern Europe 
however it is more than relevant because the unlearning is taking place on at least two 
levels. People are coming to terms with the reality that state planning has failed and is 
being replaced by the market. They are having to unlearn all their ideas that through 
solidarity of the proletariat and a paternalistic state their every need could be met. Even 
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if the needs were not met, and they were not, then there was always the balm that the 
forgone consumption was helping towards. a better future for everyone. In addition to 
the society level unlearning, the cosy world of the socialistic, monopolistic, vertically 
integrated firms is falling apart. Adherence to rules from ab 
' 
ove is no longer regarded as 
laudable. Customer needs, a formerly irrelevant sideline, are now important. The East 
German worker is therefore being forced to unlearn many aspects of working life which 
were taken for granted up till now. 
Unfortunately, the measurement of unlearning presents formidable obstacles not really 
addressed or solved in this research. Hence unlearning was not incorporated into the 
model. It is almost certain that unlearning has taken place, which means a great 
potential for learning new capabilities and routines is on tap. 
Are the above contributions enough to allow the preparation of a successful strategy for 
eastward expansion via M&As for Western firms? The answer is probably not. The 
effects of the external environment can sometimes override the internal leveraging of 
resources within the firm. Several firms survived, almost in spite of themselves, 
because the market environment was supportive, e. g. Firm A with its nice energy sector 
regional monopoly. However, will they survive in 5,10 or more years when the 
environment could well have changed? The answer must be only if they also address 
internal resource potentials, in other words invest in their employees giving them the 
means to participate and feel their contribution is necessary. Cases of nice regional 
monopolies disappearing are not unknown, see for instance the water industry in 
England (Baden-Fuller & Hunt, 1996). On the other hand the best intentions of 
leveraging internal resources can be offset by adverse nvironmental trends. Finn B 
was stuck in the middle of a pitiless competitive fight and was just surviving financially. 
Managers here acknowledged the need for enlightened HR policies but noted that the 
money and time were unavailable and the employees would not learn as they did not 
know if theirjob would exist for a few days longer. The way forward seems to be a 
middle course of emphasis on both internal and external issues, with practicality guiding 
which gets most attention. 
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6.2 Speculation 
The benefits of two-way learning have been branded here as the spring board to future 
competencies and success. The reasons were explained in Chapter 5 with reference to 
the academic literature. The reality is that in East Germany at least, not enough time has 
elapsed to check out the claims for long term, success. There is a definite need for future 
longitudinal study, see the next sub-section on future research. 
Mention has been made that there is a distinct feeling that western management theories 
are either not applicable (because of different infrastructure, lack of legal and financial 
laws at least in other CEE countries etc. ) or they need substantial modification. Certain 
elements of the six contributions mentioned above may form part of any new theory 
appertaining to organisations involved in changing from a command to a market 
economy. Two are raised here as being potentially most different from existing 
accepted knowledge and therefore of greatest interest. They are: the importance of the 
group and the need for unleaming. 
The importance of the group is of interest as it flies counter to the trend in the work 
place and also most theories of motivation. In his study of the East German motor 
industry since reunification, Marshall, 1997: 11 notes thatManagers at VW Mosel and 
Opel Eisenach found that experience accumulated by former employees of state socialist 
enterprises were surprisingly congruent with the aims of establishing team-based 
production, in fact more so even than their western Gennan counterparts'. Indeed the 
worker's prior experience was found to particularly well equip them for team work in a 
modem lean production system, ibid.: 20. 
West German managers commented that it was difficult to get West German workers to 
function in teams because there is a much more individualised worker culture. East 
German workers can be easily formed into teams. Far from being outdated, experience 
of interacting in a group was found to be an excellent starting platform for working in 
some of the most modem production environments in the world. It is therefore 
speculated that East German industries using modem team methods will be more 
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successful than their western individually based counterparts in those areas e. g. 
production where interaction and co-relian. ce is necessary. 
Although not in opposition to accepted theories in learning, the idea that unlearning has 
a critical role to play in acceptance of change has seldom been explored. Some ideas 
remain unuied rather like the fact that electricity can be conducted without resistance at 
temperatures approaching absolute zero. Using this example from modem physics, a 
change in circumstances, in this case the development of new mixtures of materials, 
meant that the previously abstract phenomena became suddenly useful. Likewise the 
sudden, political changes in Eastern Europe post 1989 have created a windfall change 
situation where vast swathes of the population are actively unleaming. The speculation 
is that employees in East Europe will embrace new methods, ideas and situations more 
easily than their western counterparts, who have not the same pressing need to question 
their fundamental beliefs. 
This last point brings up the hoary question, noted in the contribution section, of 
whether we are facing a transition or a transformation in East Germany. The difference 
being that a transition involves a smooth, unbroken move from one complete system to 
another, i. e. from socialism to capitalism. A transformation on the other hand involves 
the changing of social structures bit by bit, with some changing completely and others 
hanging onto their old identity. The main difference is that the start position was not 
true socialism (it was a messy mixture of private and public) also the end state is not 
true capitalism (we have observed areas where East Germans have clung to their past, 
e. g. groups). The view of transformation is championed by Grabher & Stark, (1997). 
We have seen in the firms visited in the field research here that the new has not 
automatically triumphed. It is speculated that the future will see substantial chunks of 
Eastern European social structure perpetuated in the new work places of even foreign 
M&As. In other words transforination ot transition. I 
6.3 Future Research 
The areas for future research are varied but can be split according to: 
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Original Model 
- 
Refinement of the measurements of the five factors influencing 
acculturative stress. Development of a less subjective measure of the outlook for the 
acquired/acquiring finns. 
Extended Model 
- 
Attempt to measure strengths and weaknesses of the five forces in the 
extended model (Figure 5-8) which are presented as making up two-way learning. 
Apply the extended model to other M&As, see "Time" below. 
Time 
- 
Longitudinal follow on studies to check out the predictions of success made here 
on the basis of assumed two-way learning. Revisiting the researched M&As and 
updating the data base. 
Design 
- 
Quantitative studies which can be generalised to industry sectors or all the East 
German econony. The majority of the firms visited in the field research were of 
medium size and in the engineering services sector. Questionnaires could be designed 
to test out the level of acculturative stress experienced after privatisation in other firms 
in the same sector or outside. Once again these results could be linked to a longitudinal 
study on whether low acculturative stress brought long tenn success. 
Place 
- 
Predictions of the positive effects of unleaming could be checked by running 
research in East Germany (in those firms where it is present) and abroad where the need 
to unlearn is not being forced by political changes. 
Theory 
- 
New theory about foreign expansion into reforming ex-communist societies 
can be tested out using both the original and the extended models in other settings. It is 
worth noting here that no firm visited had followed the "usual" steps in selecting East 
Germany as an area of expansion. Reasons for the choice were not covered by any 
theory known to this researcher and seemed to be mainly opportunistic or accidental. 
Cross-cultural comparisons 
- 
Mixed tearn research comparing East Germany with West 
Germany, CEE countries and other countries. Bearing in mind East Germany's "big 
bang" legacy, there should be fruitful mileage in comparing countries with relative 
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stability as the basis for change with the quick break with the past basis of the New 
Bundesl5nder. 
Intra German comparisons 
- 
To check out where and what remains from the socialist 
era. An example could be the observed reluctance of East Germans to give up their 
group based heritage. It would be interesting to track this phenomenon using a matched 
West German subsidiary as a control. The resistance of cultural heritage to modification 
could then be charted over time. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion we will return to the strategic management viewpoint encompassing this 
research. East German M&As had certain problems, namely barriers to change and 
integration, associated with the human capital inherited from the previous regime. The 
research raised some positive reasons why these deficits in attitudes, techniques, 
responsibility, initiative etc. can be overcome. The East German employee brings 
something to the party 
- 
education, discipline, skill, inter-personal social maturity 
- 
attributes which when coupled to the receptiveness to new ideas due to unleaming, 
makes for a potent mixture. It is up to M&A managers in East Germany to use this 
potential wisely and with some humility. 
Good managers plus good employees equal success. Visit Saxony, the most advanced 
area on the globe in year 2020. Today a risible thought. Tomorrow reality? 
244 
Bibliography English Language Literature 
Adams J. S. (1965). Inequality in social exchange. In: L. Berkowitz (ed. ) Advances in Social 
Psychology, Vol. 2, Academic Press: New York 
Adler, N. J. (199 1). International dimensions oJ*organi: ational behaviour. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing). 
Akerlof, G. A.; A. K. Rose; J. L. Yellen; H. Hessenius (199 1). East Germany in from the Cold: The 
Aftermath of Currency Union. The Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 41 
Albach H. / R. Schwarz (1994), The Management of Transition in East German Firms, Discussion 
Paper FS IV 94-17, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin 
Alt, M. (1980). Fact and fiction in survey research: some philosophical considerations. Quantitative 
Sociology Newsletter, Summer, Number 25. 
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P. (1993). Strategy Assets and Organisational Rent, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 14. 
Ansoff, H. 1, (1965). Corporate Strategy, An Analytical Approach to Business Policyfor Growth and 
Expansion. (McGraw-Hill: N. Y. ). 
Argyris C. / D. Schon, (1978). Organisational Learning: A Theory ofAction Perspective, Addison- 
Wesley; Reading, Mass. 
Arrow, K. (1974). Essays in the Theory ofRisk-Bearing. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. 
Ash, T. G. (1997). A Romantic File. The New Yorker, April 28-5 May: 162-171 
Astley, W. G. & A. H. Van de Ven. (1983). Central perspectives and debates in organizational theory. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 239-255. 
Baden-Fuller, C. W. & J. M. Stopford, (1994). Rejuvenating the mature business. Cambridge: Harvard 
Business School Press 
Baden-Fuller C. WJ C. Boschetti (1995), 'Creating competitive advantage through mergers: the lens of 
resourced based theory'. Ch. 6 pp. 91-112, in H. Thomas, D. O'Neal / E. Zajac (Eds. ), 
Strategic Integration, Strategic Mana( gement Society, Wiley 1995. 0 
Baden-Fuller, C. & B. Hunt (1996). Anglia Water, TheSSR Story So Far. City University Case Study, 
January 
Banaka W. H., (197 1). 'Training in depth interviewing, Harper & Row, NY 
Barkema H. G., J. H. J. Bell / J. M. Pennings (1996), 'Foreign Entry, Cultural Barriers and Leaming', 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 151-166. 
Barnard, C. I. (1938). Thefinctions ofthe executive. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Barney, J. (199 1). Finn Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal ofManagement, 
Vol. 17, No. 1. 
Bate, P. (1994). Strategiesfor Cultural Change. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann. 
Baumol, W. J. & Binder A. S. (199 1). Economics Principles and Policy, (5h Edition). Harcourt, Brace 
& Jovanovich: NY 
Berkowitz, L. (1954). Group standards, cohesiveness and productivity. Human Relotions vol. 7, no. 4, 
pp. 509-519. 
Berry J. W. (1980). 'Social & Cultural Change' in Triandis & R. W. Brislin (Eds. ) Handbook ofCross 
Cultural Psychology, Vol. 5, Allwyn & Bacon, Boston. 
Berry J. W. (1980). 'Social & Cultural Change' in Triandis & R. W. Brislin (Eds. ) Handbook ofCross 
Cultural Psychology, Vol. 5, Allwyn & Bacon, Boston. 
Bettis R. & Prahalad C. (1995). 'The Dominant Logic: Retrospective and Extension', Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 16. 
Bigelow, J., (1982). Catastrophe model of organisational change. Behavioural Science, 1161.27. 
Bischoff R., G. von Bismarck / W. Carlin (1993), 'From Kombinat to Private Enterprise'in Heath J 
(Ed. ), RevitalisingSocialist Enterprise: A Race against Time, Routledge, London. 
Black, J. and Boal, K. (1994). Strategic Resources: Traits, Configurations and Paths to Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15. 
Blacker, F. (1995). Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organisations: An Overview and Interpretation, 
Organisation Studies, Vol. 16 Issue. 6. 
Blake R. R & T. S. Moulton (1984), 'Solving Costly Organisation Conflicts'Jossey-Boyce: San 
Fransisco 
Bosker, C., 1992. Case Study., Why East Germany? in FT Mergers + Acquisitions International, July 
Issue 
Brown J. and Duguid, P. (1989). Innovation at the Workplace, a Perspective on Organisational 
Learning. Paper presented at the CMU Conference on Organisational Leaming, May. D 
245 
Brush, T. H. (1996). Predicting Change in Operational Synergy and Post-acquisition Perfon-nance of 
Acquired Firms. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17: 1-24. 
Burgelmann, R. (1991). 'Fading Memories: A Process Theory Strategic Business Exit in 
Dynamic Environments'. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue 1, March 
Bums, T. & G. M. Stalker, 1961. The management ofinnovation. Tavistock: London 
Burrell, G. & G. Morgan, (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analvsis. Heincmann: 
London 
Campbell D. T. & J. C. Stanley (1963). Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designsfor Research. 
Rand McNally: Chicago 
Canella A. A. & D. C. Hambrick (1993), Effects of executive departure on the performance of acquired 
firms. Strategic Management Journal, Volume 7. 
Carley, K. (1992). Organisational Leaming and Personnel Turnover, Organisational Science, Vol. 3., 
No. 1, February. 
Camall, C. (199 1). Managing Change. Routledge: London 
Caves, R. E., (1980). Industrial organisation, corporate strategy and structure. Journal of economic 
Literature, 58: 64-92. 
Chandler, A. D., 1962. Strategies & Structure: Chapters in the history ofthe American enterprise. MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
Chatterjee et al. (1992) Cultural Differences & Shareholder Value in Related Mergers: Linking Equity 
and Human Capital, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 319-334. 
Chatterjee S. (1986) 'Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions on Merging and 
Rival Firms, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7. 
Chatterjee S., M. Lubatkin, D. M., Schweiger/Y. Weber(1992) Cultural Differences& Shareholder 
Value in Related Mergers: Linking Equity and Human Capital. Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 13, pp. 319- 334. 
Child, J. & A. Kieser (1979). Organisational and managerial roles in British and West German 
companies: an examination of the culture free thesis. In: Organisations alike and unlike. 
(London: Routledge). 
Clark, B. R. (1970). The distinctive college. Aldine: Chicago, IL. 
Clarke, L. (1994). The essence ofchange. Prentice Hall: London. 
Clarke, P. & K. Stanley, (1988). Organisation, transition and Innovation Design. Pinter: London 
Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal ofLaw and Economics 3: 1-44 
Cohen, W. and Levinthal, D. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Leaming and 
Innovations, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35. 
Collis, D. (1991). A Resource Based Analysis of Global Competition: The Analysis of the Global 
Bearings Industry, Strategic Management Journal, Special Issue Summer. 
Comte A. (1853), The positive philosophy ofAuguste Compte, Trubner & Co., London 
Connor K. R. (1991). 'A Historical Comparison of Resource Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought 
Within Industrial Organisation Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?. 
Journal of Management, Vol 17, No. 1: 121-154. 
Cook, T. D. & D. T. Campbell (1979), Quasi-experimentation, Rand McNally, Chicago, IL 
Cooper R. & G. Burrell, (1988). Modernism, Postmodemism and Organisational Analysis. 
organizational Studies, 9/1: 91-112. 
Cottle T. (1967). "The circles test: An investigation of perceptions of temporal relatedness and 
dominance". Journal ofPrqjective Techniques and Personality Assessment, Nr. 3 1. 
Cyert R. & J. March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Engle%vood Cliffs 
Cyr D. J. &S. C. Schneider, (1996). Implications for Leaming: Human Resources Management in East- 
West Joint Venture. Organization Studies, 1712: 207-226 
Cyr D. J. (1995). The Human Resource Challenge of International Joint Ventures. Westport, CT: 
Quorum. 
Datta D. K. (1991). Organisational fit and acquisition performance: effects of post-acquisition 
integration. Stra! egic Management Journal, Vol. 12: 281-297. 
David, K. (1977). Epilogue: what shall we mean by changing identities? 
-1n: 
Very eta] (1996). 
De Wit, B. & R. Meyer, 1994. Strategy: process, content, context: an international perspective. West 
Publishing: St. Paul, Mi. 
Deal, T. E. & A. A. Kennedy, 1982. Corporate Cultures. Addison-Wesley 
Denzin, N. K. (1970). 'The research act, Aldine, NY 
Deutscher, I. (1968). In- Institutions and the Person. Becker H. S.; D. Riesman & R. S. Weiss (Eds. ). 
R. S. Aldine & Co.: Chicago. 
246 
DiMaggio, P. & W. Powell, (1992). The new institutionalism in organisational analysis. Chicago 
Dyack I. J. A. / K. H. Wrack (1995), 'Germany's evolving privatisation policies: the Plaschna 
Management KG, Harvard Business School Case Study, N9-795-120. 
Easterby-Smith M., A. Lowe, R. Thorpe (199 1), Afanagement research an introduction, Sage 
Publishing, London 
Eberwein, W. &J. Tholen. (1993). Euro-manager or splendid isolation: An Anglo-German 
comparison. (Berlin: de Gruyter). 
Ebster-Grosz D., & D. Pugh. (1996). Management problems qfAnglo-Gertnan business collaboration. 
(London: Anglo-German Foundation For The Study Of Industrial Society). 
Economist, 09.11.1996. A Survey of Germany 
Economist, 04.01.1997. Why too many mergers miss the mark. 
Economist, 10.05.1997. Putting Korea together again, lessons from German reunification. pp. 84 
Edwards V. & P. Lawrence (1994). Managing Change in East Germany. ý Unification and 
Transformation. Routledge: London. 
Estrin S. (1994) Privatisation in Central & Eastern Europe, Longman, London pp. 34-35 
FamaE. F. (1980). 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm'. Journal ofPolitical Economy, pp. 
288-307. 
Fayol, H. (1916). Administration Industrielle et Generale, General and industrial management. 
Translated by C. Storrs and Published in 1949 by (London: Pitman Publishing Ltd. ). 
Festinger L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations 7: 117-140. 
Fielding N. G. & Fielding (1986), Linking Data, Sage Publishing, Beverly Hills, CA 
Financial Times, London (1994) A convergence of cultures. October 29th, p. 7 
Financial Times, London (1994) Germans flexible at last on credit cards. November 30th, p. 6 
Fink, Beak & Taddeo quoted in Clarke (1994). 
Follet M. P. (1926). In: Dynamic administration: the collective papers ofMary Parker Follett, Ed. by 
H. C. Metclaf & L. Urwick (194 1). (New York: Harper & Row). 
Franke, R. H., G. Hofstede & M. H. Bond, (199 1). Cultural roots of economic performance: A research 
note. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12: 165-173. 
Frankfort-Nacmais, C. (1992). Research Methods in the social sciences. St. Martin's Press: London. 
Frese, M.; Kring, W.; Soose, A; Zempel, J. (1996). Personal Initiative at Work: Differences between 
East and West Germany. Academy ofManagement Journal, Volume 30, No. 1: 37-63 
Galbraith, J. K. (1973). Designing complex organizations. (Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley) 
Galbraith, J. K. (1967). New Industrial State. (London: Penguin) 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Culture. BasicBooks, NY. 
Gephart, R. P. Jr. (1984). Making sense of organisationally based environmental disasters. M, Journal of Management, Nr. 10 (2). 
German Federal Government Report on the new Federal States, September 1996 
Gersick, C. J. G. (1991), 'Revolutionary Change Theories', Academy ofManagement Review, Vol. 16 
M. 
Ghemawat, P. (199 1). Commitment: The Lý, namic ofStrategy. New York: The Free Press. 
Giddens, A. (1976). New rules ofsociological method: A positive critique of interpretive sociologies. 
Hutchinson: London. 
Glaser & Strauss (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory; Aldine, Chicago 
Grabher, G. (1994). The elegance of incoherence. Discussion paper FSI, 94-63, Social Science 
Research Centre, Berlin. 
Grabher, G., & Stark D. (Eds. ), (1997). Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, linkages 
and localities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grant, R. (199 1). The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy 
Formulation, California Management Review, Vol. 33. 
Grant R. (I 996a). 'Prospecting in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organisational Capability 
as Knowledge Integration'. Organisational Science 
Grant, R. (I 996b). Toward a Knowledge Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 17, Winter Special Issue. 
Gregory, R. L. (1966). Eye and Brain 
- 
the PsycholoSy ofSeeing. World University Library, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London. 
Grinyer P. & P. McKiernan, (1990). Generating major change in stagnating companies. Strategic 
Management Journal, Volume 11. 
Grinyer P. H. & J. C. Spender, (1979), Turnaround. ý Managerial Recipes. London: Blackwell 
Grinyer, P. & McKiernan P. (1988). Sharpbenders: The secrets of unleashing corporate potential. 
247 
London: Blackwell. 
Gros, D, &Steinherr, A. (1995). Winds of change: Economic transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe. London: Longman 
Haire et al (1966). Managerial thinking: an international study. (New York: Wiley) 
Hamel, G. (199 1). Competition for Competence and inter-partner learning with international strategic 
alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 83-103 
Hamel, G. And Prahalad, C. (1990). The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard Business 
Review, May-June. 
Hampden-Tumer, C.(1990). Charting the corporate mind., from dilemma to strategv. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford 
Hannan, M. T. & J. Freeman, 1984. Structural Inertia and organisational change. Sociological Review. 
Nr. 49. 
Harrison J. S.; M. A. Hitt; R. E. Hoskisson & R. D. Ireland, (1991). Synergies and Post-acquisition 
Performance: Differences versus Similarities in Resource Allocation. Journal of Management, 
Vol. 17 No. 1: 173-190. 
Haspeslagh P. C. & Jemison D. B. (1987). Acquisitions 
- 
Myths & Reality, Sloan Management 
Review, Winter Edition. 
Haspesia, 
-,, hP. C. &JemisonD. B. (1991). Managing Acquisitions. Free Press: New York 
Hax, A. and Majluf, N. (1984). Strategic Management: An Integrative Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 
Hayeck F. (1945), 'The use of knowledge in society, American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. 
Hedberg, B. (198 1). How Organisations Learn and Unlearn. In Nystrom, P. And Starbuck, W. 
(Editors). Handbook of Organisational Design, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University 
Press 
Hickson et al (1974). A culture free context of organisation structure: a tri-national comparison. 
Sociology, Vol. 8: 59-80. 
Hitchens, D. N. W. N., K. Wagner & J. E. Birnie. (1992). Productivity and competitiveness in East 
Germany. Queens University Belfast, Working papers in Economics, Nr. 39. 
Hofstede G. (1980). Culture's consequences: international differences in work related values. 
(Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publishing). 
Hofstede G. (1991). Culture & Organizations: Software ofthe mind (London: McGraw-Hill) 
Hofstede, G. & M. H. Bond (1988). The Cofucius connection: from cultural roots to economic growth. 
Organizational Dynamics. 16/4: 4-21. 
Huber, G. (199 1) Organisational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures, 
Organisational Science, Vol. 2. No. I February. 
Huff, J., Huff, A. and Thomas, H. (1992). Strategic Renewal and the Interaction of Cumulative Stress 
and Inertia, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13. 
Husserl, E., (1946), Phenomenology, in Encyclopaedia Britanicca, 14th edition. 
ifo, (1997), Quarterly Journal on Economic Trends in the FRG, Volume 20, March 
Imai, K., Nonaka, 1. and Takeuchi, H. (1985). Managing the New Product Development Process: How 
Japanese Companies Learn and Unlearn. From Clark, K., Hayes, R and Lorenz, C. The (Ineasy 
Alliance Managing the Producliviýy- Technology Dilemma. Cambridge, M. A.: Harvard 
Business Press. 
Inkeles, A. (1960). Industrial man. American Journal ofSociology. Vol. 66: 1-3 1. 
Isabella, L. A. (1990). Evolving Interpretations as a Change Unfolds: How Managers construe Key 
Organisational Events. Academy ofAlanagement Journal, Volume 33, #1: 741 
Jemison D. B. & S. B. Sitkin (1986), Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 11. 
Jensen M. C. & W. H. Meckling (1976). 'Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure'. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (Oct. ) pp. 305-360. John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Johanson J., & J-E Vahlne (1977). The internationalization process of the firm: a model of knowledge 
development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal ofInternational Business 
Studies Spring/Summer. 
Johnson, G. & Scholes, K. (1988). Exploring Corporate Strategy. (London: Prentice Hall International) 
Kanter, R. M. (1985), The Change Masters, Simon Schuster: New York. 
Katz, D. &Kahn, R. L. (1966). The social psychology of organizations. (John Wiley& Sons) 
Kay, J. (1993). Foundations of Corporate Success: How business strategies add value. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
248 
Kerr, C., J. T. Dunlop, F. H. Harbison & C. A. Myers, (1960). Industrialism and industrial man. 
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press) 
Kinsella, R. (1991). German economic and monetary union. Paper to the Economic Policy 
Conference, Dublin Economic Workshop, Kenmare, October 1991. 
Kirk J. &ML. Miller (1986), Realiýy & validity in qualitative research, Sage, Beverly Hills, 
Klein, J. (1989) Parenthetic Leaming in Organisations: Toward the Unleaming of the Unleaming 
Model, Journal of Management Studies, 26: 3, May. 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the Firm. Combinative Capabilities and the 
Replication of Technology, Organisation Science, Vol. 3 No. 3, August. 
Kom, R. (1991). One year after reunification: A new Germany in anew Europe. Paper to the 
Economic Policy Conference, Dublin Economic Workshop, Kenmarc, October 1991. 
Kottler, P. (1980). Principles qf Marketing. Prentice-Hall 
KuhnT. (1970). The Structure qfScientific Revolutions, 2nd edition. University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago IL. 
Lane, C. (1992). Britain and Germany compared. In- R. Whitley (ed. ), European businessk), stems: 
Firms and markets in the national contexts. (London: Sage). 
Laurent, A. (1983). The cultural diversity of western conceptions of management., International 
Studies of Management and Organizations, vol. XI 11, no. 1-2 Spring/Summer: 75-96. 
Lawrence, P. (1980). ' Managers and management in tFest Germany. (Croorn Helm: London). 
Lawrence, P. R. & J. W. Lorsch. (1969). Developing organizations: diagnosis and action. (Reading. 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing) 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New 
Product Development, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13. 
Levinthal, D. and March, J. (1993). The Myopia of Leaming,, 31rategic Management Journal, Vol. 14. 
Levitt, T., (1983). The global isat ion of markets. Harvard Business Review, May/Junc 
Lewin, K., (1947). Frontiers in group dynamics, concept, method and reality in social science, social 
equilibria and social change. Human Relations, Nr. 1. 
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science. 1w. D. P. Cartwright& Alvin Zander (Eds. ), Group 
dynamics, research and theory. (New York: Harper Row). 
Lewin, K. (1952). Group decision and social change. In: G. E. Swanson, T. N. Newcomb& E. L. Hartley (Eds. ). Readings in social psychology (rev. ed) (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston). 
Lipsey, R. (1987). An Introduction to Positive Economics 6* Edition. Wendenfcld & Nicholson: 
London 
Lincoln Y. & Guba E. (1985), Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA 
Lindlof T. R., (1994), Qualitative Communication Research Methods, Sage, Thousand Oak, CA. USA 
Lorn i A. (1996) Ecological Theories of Organizations: Theories Methods and Empirical Results. 
Handout ERASMUS University June 12 1996. 
Lutbatkin M., (1987) Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 8 
Luthans, F. (1992). Organizational behavior 6th edition. (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, International 
edition). 
Mahoney, J. (1995). The Management of Resources and the Resource of Management. Journal of 
Business Research, Vol. 33. 
March, J. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organisational Learning, Organisational Science, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, February. 
Marcuse, H. (1960). Studies in Critical Philosophy. Beacon Press: Boston. 
Marshall C. & G. B. Rossman (1989), Designing Qualitative Research, Sage, London 
Marshall, A. (1965). Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan. 
Marshall, N. (1997). Binary histories, post-socialist transformations and changing work organisation: 
Insight from the Eastern German automotive sector. CD-ROM Proceedings ofthe 1997 
EGOS Conference, Budapest. 
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, July 1943: 370-396. 
Mason, R. And Mitroff, 1. (198 1). Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions. New York: Wiley- 
Interscience, 
Maurice, M., A. Sorge & M. Warner. (1980). Societal differences in organizing manufacturing units: A 
comparison of France, West Germany and Great Britain. Organizational Studies, 1/1: 59-86. 
MayoE. (1933). The human problems ofan industrial civilization. (London: McMillan). 
Mc Namara, P. And Baden-Fuller, C. (1997). Three Traps Facing Knowledge Exploitation in Firms, 
Eastern Academy ofManagement Conference Proceedings. 
Millar C. C. J. M.. (1994). Attitudes and views of female consumers in Central and Eastern Europen 
249 
economics in transition. Research in consumer behaviour, Vol. 7. 
Millar C. C. J. M.. (1997). "Culture & Organisation: the case of Transmanchc Link". Internal presentation 
to City University Business School staff & postgraduate students. 
Millar, J. (1979). British management Vs. German management: A comparison oforganisational 
effectiveness in British and lVest Germanjactories. (Famborough). 
Miller, D. & P. H. Friesen, (1980). Organisations: a quantum view. Prcritice-11all: Englewood Cliffs, NJ 
Miller, D., (1993). The architecture of simplicity. Academy ofAlanagement Review. Volume 18, # 1. 
Mills C. W. (1939), 'Language Logic & Culture'. American Sociological Review, Oclober'39, quoted 
in Deutscher 
Mintzberg, H. (1975). 'The Manager's Job: Folklore or Fact'. Ilarvard Business Review. JutylAugust 
1975, pp. 49-61. 
Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power in andaroundorganisations. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall). 
Mintzberg, H., (1983). Structure infive: Designing effective organisations. Prcnticellall: Englewood 
Cliff, NJ. 
Mintzberg, H., (1990). Strategy formation: Schools of thought. Irr. Frederickson, J. W. (Ed. ). 
Perspectives on Strategic Management. Harper & Row: New York. 
Mintzberg H. & J. Waters, (1985). Of strategies deliberate and emergent. Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 6 
Mirvis P. H., A. L. Sales (1984), 'When cultures collide: issues in acquisitions', in Kimberely, J. R. & 
R. E. Quinn (Eds. ) Managing Corporate Transformations, Dow Jones Irwin, New York. 
Mitchell R. E. (1965). "Survey material collected in developing countries: Sampling measurement and 
interviewing obstacles to international comparison. International Social Science Journal 17 
(4). Quoted in Deutscher (1968). 
Montgomery C. A., (1985). Product market diversification and market power. Academy of Management 
Journal, 28: 789-798. 
Morris, M. H., D. L. Davis& J. W. Allen. (1994). Fostering corporate entrepreneurship: cross-cultural 
comparisons of the importance of individualism versus collectivism. Journal ofInternational 
Business Studies, First Quarter, 1994. 
Nadler, D. A., J. R. Hackman & E. E. Lawler, (1979). Managing Organizational Behavior. (Boston. 
Mass.: Little Brown). 
Nahavandi A. & A. R. Malekzadeh (1988), Acculturation in Mergers & Acquisitions, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 13, No. 1. 
Nelson R. R. & S. G. Winter, (1982). An evolutionary theory ofeconomic change. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, MA 
Nonaka 1, (199 1), The Knowledge Creating Company, Ilarvard Business Review, Nov/Dec 
Nonaka 1. / Takeuchi H. (1995), The Knowledge Creating Company, Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
Nonaka, I (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organisational Knowledge Creation, Organisation Science, 
, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, February. 
Nordstrom K. A. / J-E Vahlne (1992), Is the Globe Shrinking? Psychic Distance and the establishment 
of Swedish Sales Subsidiaries during the last 100 years. Paper at the International Trade & 
Finance Association, Laredo, Texas. 
O'Connell J. M. (1985), Business Week, pp 88.100, cited in J. P. Walsh (1989), Doing a deal: Merger 
and Acquisition Negotiations and their impact upon Target Company Top Management, 
Strategic Management Journal, 7, pp 119-140 
O'Grady S. / H. W. Lane (1996), ' The Psychic Distance Paradox", Journal ofInternational Business 
Studies, 2nd Quarter pp. 309-333. 
Open University (1973), Research Afethods Training Pack, Open University, Milton Keynes 
Orr, J. (1990). Sharing Knowledge, Celebrating Identity: Community Memory in a Service Culture. In 
Middleton, D, and Edwards. D. (Editors), Collective Remembering, Newbury Park: Sage. 
Ouchi, W. G. (1981). TheoryZ (NewYork: Avon). 
Parkha, A. (199 1). Interfirin diversity, organizational Icarning, logevity in global alliances. Journal of 
International Business Studies 2214: 579-601 
Parsons, T. (1956). Suggestions for a sociological approach to the theory of organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly I (June 1956: 63-85) 
Pearce J.; Branyicki 1. & Branacsi G. (1994). Person based rewards systems, a theory of organistitional 
rewards practices in reform-communist organisations. Journal of Organk-ational Behavior 
15: 261-282 1 
Pendler M, Burgoyne J., Boydell T. (1991). The Learning Company, McGraw Hill, New York 
250 
Pcnnings H, (1996), Handout at the ERASMUS 1996 PhD Course 
Penrose, E. (1959). The Theory ofihe Growth ofthe Firm, Basil Blackwell: Oxford. 
Pentland, B. And Rueter, H. (1994). Organisational Routines as Grammars of Action. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 39. 
Peters, T. J. & R. H. Waterman. (1982). In search of excellence: lessonsfrom Amcrica's best-run 
companies. (New York: Harper-Row). 
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. (Marshfield Mass.: Pitman Publishing: 1-32) 
Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited. 
Porter, M. E., (1979). How competing forces shape strategy. Harvard Business Review. AfarchlApril 
pp. 96-104. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. Free Press, NY. 
Porter, M. E. (1997). From competitive advantage to competitive strategy. Harvard Business Review. 56 
(3), 2846. 
Prahalad, C. K.. & R. A. Bettis (1986). The dominant logic: A new linkage between diversity and 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 7: 485-501. 
Pucik, V. (1988). Strategic alliance, organizational learning and competitive advantage: The IIRM 
agenda. Human Resource Management 2711: 77-93. 
Quinn, J. B. (1978), 'Strategic Change: Logical Incrcmentalism', Sloan Management Review. No. 20. 
Randelsome, C.; W. Brierley; K. Bruton; C. Gordon-, P. King, (1993). Business Cultures In Europe. 
2nd Edition, London: Butterworth-Heinemann 
Robson, C., (1993). Real WorldResearch. Blackwell: Oxford. 
Ronen S. & 0. Schcnkar. (1985). Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: A review and 
synthesis. Academy of Management Review, July 1985. San Fransisco 
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, structure and economic performance. Cambridge: t larvard University 
Press 
Schachter S. et al,. (195 1). An experimental study of cohesiveness and productivity. Human Relations, 
August 1951: 229-239. 
Scheider P. (199 1), The German Comedy, Scenes of Life after the Wall. I. B. Tauris Co. London & New 
York. 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organkational culture and leadership. (San Fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass: 1.22). 
Schweiger D. M. & J. P. Walsh (1990), 'Mergers and Acquisitions: An Interdisciplinary View', 
Research in Personnel and Human ResourcesManagement. Vol. 8 
Selznick, P. (1949). TVA and the grass roots. (Berkley CA: University of Cal ifornia Press). 
Senge P. M. (1990), The 51h Discipline. The Art and Practice ofthe Learning Organisation. 
Doubleday, N. Y. 
Shafritz J. M. & J. S. Ott. (1987). Classics oforgankational theory. (Chicago, I L: Dorsey Press, 2nd 
edition). 
Shane, S. (1994). The effect of national culture on the choice between licensing and direct foreign 
investment. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15: 627-642. 
Shrallow D. A. (1985), Managing the integration of acquired operations, Journal of Business StrateQ-. 
Volume 6, No. 1. 
Shrivastava R. (1986), 'Postmergcr I ntcgration', Journal of Business Strategy, 7/1. 
Silverinan, D. (1970). The TheoryofOrganisations. BasicBooks: NY 
Simon, H. (1991). Bounded Rationality and Organisational Learning, Organisation Science, Vol. 2. 
Simon, H. A. (1946). The proverbs of administration. Public Administration Review, 6 Winter 1946. 
Singh, H. & Montgomery, C. A. (1987). Corporate acquisition strategies and economic performance: A 
comparison of firms with difTerent levels of performance. Strategic Alanagement Journal, 8, 
377-386. 
Sinn, H-W(1995). Staggering along: wages policy and investment support in East Germany. The 
Economics of Transition, Volume 3, No. 4. European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Slatter, S. (1984). Corporate recovery: A gukle to turnaround management. Penguin, Harmondsworth 
Smith A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes ofthe wealth ofnations. Reprinted 1M (New 
York: Random House, Modem Library Edition, 1937). 
Smith, P. B. (1992). Organisational Behaviour and National Culture. British Journal of Management, 3 
Soendergaard, M. (1994). Research note: Hofstcde's consequences -A study of reviews, citations and 
replications. Organization Studies, 15/3: 447456. 
Spender, J-C, (1992). Limits to learning from the west: how western advice may prove limited in Eastern 
Europe. In: The intemational executive. Wiley: London: 389453 
251 
Stewart, R. plus four others, (1994). Managing In Britain and Germany. (London: NI acm i Ilan, St. 
Martin's Press). 
Stigler, G. (1968). The Economics of Information. In Stigler, G. The Organisation ofinditstry, 
Homewood: Irwin. 
Stopford, J. M. & C. Baden-Fuller, 1992. Rejuvenating the mature business. Routlcdge: London 
Stradling, A. (1989). Beyond the wall: the other Germany. European Business review. Nr. 4. 
Strebel P. (1994), 'Choosing the Right Change Path, California Management Review. Winter edition. 
Taylor, F. W. (1911). Scientific Management. Reprinted im (Harper & Row, 1947: 39-73) 
Teecc, D. (1977). Technology Transfer by Mu Itinational Finns: The Resource Cost of Transferring 
Technological Know-How. The Economic Journal, Vol. 87. 
Teece, D., Pisano, G. and Schuen, A. (1990). Finn Capabilities, Resources and the Concept of Strategy. 
Consortium on Competitiveness and Co-operation Working Paper #90-9, University of 
California at Berkeley, Centre for Research in Management, Berkeley, CA. 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action. (London: McGraw-Hill: 3-24) 
Thomson, J. N. (1996). Take-overs and acculturation: Linkages from East German privatisations to 
workforce integration. Journal ofEastern Europe Management Studies, tlol. 1. Number 4: 25- 
46. 
Thomson, J. N. & P. Me Namara (1997). Two-way learning in west/cast mergers: Short term and long 
term viewpoints. CD-ROAI conference paper, EGOS Colloquium, Budapest, July 3-5. 
Thomson, J. N. & P. Me Namara (1998). Companies which came in from the cold: Lessons from 
mergers and acquisitions in East Germany. Internal City University 1york-ing Paper. 
Tolbert P. S. & L. G. Zucker (1983). 'Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of 
Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28: 22-39 
Tushman, M. L. & E. Romenalli (1994). Organizational Transformation as Punctuated 
Equilibrium: An Empirical Test. Academy ofAfanagement Journal, Vol. 37. No. 5. pp. 114 1- 
1166. 
University of Bath, (1995). Research Methods Course Handout, David Birks. 
Valentine, V. & M. Evans (1993). "The dark side of the onion: rethinking the meaning of rational and 
emotional responses". Journal of Alarket Research Society, Vol. 35 (2). 
Van der Ven, H. (1986). Central problems in the management of innovation. Management Science, A 
32 
Van Maanen, J. (1988), Talesfi-om thefield: On writing ethnography, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL 
Very, P.; M. Lubatkin; R. Calori (1996). A cross-national assessment of acculturative stress in recent 
European mergers. International Studies of. 4fanagement and Organisation, Vol. 26, Number 
1: 59-86 
Very, P.; M. Lubatkin; R. Calori & J. Vega (1997). Relative standing and the performance of recently 
acquired european firms. Strategic Management Journal. Volume 18: 8, pp. 593-614. 
Villinger, R. (1996). Post acquisition managerial learning in Central East Europe. Organi--ational 
Studies, 17/2: 261-282 
Walsh, J. P. (1988). Top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol 9: 173-183. 
Walter G. A. (1985), 'Culture Collisions in Mergers& Acquisitions', In Organisational CultureP. J. 
Frost et al. (Eds. ) 
Weber, M. (1922). Max Weber: EssaysinsocioloQ% Edited and translated by H. H. Gcrth and C. Wright 
Mills (Oxford University Press, 1946). 
Weber, M., (1924). The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organisation. IM Organisation Theory. D. 
Pugh (Editor), Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 
Weick, K. E. (1991). The non-traditional quality of organisational learning. Organi: atlonalScience, 
2/1: 16- 124 
Wernefelt B. (1984). 'A Resource Based View of the Firm'Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 5, pp. 
171-180. 
Whitley, R.; Jacklie M.; Hoccvar M. (1997). Success without shock therapy in Eastern Europe: The 
case of Slovenia. WZB Berlin Presentation, Feb. 
Whittington, R., (1993). What is strategyfor and does it matter. Routlcdge: London 
Wilson, D. (1992). A Strategy of Change: Concepts and controversies in the managcment ofthange. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Wittgenstein, L., (1953). Philosophical Investigations. (translation G. E. M. Ansombe), Blackwell: 
252 
Oxford. 
Yaw, D. J., (1994). MBA dissertation: Managing Corporate Change in anew Market Economy: Case 
Study of an Engineering Services Firm in Eastern Germany, ticnicy Management College. 
Brunei University. 
Yin R. K. (1989), Case Study Research, Second Edition, Sage Publishing, New York 
Yung, C. G. (1933). Psychological Types. Harcourt, Brace & Co.: NY 
Bibliography German Language Literature 
Aderhold, J. et al (1994). Von der Betriebs- zur Zweckgemeinschaft. (Berlin: Sigma). 
Alt, R.; Althaus et al (1993). Wandel von Arbeitsbezichungen und Sozialpolitik in osideutschen 
Betrieben. In: Zwischenbericht an die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Universität, 
Tübingen. 
Alt, R; Bishoff; Lang, R., SOKULT9O-Projekt, (1991). Universität Leipzig. 
Altschuh, E.; Schultz/Gambard (1993): Denk- und Führungsstile von Managern in Ost und 
Westdeutschland. Aktuelle Beiträge zur Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung 6. 
Arbeitgemeinschaft deutscher Wirtschaftswissenschftler Forschungsinstitute e. V. (1997) Die Lage der 
Weltwirtschaft und der dhischen Wirtschaft im Fruhjahr 199 7 
AssmannG; Backhaus, K&HilkerJ. (Eds. )(1991). Deutsch-DeutscheUnternehmen. Pocschei 
Verlag: Stuttgart 
Bode E. & C. Kriegen-Boden (1990). Sektorale Strukturprobleme der ; Virtschaft in den neuen 
Bundesländern. Die Weltwirtschaft, lleft 2. 
Bohring, G. & K. Ladensack (1986). Leiter und Leiterverhalten. (Berlin: Dietz). 
Dittmar, N. (1997). Die langsame Wende beim sprechen. Irr The Berliner Zeitung, 12.03.1997: Vi. 
FreselHilligloh(1994)! nTromsdorffG. (Editor), PsychologischeAspekledesso. -1o-polltisclien ;; andclv 
in Ostdeutschland. de Gruyt-. r Verlag, (1994), Berlin 
Friedrich, W. (1990). FührungskräfteundGründungspotentialeinderehemaligenDDR. (Kerpen: 
WSF). 
Gaulhofer, M. &J. Sydow(1991). KooperationvonOst-undwestdeutschenUnternchmungen: 
Strukturelle und kulturelle Probleme. Ln: zfo Ileft 3: 15 1. 
Glotz, P.; K. Ladensack, (1994). Personeller Wandel im Management ostdeutscher Unternehmen. In 
preparation. (Freiberg: Merseburg). 
Glotz, P.; K. Ladensack (1995), Reorganisation des Managements in ausgewiessenen Organisationen in 
den neuen Bundesländer, Forschungsbericht FFI-92-75-1, Freiberg 
Günther, U. (1990). Vom Leitungskader zum Manager 
- 
ostdeutsche Führungskräfte im Wandel. in: 
Kommunikationskultur zind. 4rbeitsweit. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag: 94-101). 
Hein, C. (1992). Irr "The Abendschau", ZDF Television, 11 December 1992. 
Hentze, J. & J. Lindert (1992). Manager im Vergleich. (Bern/Stuttgart: Haupt). 
Iluck. (1990). Menschenführung Ehrensache 
- 
DDR-Manager in Personlichkeitstest. Ln: Demmcr C. 
Management Wissen, Vol. 9: 94-96 
Icks, A. (1992). Mittelständerische Unternehmen als Qualifizierungspaten. Schriften zur 
Mittelstandforschung. (Stüttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel). 
Ifb-InstitutfürWirtschaft, München, (1991). BaubedarfindenneuenBundesländernbis2003. 
Köhler A. (1997), Ln; Berliner Zeitung, 03.06.1997 
Ladensack, K&P. Glotz(1996). PersonalcntwicklungbeiUntemehmenimTumaround. Personal, 
November 
LangR. (1997). Speechtotheopeningoftliell10stForum. ChemnitzMarch. 
Lang, R. (1994). Führungskräfte inOstdeutschland: Forschungsbericht zum Projekt SOKULT 92. 
Arbeitspapier 03. Technische Universität Chemnitz-Zwickau 
Lindert K. / J. Hentze (1992), Manager in Ostdeutschland und Ost Europa, 1 laupt Verlag 0 Lüdemann, M., Sourisseaux; Wagner (1994). Eine kulturbewußt-systematische Bildungsbedarfsanalyse 
in beiden Teilen Deutschlands. Ln: Kornbichter & llartwich (Editors). Kommunikationskultur 
und Arbeitswelt. pp. 53-68. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag). 
Luther, P.; G. Wöllner(1993). FührtingseigenschaftenvonUnternehmernindenneuenBundesländern. 
Gesellschaft für Mittelstandl'orschung und Personatentwicklung e. V., Berlin. 
Maaz, H-J. (1990). Der Gefühlistau. Knaur Verlag: M ünchen 
Maaz, H-J. (1993). Das Gestürzte tlolk: Die unglückliche Einheit. Knaur Verlag: München 
Maaz, H-J. (1994). Die Entrüstung: Deutschland. DeutschlandStasi, Schuld undSünderbock Knaur 
Verlag: München 
253 
Maeck, U. B. (1993). FührungsverhaltenindenneuenundaltenBundeslandcmutiddieKonscquenzcn 
für die Personalentwicklung 
-eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der norddeutschen 
Metallindustrie. Diss., Universität, Rostock. 
Maier, H. (1993). Der Innovationsirägheit der Plan*ýe-irtscliaft In der DDR 
- 
Ursachen und Folgen. hr, 
Deutschlandarchiv 26,: 806-818. 
Makhoul, H. (1988). Die Berücksichtigung von Erfordernissen einer wirksamen Leitcrtätigk-eit bei der 
Analyse und Gestaltung der Aufbauorganisation der Leitung in sozialistischen 
Industriebetrieben. Diss. A, Universität Leipzig. 
Marchazina, K.; Wolf, L; Döbbler (1993). Werthaltungen in den neuen Bundesländern: Strategien für 
das Personalmangement. (Wiesbadcn: Gabler). 
Markowski, B. (1989). Die Motivation der Leitungskader in Industriebetrieben in Paten und in der 
DDR. Diss. A, Universität Leipzig. 
Mernorandum'92, Alternative Political Workgroup (1992) 
Müller D. (1993), 'The wall in the heads' Anthropological Joumal on European Cultures. Giordano CJ 
1. M. Greverus (Eds. ). Vol. 2, No. 1. 
Müller D. (1994), 'Macht und Disziplin', Historische Anthropologie 
- 
Kultur, Gesellschaft. Alltag. 2 
Jahrgang, Heft 1. Lüdkte A. / U. Luig (Eds. ). 
Myritz, R. (1993). Managerkompetenzen ostdeutscher Führungskräfte: Defizite im Führungsverhalten 
und auf sozialem Gebiet. J il: Personal, Vol. 1: 10- 13. 
Peisker, M. (1985). Theoretische und methodische Probleme der Ausprägung eines 
leitungsstufenbezogenen Leiterverhaltens. Diss. A. Universität Leipzig. 
Projekt Interkult, (Hermann, T.. G. Wirant (1994). Ergebnisse zum Projekt Interkult 
- 
Deutsche 
Stichprobe. TU Chemnitz-Zwickau, Internes Material. 
RWI Konjunkturbericht, Jahrgang 47 (1996), lieft 2. 
SchifferH-W. (1995). Energiemarkt BRD. TÜV: Köln 
Schmittberger, M. (1994). Wandel im Selbstbild und Führungsprofil von ostdeutschcn Führungskräften 
- 
Forschungsdesign zur Förderung not-wendiger Kompetenzen. In: Kombichler &, 1 lartwich 
(Editors). Kommunikationskultur und Arbeitswelt. pp. 269-295. 
Sinn, 11-W, (1994). VolkswirtschaftlIche Probleme der Deutschen Vereinigung, Westdeutscher Verlag, 
Düsselsdorf 
Spiegel, 03.07.1995,27/3. Das Ost-Gefühl: Heimweh nach der alten Ordnung 
Stachle, W. H., (1 994), Mehr-Ebene Analysis in Alanagement, 7th Edition, München 
Stieler, B. Ln: Denisow, K. & B. Stieler, (1992). Der Funktions- und Organisationswandel von der 
KaderpolitikzurPersonalwirtschaft. Forschungsbericht, (Berlin: n&oRtscarchGmbli). 
Stobbe Ln: Henkel, R. C. (199 1). Zwistigkeit und Frust und Fremdheit. Manager Magazin Nr. 1: 162. 
170. 
Stollberg, B. (1988). Einstellungen%onLeiternzudenLeiter-Mitarbeiter-Bezichungenunterdem 
Aspekte der Integration der Mitarbeiter in das soziale Geschehen des Arbeitikollektivs. IJI: 
Informationen zur soziologischen Forschung in der DDR, Vol. 2. (Berlin: Akademie für 
Gessellschaft Wissenschaft: 19-29) 
Stratemann, I. (1992). PsychologischeAspektedeswirtschaftlichenWiederaufbausindcrincuen 
Bundesländern. (Stüttgart: Hochgrefe). 
Tack, K. (1992). Managemcnt-Traiiiing für Führungskräfte. In: Myritz R. (Editor), Manager in 
Ostdeutschland. Eine Dokumentation von Chancen und Risiken in der betrieblichen 
Personalarbeit von Unternehmen i der neuen Bundesländern. (Köln: Deutscher Instituts 
Verlag: 143-159). 
Thomas, A. (1994). Kulturelle Divergcnzen in deutsch-deutschen Wirtschaftskooperation. I : 
Komblicher & Hartwig (Editors). Kommunikationskultur nd Arbeitsweit. (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag: 42-52). 
Treuhandanstalt (1994), THA Abschlußbericht, 31.12.1994. 
Trommsdorff, G. Editor (1994). Psychologische Aspekte des sozio-politischen Wandels in 
Ostdeutschland, e Gruyier-Verlag, Berlin. 
Volkamp, U. & V. Wittke, (1991). Aus Modernisicrungsblockaden werden Abwärtsspiralcn. JW, 
BerlinerJournalfürSoziologie, 1: 17-39 
Vorweg, M. (1966). Sozialpsychologische Strukturanalysen des Kollektives. (Berlin) 
Wagner, K. (1986). DieBezichungzwishenBildung, BeshafligungundProductivität: eindeutsch- 
englischer Vergleich. (Berlin). 
Walter A.; T. Stegeretal(1994). EvaluierungvonQualirikationsprozessenfürdieGruppenleiterder 
VW Sachsen Gmbil, Mosel 
- 
1. Ergebnisbericht zum Projekt (1 Phase). TU Chemnitz- 
254 
Zwickau. 
Wolf et al (1986) In: Radig, C. Wertorientierungen und Lebenseinstellungen von Leitern. Diss. A, 
Universität Leipzig. 
Wunderer, R. (1990). Führungs- und personalpolitische Gedanken zum Übergang von der Plan. ur 
Marktwirtschaft. Kommentar Ln: von Eckhardstein, D. et al (Editors). Personalwirtschaftliche 
Probleme in DDR-Betrieben. (Mering: flampp) 
Wuppertaler Kreis Eds. (1992). Füllrungsverständnis in Ost und West. Ergebnisse eine Befragungvon 
Führungskräften. Köln. 
255 
Table 3-8 
Empirical Studies about East German Management 
before and after Reunification 
Pre-Reunification 8 studies 
Vorweg(1966) 1965 
Bergleiter (1967) 
Peisker (1985) 
Wolf et al (1986) 
Bohring/Ladensack 
(1986) 
Makhoul (1988) 
circa 1965/66 
1982/83 
1972-83 
circa 1983-85 
1986/87 
Stollberg (1988) 
Markowski (1989) 
Post-Unification 
Friedrich (1990) 
Huck(1990) 
Wunderer (1990) 
Stobbe (199 1) 
Alt/Bishoff/Lang 
SOKULT90 (1991) 
Kienbaurn (199 1) 
Gaulhofer/Sydow'91 
G anther (1990) 
Wuppertaler Kreis 
(1992) 
Icks (1992) 
Stieler ( 1992) 
Tack (1992) 
Stratemann (1992) 
Myritz (1993) 
Machazinal/Wolf/DOb 
bier (1993) 
Alt/Althaus et al 
(1993) 
Altschuh/Schultz/Gam 
bard (1993) 
Luther/W61 Iner (1993) 
Maeck (1993) 
Walter/Steger et al 
(1994) 
Glotz/Ladensack 
(1993) 
Thomas (1994) 
LUdemann/Sourisseau 
x/Wagner (1994) 
Scmittberger (1994) 
Aderhold et al (1994) 
Projekt Interkult 
(Hermann/Wirant 
(1994) 
1987/88 
1987/88 
26 Studies 
Relationships and potential of the Top functionaries in 
Kombines 
Job content details of Division Chiefs 
Management Behaviour and time management 
Management values and satisfaction 
Organisational and managerial leaming in the introduction 
of new procedures 
Organisational functions, time management of Divisional 
Chiefs when creating a new organisational structure 
Cooperation and relationships within the leadership 
collective 
Values and attitudes including demotivating factors 
1990 Management leadership and organisational qualifications 
circa 1990 Personality traits of Western and Eastern managers 
1990 Management style 
1990 Personality traits of candidates for management positions 
1990 Management content, style, values and satisfaction 
1991 Attitudes and behaviour of top managers 
1990/91 Management values in East/West cooperations 
1990 Training, political background, motivation of top managers 
1991 Differences in management actions between West and East 
1990/91 Examination of specialists from East Germany in training in 
West German Alittelstand organisations 
1990-92 Values of managers 
after the Wende Knowledge, ability, need for training. self confidcnce of 
middle management 
1991 Personal motivation 
1992 Qualifications and competence of top management 
1991 Values of managers, workers and unemployed 
1992/93 Examination of non-management personnel strategies to 
overcome change from plan to market economy firms 
1989/90 Management behaviour and thought processes 
1991/2 Leadership in firms 
1992/3 Management behaviour, style and organisational knowledge 
1993 Group leaders behavior, values and satisfaction 
1993 Structure of management in East German companies: 
background and leadership successes 
after the Wende East German cultural standards in East-West cooperation 
circa 1991/2 Shift leaders! cultural values, training needs 
1993 Biography and values 
1992-93 Management style 
1994 Managerial Values and styles 
* Lang 0 994) 
256 
